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ABSTRACT 
 
ERIK KINJI GODWIN: Transaction Costs, Discretion, and Policy Control 
(Under the direction of Virginia Gray) 
 
 
This research evaluates the utility of applying the transaction cost approach to 
questions of political control over bureaucratic policy.  The transaction cost approach to 
political decision-making generates two predictions that, if accurate, add considerably to the 
study of bureaucratic policymaking.  First, the theory predicts that a principal’s willingness 
to influence bureaucratic policy will decrease as the transaction costs of doing so increase.  
This suggests that principals can obtain strategic advantages in battles over bureaucratic 
policy by selectively increasing the transaction costs of policy control to political rivals.  
Second, a principal may prefer that the bureaucracy refrain from any new policy action when 
the transaction costs of policy control become too expensive during periods of divided 
government.  In its extreme form, such a pattern would result in bureaucratic gridlock.  
I empirically test both predictions using a new dataset of all federal regulations that 
underwent White House review between 1981 and 2005.   The results strongly support the 
model.  The President is significantly less willing to influence federal regulatory policy when 
the transaction costs of policy control are increased by the presence of either statutory or 
judicial deadlines.   Perhaps even more significantly, split-party control of Congress reduces 
the number of the most important regulations on the federal agenda by 33 percent. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
TRANSACTION COSTS, THE BUREAUCRACY, AND  
THE POLITICS OF POLICY CHANGE 
 
During a stint in Clinton's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) I represented 
the White House interests in the design of federal regulations.  One of the primary functions 
of OMB was to ensure that agency policymaking remained consistent with presidential 
preferences.  Perhaps the job's biggest surprise was just how difficult that seemingly simple 
goal was to accomplish.  Even at points in the policymaking process designed to maximize 
presidential power other actors could make it very difficult, and sometimes impossible, for 
the White House to reliably control agency policymaking.  Bureaucratic policy was 
consistently shaped by forces outside the White House, including the efforts of Congress, the 
courts, and the agencies themselves.  Later, as a lobbyist specializing in executive branch 
systems, it became clear to me just how many elements affect who wins and who loses when 
the bureaucracy crafts policy.  "Controlling" bureaucratic output sounds like a mundane task, 
but at times it felt like the downhill side of an avalanche.   
In the spring of 1998, seven members of an EPA negotiating team sat in one of the 
White House conference rooms.  They were there for the final round of the White House 
review of a regulation containing three provisions that the Clinton Administration strongly 
opposed.  Across the table were two White House analysts – an environmental scientist and 
myself – in charge of the review.  As the discussion turned to the disputed provisions, the 
EPA program director shifted forward and repeated what he had already said a dozen times: 
"There isn't anything that we can do.  The authorizing statute specifically prohibits us from 
making those changes even if we wanted to."  EPA's preferences were entirely in line with 
the statutory requirements, in no small part because EPA staff had written a significant 
portion of the statutory language.  Because the agency could use the statute for political cover 
the White House was forced to concede.  Despite strong Administration opposition, EPA 
obtained precisely the policy it desired.   
Two weeks later, the same EPA and White House teams disagreed on another issue.  
Despite a call from the Senate committee chair and follow-up pressure from his staff, we (the 
White House) were able to dictate policy to EPA with relatively little effort.  Two executive 
orders already framed the limits of executive branch intentions, and we identified the issue 
early enough to steer its development.  What explained the difference in outcomes?  The 
overall political climate on environmental issues had not changed in the intervening 
fortnight, but the regulation-specific variables had changed sufficiently such that the balance 
of power was reversed.  I spent the next decade as a White House analyst, a federal 
contractor, and an industry lobbyist being paid to answer the question at the heart of these 
examples: "When is it possible to move agency policy away from the preferences of the 
House, Senate, or White House?"  A strategy that worked frequently was to follow EPA’s 
approach in the first example above: use one political institution to limit the discretion of 
future actors.   
Why does this work?  What makes this strategy so integral to Washington politics 
that lowly agency contractors, White House staffers, and lobbyists-for-hire are all taught the 
same tactic as part of their jobs.  One of my branch chiefs at OMB had a particularly colorful 
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way of driving the point home.  He would say: “politicians ask the same question before 
pushing for a policy that you asked before taking this job – are the probable benefits worth 
the costs?”   This illustrates how much of the Washington establishment views policy work.  
Each effort by the President, House, or Senate (hereafter the “principals”) to influence policy 
can be thought of as a transaction where a principal “purchases” a policy outcome.  This 
transaction incurs costs and yields benefits.  Thus, a principal will only enter into a policy 
battle when its expected benefits outweigh the anticipated costs.  These entry decisions are 
often complex.  The battles with EPA described above highlight the fact that battles over 
policy implementation may take many forms.  The political terrain changes, resources 
available to the principals fluctuate, and timelines shift.  Maximizing the net benefit of policy 
control over long periods of time requires that the principal realistically value the policy, 
assess the costs, and strategically approach the business of policy design.   
One of the largest cost components for most policies is the degree to which choices 
have been constrained by earlier policy decisions.  Consider the EPA examples.  In the first 
case, Congress used a proscriptive statute to make future White House interference on the 
issue prohibitively expensive.  The President could conceivably have refused EPA’s 
regulation, petitioned Congress to re-write the statute, and then forced the agency to write a 
regulation consistent with White House priorities.  Even had it been possible, however, it 
would have necessitated a truly staggering expenditure of staff resources and political capital.  
In the second example, Congress and the agency conceivably could have overturned the 
White House decision.  Doing so, however, would have taken a considerable toll on both 
Congress and the agency.  It would have required a new statute, no veto, and a new 
regulation from the agency.  Both of these examples demonstrate that one of the best ways to 
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increase the costs to one principal is to use the authority of another principal earlier in the 
process.  The potential for this strategy exists in virtually every policy system.  The 
separation of powers design means that policymaking generally takes the form of multi-stage 
processes in which multiple principals have the opportunity to engage in the debate.  From a 
practical standpoint, the goal becomes one of raising the costs of future actions by one’s 
opponents and lowering those costs to one’s allies.     
Within the universe of policy systems, the implementing decisions made by the 
bureaucracy are among the most interesting for the following reason – one principal can use 
the bureaucratic apparatus to control another principal.  This seems to run against 
democratic theory.  After all, the bureaucracy has no formal authority over the President, 
House, or Senate, and this would seem to place the bureaucracy in a permanently inferior 
position.  Nevertheless, one elected principal can use bureaucratic systems to constrain 
another elected institution.  For example, the White House frequently inserts its preferences 
into agency actions that become legal precedent.  This creates a problem for the 
congressional committees that want a different outcome, as the only way to override the 
policy is for Congress to write a new statute that clearly specifies how the new rule is to be 
written.  Not only is generating such a statute expensive, but the new bill would be a prime 
candidate for a presidential veto.  By forcing the implementation arm of the federal 
government onto one track the President made it more difficult for Congress to alter that 
policy.  Congress enjoys similar advantages.  By allocating budgetary funds to specific 
agency programs it increases the costs to the administration of pushing a different policy 
agenda in those agencies.    
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The idea of competing principals warring on the field of bureaucracy policy 
continued to fascinate me when I turned to an academic career.  Construed broadly, I am 
interested in the extent to which one principal can use bureaucratic systems to limit the 
policymaking authority of other principals in later stages of the policy process.  Political 
Science has not yet developed a general theory or model that describes this process or 
predicts when it will occur.  With the exception of a handful of studies, sixty years of 
research on bureaucratic oversight did a fine job of providing over-simplified principal-agent 
models that often bear little resemblance to actual policymaking in Washington.   
 
Why Study Bureaucratic Oversight? 
Political scientists study the success and failure of bureaucratic oversight for a 
number of reasons.  First, the question of who actually controls the implementation stage of 
policymaking has significant implications for theories of representation.  Who is making 
decisions about grant allocations, regulations, and enforcement actions, elected officials or 
unelected bureaucrats?  If the answer is the latter, then what guarantee do we have that 
governing decisions reflect the desires of the electorate?  Second, when Congress, the 
President, and the agencies disagree over bureaucratic outputs, who wins and under what 
circumstances?  This set of questions is of particular interest to those who employ the new 
institutionalism perspective.  Finally, are some policy areas more responsive to certain types 
of pressure than others?  If so, are there structural aspects that can be recreated in other 
policy areas?  Special interests, government bureaucrats, politicians, and political scientists 
spend considerable resources investigating the answers to these questions.    
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Research on Bureaucratic Oversight 
American politics has a long history of examining the uneasy relationship between 
elected officials and the unelected bureaucracy (see Cushman 1941; Ogul 1976).  The 
scrutiny is reasonable given that the authority of the federal bureaucracy presents a potential 
threat to the goals of representative democracy and to the effectiveness of political entities.  
Federal bureaucrats are not elected, yet their decisions have considerable effects on domestic 
and international policy.  This raises the question of who is in charge of federal policy.  If the 
politicians are in charge and the bureaucracy selects outcomes that are consistent with those 
of the elected institutions then no problem exists – the preferences of the electorate are taken 
into account and politicians can be held accountable for policy.  Conversely, the electoral 
connection is severed if the agencies craft policy based upon their own preferences rather 
than those of their political principals.  I am most interested in a third, more subtle possibility 
– that the bureaucracy generates policy that systematically favors one political institution 
over another in ways not intended by the system of checks and balances.  For example, if the 
courts control agency policymaking to a disproportionate degree the federal system is 
certainly not functioning as intended.  In sum, research on bureaucratic oversight has 
consistently sought to answer the question, “who controls bureaucratic policymaking?” 
 
The Need to Delegate and the Definition of Discretion 
Why is there any doubt about who controls the bureaucracy?  The answer lies in the 
need to delegate authority to the agencies.  Principals rarely dictate policy so completely that 
agency influence is completely removed.  This creates opportunities for the policies that 
agencies implement to differ from the policies intended by the principals.  The degree to 
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which the two can differ depends in part upon how much authority the principals delegated to 
the agencies.  Measuring delegated authority is most easily done by evaluating the amount of 
policymaking discretion granted to the bureaucracy by the principals (McCubbins 1985; 
Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989; Bawn 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Shipan 
2004).   Efforts to operationalize discretion have run the gamut from ex ante measures of an 
“agency’s potential to drift from legislative intent” (Bawn 1995), to ex post evaluations of 
“the departure of agency decisions from the positions agreed upon by the executive and 
legislature at the time of delegation” (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989).  In terms of 
evaluating how one principal controls another, Bawn’s ex ante measure (expanded to include 
all principals) provides a cleaner theoretical look at a principal’s decision to engage in the 
policy process given existing constraints.  This is particularly the case when examining a 
principal’s response to the ex ante controls put in place by other principals earlier in the 
policy process.   
Delegation of discretion occurs for a number of reasons.  One possibility is that 
principals find it politically expedient to take credit for a publicly popular policy while 
sticking the agencies with the unpopular task of implementation.  In these instances, 
delegation allows the principals to take credit (e.g., clean air) while avoiding the negative 
backlash resulting from the inevitable costs of implementation (Lowi 1967; Fiorina 1982; but 
see Bawn 1995).  This implies that Congress does not care overmuch about the policy itself, 
although it may care a great deal about the credit-claiming opportunities available.  It may 
also work to avoid absorbing too many of the costs of governance.  Kiewiet and McCubbins 
(1991) labeled this possibility the “abdication hypothesis.”   
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Resource scarcity may also compel principals to delegate policymaking authority 
(Moe 1990; Bawn 1995; Huber, Shipan, Pfahler 2001; Shipan 2004).  Policymaking 
generally requires considerable expertise, research, and time.  For example, the debate over 
the disposal of the nation’s high-level nuclear waste in Yucca Mountain, Nevada, has 
occupied hundreds of scientists from five agencies for 20 years.  Congress simply cannot 
duplicate that effort efficiently with the limited staffs available to House and Senate 
committees.  Principals would like to leverage the considerable issue experience, technical 
expertise, and implementation infrastructure housed in the agencies.  Ideally, this would take 
the form of setting the broad normative targets and letting the agencies implement those 
goals.  To do so, however, principals must provide the agency with sufficient authority to 
address the technical issues, deal with time and resource constraints, make mid-course 
corrections, and handle unanticipated problems.  Rigidly-specified constraints imposed on an 
agency reduce its ability to apply its expertise in a flexible, reasonable fashion.  For these 
reasons, delegation of policymaking authority is an integral part of the policy process. 
It is worth noting, however, that delegation is by no means inevitable.  Congress, the 
courts, and the President are perfectly capable of specifying particular policies in great detail 
if they are interested in doing so (see Fiorina 1982).  As Bawn (1995) notes, “delegation is 
not an all-or-nothing decision” (see also McCubbins 1985).  There are certainly reasons not 
to delegate.  Chief among these is the possibility that when a principal delegates authority to 
the agency, the final policy will not look like what the principal intended.  Finally, the 
political credit for some policies accrues at the implementation phase.  Certain grant-giving 
operations and constituent-specific pork barrel allocations are notable examples.   
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In general, however, delegation is the norm.  With delegation comes the risk that the 
implemented outcomes will differ from the principals’ preferred policies.  This dissertation 
investigates what forms that risk takes, how principals address it, and the success that they 
enjoy by limiting a key aspect of agency discretion.   
 
The Twin Natures of Policy “Drift” 
The act of an agency generating policy that shifts the outcomes away from a 
principal’s ideal point is known as “drift” (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989).  From the 
perspective of any given principal, there are two possible sources of drift.1  First, an agency 
may shift outcomes away from the principal’s ideal point if the agency’s policy preferences 
are different from those of the principal.  I refer to this type as agency-driven drift.  Theories 
of agency-driven drift assert that the agency has autonomous policy preferences (Lowery 
2000; Niskanen 1971; Moe 1990; Golden 2000), and that it uses its discretion to push policy 
away from the principal’s preferred option.  For example, EPA is widely believed to have 
actively worked against the environmental agenda of President Reagan during the mid-1980s.  
This is by far the most studied aspect of bureaucratic control.  A multitude of scholars 
discuss attempts by Congress to limit agency-driven drift (see McCubbins 1985; McCubbins 
and Schwartz 1984; Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989; Bawn 1995; Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1999).  Research has also asked how much control the President can exert to 
limit agency-driven drift (see Wood and Waterman 1991, 1993; Cooper and West 1988; Moe 
1982). Regardless of the principal, the problem revolves around a recalcitrant agency actively 
working against its political masters. 
                                                 
1Excluding chance or unintended consequences. 
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The second type of drift – principal-driven drift – occurs when one principal 
struggles against another to control agency outputs.  Unsurprisingly, principals do not always 
agree about what constitutes the best policy outcome.  The separation of powers system 
precludes the possibility that one principal can exercise complete control over the policy 
process within the bureaucracy.  Put another way, no meaningful system of governance at the 
federal level is solely the purview of a single political institution.  Structurally, this increases 
the likelihood that principal-driven drift will appear in those instances when principals 
disagree over policy endpoints (Whitford 2005, Shipan 2004, Wood and Bohte 2004).  
Further, intra-branch principal conflict (e.g., House vs. Senate, committee vs. floor) creates 
significant opportunities for principal-driven drift (Bawn 1997, Shipan 2004).  The challenge 
created by principal-driven drift, then, is for one principal to “lock in” bureaucratic policy 
such that other principals at later stages cannot overturn it.   
 Returning to the central question of this dissertation, can one principal control the 
policy influence of another through the medium of agency policymaking?  The bureaucratic 
oversight literature dealing with this question has been, on the whole, unable to reach a 
conclusion about the viability of the mechanism.  This is largely due to an underspecified 
theoretical approach generated by the path that the literature has taken, which is the subject 
of the next section. 
 
The Bureaucratic Oversight Literature’s Treatment of Drift 
Early on, the bureaucratic oversight literature did not address questions of principal-
driven drift because the general consensus was that the agencies, not the principals, were in 
control of bureaucratic policy.  This precluded the possibility that one principal is using the 
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bureaucracy to control another principal’s policy impact.  In these “strong bureaucracy” 
models agencies are relatively effective at using resource advantages to implement policy 
preferences regardless of the preferences of Congress or the President.  Thus, scholarship 
called into question the efficacy of oversight by political principals (e.g., Dodd and Schott 
1979; Niskanen 1971; Ogul 1976; Wilson 1989; Lowi 1979) to control the bureaucracy.  
Principals appeared to lack either the resources or the political will to consistently check 
agency-driven drift, much less engage in activities designed to limit principal-driven drift.  
Strong bureaucracy models have all but disappeared in the last three decades (Lowery and 
Brasher 2004), gradually giving way to models that reach the opposite conclusion regarding 
bureaucratic power. 
 
The Rise of Principal-Agent Models of Bureaucratic Control 
The change in opinion regarding the strength of the bureaucracy occurred in the 
1980s as scholars employed a new framework to formally model and empirically test the 
question of bureaucratic control.  Researchers realized that the problems resulting from 
delegation under conditions of information asymmetry naturally lent themselves to the 
principal-agent framework (Niskanen 1971; Bendor 1988).  “Weak” bureaucracy theories 
came to dominate the literature in no small part because of this shift toward formalized 
principal-agent modeling (e.g., Shipan 2004; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001; Bawn 1995, 
1997; Weingast and Moran 1983).   
The new scholarship recognized, successfully modeled, and empirically confirmed 
two sources of authority with which to constrain agency-driven drift that previous studies had 
overlooked.  First, principals have significant ex ante control over agency policymaking.  
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Key among these controls is the authority to design the structure of the agencies themselves 
(McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Wood and Bohte 2005).  In so doing, they create the 
goals, powers, incentives, and interactive effects that govern agency behavior.  Essentially, 
the political principals get to set the rules of the game.  It would be naïve in the extreme to 
assume that they do so without constraining the agency in ways that reduce the likelihood of 
agency-driven drift.    
Principals also have tremendous institutional authority that gives them monitoring 
and control options that are more effective and less resource intensive than those identified in 
earlier work (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).  In particular, the well-known “fire alarm” 
system allows politicians to constrain agency behavior without constant oversight.  
Aggrieved parties and interest groups notify the relevant political principals when the agency 
deviates from the principals’ preferred policies.  Fire alarms substantially reduce oversight 
costs while retaining efficacy.  Agencies, reluctant to risk punishment, follow the normative 
goals of the principals even in the absence of direct control via structural or statutory 
constraints.  Direct oversight mechanisms (“police patrols”) also limit agency-driven drift 
(Aberbach 1990), but are more expensive to implement.  For example, the President requires 
agencies to submit policy changes to the White House for review.  This review requires 
significant White House resources, primarily in the form of staff time at OMB.  It is, 
nevertheless, quite effective at ensuring that agency outputs reflect White House preferences 
(Cooper and West 1988). 
 
Where are the Effects of Principal-Driven Drift? 
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The principal-agent models described above were parsimonious, even elegant, but 
they were insufficient to deal with the rising concern over principal-driven drift.  To be fair, 
early research was not looking in this direction.  The early principal-agent models arose in 
direct response to the strong bureaucracy literature.  A dyadic relationship was implicit in the 
strong bureaucracy models – agencies drove policy right through the political institutions, so 
the conflict was agency vs. everyone else.  When the principal-agent models were developed 
they incorporated a reversed-form version of the dyad and assumed that one principal was 
controlling the agency.  If only one principal exists then principal-driven drift is simply not 
an option under consideration.  Similarly, the idea that policy had multiple stages did not 
matter in a strong bureaucracy framework since the agency was in control every step of the 
way.  Researchers lost no theoretical traction in looking at each step as an independent game.  
Later work in the principal-agent tradition has struggled to deal with the questions of 
principal-driven drift as a way to examine the inter-institutional struggle over policy 
influence.  A significant portion of this problem resulted from the restrictive assumptions 
placed upon models that were initially designed to deal with agency-driven drift. 
Two endogenous limitations render those models incapable of empirically evaluating 
principal-driven drift.  First, the majority of the models assumed that the entire policy 
process occurs during a single stage.  Principal-driven drift is not a problem in a single-stage 
system because there would never be uncertainty about whether another principal would seek 
to influence the process at some future stage.  Of course, the single-stage assumption bears 
little semblance to the typical bureaucratic policymaking process.  No significant 
bureaucratic activity is formulated, implemented, and reviewed in a single stage.  Whitford 
(2005) argues persuasively that a more realistic model would incorporate multiple principals 
 13
influencing the bureaucracy at multiple stages.  Such a model would provide greater 
theoretical traction.  The recognition of the need for viewing bureaucratic processes as multi-
stage systems appears elsewhere as well (e.g., Ferejohn and Shipan 2000; Shipan 2004).     
The second assumption is that the bureaucracy responds only to a single principal.  
This modeling simplification makes the unrealistic assumption that an agency need only 
worry about the preferences of one political master.  Even models that allow for multiple 
principals restrict interactions such that the decisions of one principal do not affect the 
actions of the others (see Waterman, Rouse, and Wright 2004 for an excellent discussion of 
this problem).  Moe (1984) and others (e.g., Whitford 2005; Krauss 1999; Waterman, Rouse, 
and Wright 2004; Hammond and Knott 1996) argue that the dyadic approach is profoundly 
flawed.  It does not accurately mirror the ways in which the separation of powers design 
forces the branches of government to share control over major bureaucratic systems, thereby 
ignoring all of the options created (and precluded) by multiple principals fighting over the 
same policy outcome.  
One promising line of inquiry – the deck-stacking literature – explicitly recognizes 
the presence of multiple principals, multiple stages, and both sources of drift (McCubbins, 
Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989; Bawn 1995, 1997; Balla and Wright 2001).  As I explain at 
length later in this chapter, however, the deck stacking approach still has difficulty in dealing 
simultaneously with principal-driven drift and agency-driven drift.  In addition, its chief 
explanatory power applies to broad policy issue areas rather than at the level of individual 
policies.  In sum, the bureaucratic control literature has great difficulty in evaluating 
principal-driven drift.  The question is, why has that remained the case?  
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The Problem – Conflating the Two Types of Drift 
The theoretical and empirical wall that the oversight literature has run up against is 
one of its own making – it typically conflates the two types of drift when evaluating how to 
prevent agency policy from deviating too sharply from principals’ preferences.  For example, 
a piece of agency-driven drift research might ask: “How can the House and Senate prevent 
the agency from promulgating policymaking too far from the preferences of Congress?”  
This ignores the possibility that principal-driven drift is a problem in the same policy area.  
Alternatively, research might ask a principal-driven drift question like “How can the House 
and Senate prevent the President from forcing agency policymaking too far from the 
preferences of Congress?”  This question ignores the possibility that agency-driven drift is 
occurring simultaneously.   
Conflating the two types of drift creates a number of problems for good scholarship.  
The same mechanisms that one principal might use to prevent an agency from exercising free 
will may have no effect on another principal’s attempts to control the policy outcomes.  
Equally importantly, the nature of the drift matters when designing and interpreting studies of 
bureaucratic oversight.  If we are concerned that unelected bureaucrats are controlling policy 
despite the best efforts of the principals then studying agency-driven drift is critical.  If, 
however, a scholar is principally concerned with understanding how inter-branch conflict 
shapes policy then principal-driven drift might become the focal point of the research.  
Finally, as I show in the next section, the outcomes that scholars should be evaluating are 
very different depending upon which type of drift they are attempting to study.  For example, 
studies that evaluate how much political appointees matter have looked at how agency 
enforcement systems change when a new appointee takes office (see Wood and Waterman 
 15
1993).  This can only evaluate how successful appointees are at preventing agency-driven 
drift.  Assessing their success in fending off other principals would require very different 
measures.   
This becomes a problem very quickly for examinations of principal-driven drift.  In 
order to determine whether a reduction in agency discretion was intended to forestall 
principal-driven drift, one must rule out the other potential reasons for the action.  There are 
at least two other reasons why a principal might reduce agency discretion: credit claiming 
and controlling agency-driven drift.  Saying with confidence that a principal is reducing 
discretion due to principal-driven drift requires us to rule out the other possibilities – an 
exceptionally difficult task.  Credit claiming is particularly problematic.  For example, 
Executive Order 13148, “Greening of the Government through Leadership in Environmental 
Management” was significantly more detailed than it needed to be.  It specificity reduced 
agency discretion in policymaking, procurement, and systems management, and reduced 
Congress’s leeway in specifying agency procurement pathways.  The last effect was, 
however, completely coincidental to the purpose of the executive order.  Its intended purpose 
was almost exclusively to increase then-Vice President Gore’s visibility with the 
environmental community prior to the 2000 presidential election.  I took part in crafting the 
document, and Gore’s staff were very clear about the impetus behind the executive order, its 
primary goal, and the intended audience.  Because of the E.O.’s specificity and high-profile 
nature Gore was able to bolster his claim as an environmental leader.  As a data point, 
however, it might look like an example of the President exerting policy control over agency 
procurement in such a way as to limit Congress’s ability engage in principal-driven drift. 
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Similarly, controlling for agency-driven drift presents a host of problems, chiefly due 
to the fact that no reliable measure of agency preference exists.  Three articles have tried 
various workarounds, but none are compelling.  Wood and Bohte (2004) attempt to 
overcome the lack of an agency preference measure by examining how the expectation of 
principal-driven drift affects the original designs of the agencies.  This clever design 
increases confidence in the finding that a link between discretion and principal-driven drift 
exists.  It cannot, however, account for the possibility that the same political forces that make 
principal-driven drift more likely also increase the possibility of agency-driven drift.  In 
particular, research has suggested that conflict among the principals increases the likelihood 
of agency-driven drift (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Calvert, McCubbins, and 
Weingast 1989).  Shipan (2004) chooses to assume that agencies do not have preferences 
independent of the President’s.  This assumption is not uncommon, but simply assuming 
away the presence of agency-driven drift does not inhibit the probability that it imposes 
spuriousness on the empirical tests.  Epstein and O’Halloran’s (1999) seminal work on 
delegated discretion is similarly unable to differentiate between agency-driven and principal-
driven drift.  These three pieces represent the best efforts of the literature to isolate and 
evaluate principal-driven drift.  Even so, their shortcomings demonstrate why the absence of 
a measure of agency preference hamstrings this line of enquiry by forcing the conflation of 
agency-driven and principal-driven drift.  How, then, can the study of principal-driven drift 
move forward? 
 
A Transaction Cost Model of Behavior  
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The principal-agent literature has begun to employ the transaction cost approach 
within multi-principal, multi-stage models to address questions of principal-driven drift 
(Macher and Richman 2008).  The transaction cost approach provides a micro-theory of 
behavior that applies to principals and agents alike, thereby allowing decisions by multiple 
actors on the same policy question to be evaluated consistently and systematically.  This in 
turn allows a rigorous examination of principal-driven drift that adequately controls for the 
effects of agency-driven drift on principal decision making. 
 All changes to federal policy involve two broad categories of costs that apply to both 
the winners and the losers.  The first category includes the actual expenditures required by 
the programmatic change and the political costs created by the competition over the issue.  
The second category is made up of the costs required to bring the decision about.  These 
include the procedural costs imbedded in the processes that govern the decision making 
process, and many of the enforcement costs of implementing the policy change.  Costs in this 
latter category make up the bulk of the political transaction costs.  Transaction costs vary 
issue by issue depending upon the processes that apply to the issue, the policy and legal 
precedents already in place, and the difficulty of implementation.   
The term “political transaction costs” was first coined by North (1990).  Based upon a 
bounded-rationality model of micro-level decision making, transaction costs capture the idea 
that sometimes controlling an agency output is simply more costly to a principal than the 
outcome is worth.  Thus, the decision to constrain an agency’s policy discretion is dependent 
upon the cost to the principal of constraining the agency.  Principals prefer, therefore, those 
control mechanisms that are least costly to implement.  Epstein and O’Halloran’s (1999) 
provide an excellent definition of transaction costs: “When we refer to political transaction 
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costs, then, we mean transaction costs that arise in transactions among political actors” (44).  
A similar definition is used by Wood and Bohte (2004).  One of the benefits of the 
transaction cost approach is that it provides a micro-theory of behavior capable of capturing 
the incentives imbedded in a principal’s decision to delegate discretion.  In particular, 
coupled with the right model, the approach can differentiate between agency-driven and 
principal-driven drift sufficiently to examine them independently.  
Transaction costs are commonly known in the literature as part of decision-making 
“friction” (Jones, Sulkin and Larsen 2003; Godwin, Lopez and Seldon 2008).  Political 
principals incorporate these costs into the decision to pursue a particular policy change or 
invest the resources elsewhere.  This is a critical point.  It suggests that if one principal can 
raise the transaction costs to another principal high enough relative to the benefits then the 
second principal will not engage on the issue.  Raising the transaction costs can be 
accomplished by strategies such as structuring the political environment surrounding the 
decision, altering the informational costs of decision making, and instituting new precedents 
or requirements governing the issue.  Other theories, such as principal-agent models and 
deck-stacking, incorporate some of these costs.  For reasons that I describe at length in the 
next section, however, neither general model provides the specificity necessary to deal with 
the majority of bureaucratic processes.   
A principal enjoys two primary advantages from raising the transaction costs to future 
principals seeking to influence an issue.  First, the principal does not have to continually 
protect her initial policy.  Once the transaction costs are imposed they apply to everyone, 
making all future changes to the policy expensive.  Thus, constant oversight is not required 
and the principal can turn her attention to other issues.  Second, the wide range of transaction 
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costs within political systems – and particularly those systems that require implementation by 
the bureaucracy – allows a targeted, issue-specific method of locking in a policy change.  For 
example, a principal can raise the costs of overturning a specific water quality issue rather 
than having to make all environmental policies more difficult to adjust.  Taken together, 
these advantages suggest that manipulating transaction costs should be one of the key tools 
used by principals seeking to control bureaucratic policymaking.   
The logic is uncomplicated.  Imagine a simple two principal, two stage scenario 
where Principal I and Principal II disagree over a policy outcome.  In the first stage, Principal 
I has an opportunity to either increase or decrease agency discretion over policy design.  
Assuming that the agency’s preferences are consistent with its own, Principal I would like to 
delegate policymaking discretion to the agency.  Increasing discretion, however, allows 
Principal II to use its influence over the agency in the second stage to move policy away 
from Principal I’s ideal point.  In response to the expected principal-driven drift, Principal I 
provides less discretion to the agency than it would in the absence of the threat of principal-
driven drift.  Since decreasing discretion will increase the costs of the policy transaction, 
Principal I will only do so when the increase in the expected benefits justifies the costs.     
One testable prediction generated by the above scenario is that as the probability of 
interference by principals in the future rises, so to does the current principal’s willingness to 
incur the transaction costs arising from limiting agency discretion (assuming that the 
principals disagree).  Recent large-n empirical tests support this hypothesis.  Wood and 
Bohte (2005) find that the initial design of agency processes depends upon the perceived 
probability that principals in the future will create policy that runs contrary to the preferences 
of the principals in the enacting coalition.  If the probability of principal-driven drift is high 
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then the enacting coalition reduces agency discretion.  Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) find 
that Congress decreases agency discretion through statute when another principal is more 
likely to influence the agency outputs in future stages.  Similarly, Whitford (2005) finds that 
Congress will willingly incur the transaction costs of reducing agency discretion in order to 
protect its position from other principals in the future.   
 
The Theoretical Model 
The theory behind using transaction costs to evaluate principal-driven drift for a 
given policy decision relies upon two causal links.  In the first, a principal at some initial 
stage anticipates principal-driven drift and reduces an agency’s discretion accordingly.  The 
second link assumes that this reduction in discretion causes a decrease in the ability of 
principals at future stages to move agency policy outcomes.   Thus, extant theory takes the 
following form: 
Scholarship has not established the veracity of either link.  First, as stated above, 
research cannot convincingly demonstrate that principals reduce discretion with the intention 
of constraining other principals at future stages.  Thus, the explanation for why principals 
elect to employ the “reduces discretion” arrow may have nothing to do with principal-driven 
drift.  Second, no scholarship to date has demonstrated that principals at future points alter 
their behavior in any way in response to changes in agency discretion.  This makes the 
“reduces principal-driven drift” arrow nothing but conjecture.  In sum, neither arrow of the 
model has unequivocal – or even marginally strong – support.   
If, however, we are able to establish that the second link exists – i.e., that principals in 
later stages alter their behavior in response to changes in agency discretion – then the 
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expectation of principal-driven drift becomes a credible reason for a principal to reduce 
discretion.  In order for the transaction cost logic to hold, reducing discretion must 
successfully alter the behavior of principals later in the process.  Consider an empirical 
finding demonstrating that principals interfere less in agency policymaking as a result of 
another principal’s decision to reduce agency discretion at an earlier stage in the process.  If 
this is the case then it becomes reasonable to assert that part of a principal’s decision to 
withhold agency discretion comes from expectations of principal-driven drift.  In fact, such a 
finding would, alone, strongly suggest that the first link is valid for the following reason.  If a 
principal has access to an action (reducing agency discretion) that successfully constrains 
future principals, then it would be naïve to assume that the principal would not use such a 
powerful tool.  Even if the primary goal of reducing agency discretion is credit-claiming or 
reducing agency-driven drift, the transaction cost theory of behavior predicts that the added 
benefit of reducing principal-driven drift would increase its use.     
Until now we have had to take the second link on faith – the data to test it simply did 
not exist.  Testing whether one principal’s attempts to reduce agency discretion at one stage 
actually reduces the influence of other principals in future stages requires a dataset that 
accurately tracks two things.  First, it must identify the first principal’s efforts to reduce 
discretion.  Second, it must link that reduction in discretion to the actions of other principals 
in future stages on the same policy issue.  This is the first contribution of my dissertation. 
 
Transaction Costs vs. Deck Stacking 
Many of the key benefits of the transaction cost approach are also generated by a 
relatively mature line of literature based upon the deck-stacking model.  One of the key 
 22
theoretical advances of this dissertation is explaining how the deck-stacking micro-theory of 
behavior and standard political variables can be used in a ways that are as yet unexplored.  
To this end, the next section explains the critical differences in the theory that make the 
transaction cost approach a useful and distinct method of researching one principal’s use of 
the bureaucracy to control another principal’s policy reach.   
The broad definition of the deck-stacking theory provided by McCubbins, Noll, and 
Weingast in their seminal 1987 article remains the most cogent explanation of the theory (the 
authors are here describing deck-stacking when creating an agency):  
the coalition that forms to create an agency – the committee that drafted the 
legislation, the chamber majorities that approved it, and the president who signed it 
into law – will seek to ensure that the bargain struck among the members of the 
coalition does not unravel once the coalition disbands.  Specifically, the coalition will 
seek to… create pressures on agencies that replicate the political pressures applied 
when the relevant legislation was enacted (255). 
 
The enacting coalition accomplishes this goal primarily by setting the procedures that the 
agency must follow when implementing the policy (Balla and Wright 2001; Bawn 1995; 
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989).  The logic is that a policy’s enacting coalition 
can favor its constituents during agency implementation by specifying procedural 
requirements such as where an agency obtains information, what types of analyses the 
agency must undertake prior to making a decision, who the agency must consult, or how 
agency decisions can be challenged.  In this way the coalition protects its constituents against 
the possibility that the agency – or some future coalition – will successfully impose policy 
drift.  Administrative procedures are durable, difficult to overturn, and generally affect more 
than a single policy decision.  These characteristics make them particularly attractive to the 
political interests that won during the enactment stage of the policy.   
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 Deck-stacking shares some important characteristics with the transaction cost 
approach.  They both provide a framework within which to evaluate how principals reduce 
the likelihood of policy drift.  Similarly, they explicitly recognize that the multi-stage nature 
of federal policymaking creates opportunity for drift over time – and that the duration process 
can be measured in decades.  Perhaps most importantly, the concept of political cost is 
present in both theories.  Cost is explicit in the transaction cost approach.  Within the deck-
stacking theory the additional transaction costs of overcoming entrenched procedural 
requirements are the driving incentive behind agency and principal behavior.  For example, 
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987) consider the case of an agency seeking a better deal: 
“The agency may seek to develop a new clientele for its services, but such activity must be 
undertaken not only in full view of the members of the initial coalition, but in an 
administrative process that is designed to favor them (262).”  The implication is that this is a 
difficult task, but the authors stop short of making explicit the notion of cost.  Later 
examinations of the deck-stacking theory connect the link between procedural requirements 
and transaction costs (Wood and Bohte 2004; Spence 1997).   
 Despite these similarities, however, the theories have two critical differences that 
argue in favor of using the transaction cost approach when evaluating federal policymaking 
at the level of individual policies.  First, the deck-stacking theory is best used to address 
general policymaking trends, not individual policy decisions.  The primary mechanism of 
deck stacking – administrative procedures – clearly demonstrates this broad focus.  For 
example, the Small Business Regulatory Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA) imposes 
procedural requirements on administrative actions designed to increase the influence of small 
businesses.  The statute requires the agency to conduct impact analyses on small businesses, 
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grants specific judicial recourses for small businesses, and increases small business access to 
agencies in a number of ways.  What SBREFA does not do, however, is guarantee that the 
outcome of any given agency policy decision is consistent with the desires of small 
businesses.  Not a single provision of the statute identifies a specific agency decision that will 
favor small businesses.  Instead, SBREFA imposes administrative procedures that increase 
the impact/influence of small business concerns on a broad swathe of agency decisions – and 
does so in a way that will be difficult for any future big-business coalition to overturn.   
This focus on the broad policy trends rather than specific policy outcomes is an 
explicit tradeoff made by the designers of the deck-stacking approach:  
Specifically, the coalition will seek to combine sanctions with an institutional 
structure to create pressures on agencies that replicate the political pressures applied 
when the relevant legislation was enacted.  Here, the point of administrative 
procedures is not to preselect specific policy outcomes, but to create a 
decisionmaking environment that mirrors the political circumstances that gave rise to 
the establishment of the policy (Mccubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; 255).    
 
Similarly, Spence (1997) says of deck-stacking through administrative procedures: “While it 
is true that the APA [Administrative Procedures Act] and NEPA [National Environmental 
Policy Act] increase the transaction costs of agency decision making, neither increases the 
cost of making a particular decision.”   
This dissertation, however, requires a theoretical paradigm capable of evaluating how 
one principal constrains the behavior of another principal during the development of specific 
policy outcomes.  The transaction cost theory takes the same incentive structure and 
understanding of political transaction costs and applies them to all levels of the policymaking 
process, including individual decisions.  By expanding the scope of possible controls beyond 
administrative procedures the transaction cost approach captures the full range of constraints 
on a given issue.  These include many that are generally excluded from the deck-stacking 
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approach, such as proscriptive statutory language that constrains a single decision, 
impeachment of political appointees, and budget cuts.  Put simply, sometimes political 
principals lower the hammer and say to the agency “do exactly this, by the following date, 
and to this standard.”  This is not stacking the deck to favor particular players in the future – 
this is taking all of the other players’ cards away and stealing the pot.   
The second benefit of the transaction cost approach for my research stems from the 
theoretical ambiguities associated with deck-stacking theory’s concept of the “enacting 
coalition.”  The deck-stacking theory gives the enacting coalition the prime mover advantage 
with which it will restrict policy drift.  The difficulties begin when the theory attempts to 
split the general concept of drift into its agency-driven and principal-driven drift 
components.  Deck-stacking evaluations of agency-driven drift have made substantial 
contributions to our understanding of the importance of the decision-making environment in 
policymaking (Balla and Wright 2001; Bawn 1995).  When evaluating principal-driven drift, 
however, the deck-stacking theory encounters a problem with its use of the coalition as the 
unit of analysis.  The theory postulates that the enacting coalition seeks to protect its policy 
from new coalitions that have different preferences.  Specifically, the enacting coalition seeks 
to minimize “coalitional drift,” or drift resulting from a later coalition’s influence over the 
policymaking process (Wood and Bohte 2004; Bawn 1995, 1997).  The concept of 
coalitional drift works well within the context of agency design (Wood and Bohte 2004) and 
the structuring of procedural authority granted to an agency (Bawn 1995).  It lacks sufficient 
specificity, however, to evaluate how one principal attempts to constrain principal-driven 
drift within the same “coalition.”  This is problematic because, as Moe (1990) points out, 
there is considerable ambiguity regarding who makes up the “enacting coalition.”  Does the 
 26
term encompass all participants, even those who disagree with the policy chosen, or does it 
refer only to those members whose policy position was implemented?  The problem is that 
the concept of coalitional drift often assumes that members of the enacting coalition can be 
treated as a unitary actor that supports the chosen policy.  Drift, then, can only occur after the 
composition of the dominant coalition changes at some future date.  Moe (1990) and Balla 
and Wright (2001) point out that it is by no means certain that the members of the enacting 
coalition are united in support of the selected policy.  If this is the case, then a member who 
supported the losing side may seek to pull the policy back toward his/her preferred option – 
this constitutes principal-driven drift, but it is not accounted for because it occurs without a 
change in the coalition.   
For example, consider a policy decision where a statute will result in a bureaucratic 
policy with two possible implementation outcomes, A and B.  Congress prefers outcome A, 
the President prefers outcome B, and both Congress and the President prefer either outcome 
to the status quo.  Further assume that the President has sufficient control over agency 
policymaking such that the President can shift policy once the bureaucracy begins 
implementation.  In this case, coalitional drift suggests that drift caused by principals will 
only be a problem when the members of the coalition change.  It makes no explicit provision 
for the possibility that a principal within the current coalition will cause policy drift at some 
later stage (e.g., the implementation phase) of the process.  My research, however, requires a 
way to handle the potential for drift from within the enacting coalition.  The transaction cost 
approach allows a clean look at the incentives and actions of individual principals within the 
coalition.  By changing the level of analysis from the coalition to the individual principals 
within the coalition I am able to evaluate how one principal (e.g., Congress) attempts to 
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minimize principal-driven drift from a second principal (e.g., the President) within the same 
coalition.   
In sum, both the transaction cost and deck-stacking approaches solve some of the 
earlier problems inherent in studies of bureaucratic oversight by employing multi-principal, 
multi-stage processes and a coherent micro theory of behavior.  For the purposes of this 
evaluating principal-driven drift at the level of individual decisions, however, the deck-
stacking approach has two critical shortcomings.  First, it has considerable difficulty in 
predicting how broad administrative procedures will impact a specific policy decision.  
Second, the theory’s indecision over what constitutes the “enacting coalition” – and the 
resulting difficulties in defining coalitional drift – render the approach theoretically incapable 
of cleanly addressing efforts to control principal drift within the same coalition.   
Thus, the transaction cost framework enjoys some unique advantages for research 
into principal-driven drift – advantages that have so far gone untapped.  First, it utilizes a 
more realistic view of the world than the early dyadic, single-stage models.  Second, it has a 
micro-theory of behavior that applies across all categories of policymaking authority.  
Finally, it provides the critical specificity necessary to evaluate the whether the imposition of 
transaction costs by one principal systematically changes the behavior of the second principal 
at the level of individual policies.   
 
Contributions of this Dissertation 
Contribution #1: An Empirical Test of the Transaction Cost Theory and Multi-Stage 
Principal Drift 
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I test the hypothesis that a principal’s decision to limit agency discretion decreases 
the likelihood that other principals will attempt to control the policy’s outcomes in future 
stages.  I have chosen to test the transactions cost theory using the federal regulatory system 
as the target bureaucratic process.  The regulatory process carries undeniable importance to 
the President, the House, the Senate, both parties, and the agencies themselves.  Regulatory 
influence spans much of society, such as safety, health, transportation, corporate behavior, 
and the environment.  By their nature, regulations (or “rules”) favor some groups over others, 
making them one of the principal battlegrounds in the policy arena.  Research on regulations 
has been uneven, with few empirical works investigating the implications of winning and 
losing within the regulatory arena.  The process itself is not well-understood, and regulatory 
outcomes are notoriously difficult to measure cleanly (Wood & Waterman 1991). 
 
Empirical Test #1: Statutory Deadlines and Presidential Decision Making 
There are two separate empirical tests of the theory.  First, I evaluate how presidential 
influence over regulatory outcomes is affected when Congress reduces agency rulemaking 
discretion.  I have constructed a dataset that tracks all regulations reviewed by the White 
House from 1994-2005.  The data allow me to identify whether the agency’s rulemaking 
discretion is reduced by Congress through a statutory deadline.  It also tracks whether the 
President chose to reject the regulation as submitted by the agency.  This makes it possible to 
test whether a previous reduction in agency discretion by Congress affects the likelihood that 
the President will use his authority to reject a rule.  The results demonstrate that, consistent 
with the transaction cost theory, the President is far less likely to reject large categories of 
regulations when Congress has already reduced the agency’s discretion.   
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 Empirical Test #2: Court Deadlines and Presidential Decision Making 
The second empirical test evaluates whether court actions that reduce agency 
discretion have the same effect.  This is necessary because the observed relationship between 
a pre-existing contract with Congress and presidential power may have more to do with the 
nature of the relationship between those two institutions than with the impact of transactions 
costs.  The ubiquitous budgetary and lawmaking authority of the Hill could make the 
President responsive to Congress in a way that other institutional relationships simply do not 
resemble.  This would damage the generalizability of my theory, and strongly indicate that I 
may be capturing a spurious relationship.   
Fortunately, the dataset allows me to examine how judicially-imposed restrictions on 
the promulgating agency affect the President’s imposition of policy preferences.  Similar to 
statutory deadlines, a judicial deadline indicates that a court order reduces agency discretion 
by requiring that the agency promulgate the regulation by a specified date.  This 
unambiguously means that the court imposed a meaningful constraint on the agency’s 
policymaking authority prior to the promulgation of the rule.  I use the same dependent 
variable as above – the likelihood that the President rejects the rule.  The results once again 
support the hypothesis that presidential action depends in part on the amount of discretion a 
principal has previously granted to the agency.   
 
Contribution #2: The Second Face of Power 
The burgeoning literature on principal-driven drift provides the theoretical tools 
necessary to examine a bureaucratic oversight question that has so far gone unanswered: 
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“does the presence of competing principals reduce the bureaucracy’s ability to govern 
effectively?”  By mining the divided government literature for measures of principal conflict 
and using an expanded version of the regulatory dataset described above I examine the 
effects of probable principal-driven drift on the volume of regulatory output.  The findings 
strongly support the theory that principals prevent bureaucratic action when they anticipate 
strong resistance from other principals in the future.  This has significant implications for 
arguments that divided government causes policy gridlock, and thereby reduces the federal 
government’s ability to govern effectively.   
 
What this Dissertation Does Not Address 
 Before moving to the hypotheses and their empirical tests, I will discuss briefly what 
this dissertation does not do.  First, I make no claims about where the policy preferences of 
the principals and the agencies originate.  In the case of the principals this follows a long 
tradition of simply placing a principal’s preference on a single liberal-conservative 
dimension relative to the other principals.  The evaluation of agency preferences, however, 
does not have quite so clean a history.  Scholarship has yet to agree upon the source of 
bureaucratic preferences, their expression, or the appropriate modeling method.  Do 
bureaucrats seek, as Moe (1990) states, specific policy outcomes?  Is Niskanen (1971) 
correct that agencies seek to maximize their budgets?  Or do the preferences depend, as 
Golden (2000) claims, on the situation?  The sheer range of possibilities – and the lack of 
agreement – provides a compelling incentive to design tests of the model that do not require 
me to adjudicate among the options.  It has been my experience that agencies definitely do 
have preferences that at times diverge from those of their political masters.  Measuring those 
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preferences on a case-by-case basis for 35,000 different regulatory actions is impossible.  My 
approach, therefore, is to recognize that agencies could have unique preferences.  With this 
in mind, I design the tests evaluating one principal’s reaction to another’s actions in such a 
way that assessing the agency’s preference is not required.  I return to the issue of agency 
policy preferences in Chapter V, but I remain agnostic as to their source. 
 A second line of enquiry that this dissertation avoids is an evaluation of how interest 
groups affect policy preferences, oversight options, and the probability of agency-driven and 
principal-driven drift.  The bureaucratic oversight literature is replete with references to ways 
in which interest groups intervene in the policy process – stacking the deck, fire alarms, iron 
triangles, and even back-room dealings – all figure prominently.  In the same way that the 
study design sidesteps the need to locate the fountainhead of bureaucratic preferences, it also 
can safely ignore the effects of interest groups.  As I will demonstrate in chapter four, the 
question of how a principal reacts to the earlier actions of another principal does not depend 
on interactions with interest groups.  Using the initial EPA example, the agency was quick to 
inform the White House that a statute defined the universe of possible regulatory activity.  It 
would not have mattered in the slightest, however, if that information had come from an 
interest group.  Similarly, while I know for a fact that the agency drafted the proscriptive part 
of the statute, it would not have had any effect on the White House decision if the statutory 
language had been drafted by the Sierra Club instead.    Because of the study design I can 
confidently set aside the complexities of interest group effects and preference origination.   
 I turn now to an explanation of the regulatory process and a description of the dataset.    
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CHAPTER II 
THE FEDERAL REGULATORY PROCESS 
If the transaction cost model works as theorized, then a pre-existing contract between 
the agency and Principal I that reduces agency discretion should have a negative effect on 
Principal II’s willingness to constrain the agency at a later stage.  The additional cost to 
Principal II of overriding Principal I’s decision will, on average, reduce Principal II’s 
willingness to pursue its policy preferences.  What is needed, then, are data from a multi-
principal, multi-stage bureaucratic system that allow us to track the effects of a pre-existing 
contract on Principal II’s willingness to exercise authority.  Fortunately, data are available in 
the regulatory arena.  This chapter describes the regulatory process and the measures of 
principal influence. 
The regulatory process has numerous stages, each of which has multiple requirements 
(see Kerwin 2003).  For the purposes of this dissertation, however, I focus on two specific 
levels of the federal regulatory system: 1) the general inter-branch process that sets the 
parameters for agency regulatory activity, and 2) the nuances of the executive branch 
processes that generate the actual regulatory language.  This dissertation’s theoretical 
foundation and the specificity of its hypotheses allow me to set aside, for example, the 
complex rules within the House and Senate that lead to authorizing statutes.  Similarly, I do 
not focus on what gives an entity legal standing when challenging a regulatory issue, or how 
the Supreme Court chooses to grant certiorari when a federal agency is the defendant.  While
fascinating questions in their own right, the analyses that follow do not depend upon the 
answers to evaluate the transaction cost theory of principal behavior.   
 
General Model of Regulation 
The constitutionally-proscribed order for federal policymaking is well known.  
Congress writes a statute, the President signs it into law, and the courts (where necessary) 
opine on the results.  If these were all of the steps, however, the question of who controls 
federal lawmaking would be far less interesting.  Instead, the process has grown increasingly 
byzantine, in part as a response to the growing need for regulations capable of addressing 
issues that continue to increase in complexity and technical specialization.  The growth of the 
process of administrative lawmaking is unsurprising.  The stakes are enormous – the most 
expensive 31 of the 4,153 federal regulations promulgated in Fiscal Year 2001 had aggregate 
costs to society of $1.6 to $2.0 billion and aggregate benefits of $2.4 to $6.5 billion (OMB 
2003).  With these kinds of rents available the regulatory arena receives an enormous amount 
of attention from within and without the government.  The federal bureaucracy now 
promulgates thousands of regulations per year on issues that span the nation’s social and 
economic activities (OMB 2003).  Figure 1.1 provides, therefore, a more accurate depiction 
of the policy process.  
 Note that all three principals have specific points of control over agency 
policymaking.  In later chapters I relax the assumption that the stages proceed in the order 
given above.  In reality the President, House, Senate, and courts can influence the 
bureaucracy even when it is not their “turn.”  I address this possibility in the empirical 
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chapters.  For now, however, the general model above provides a useful starting point when 
discussing the federal process used to generate administrative law.     
   
The Executive Branch Process 
Within the “Executive Branch Generates Regulations” box in Figure 2.1 the agencies 
and the White House are responsible for crafting the implementing regulations.  Figure 2.2 
highlights the key procedural steps of the White House review process.  The initial step 
occurs when an agency receives the statutory mandate, queries the interested public and 
private entities, and drafts a proposed regulation.  At this point the regulation is designated as 
“economically significant,” “other significant,” or “not significant.”  These definitions come 
from President Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 “Regulatory Review.”  E.O. 12866 directs 
the regulatory agencies (excluding certain agencies such as the CIA and the independent 
commissions) to submit all “economically significant” and “other significant” regulations to 
the White House for review prior to publication.  E.O. 12866 provides the thresholds for 
significance in the following criteria: 
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely 
affect, in a material way, the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, 
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or 
tribal governments or communities; 
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or 
planned by another agency; 
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan 
programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or 
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s 
priorities, or the principles set forth in this Executive Order. (Federal Register, 
Vol. 58, No. 190, Oct. 4, 1993, p. 51738) 
 
Those regulations meeting threshold number one and that have a novel legal or policy 
implication are classified as “economically significant.”  Regulations meeting any of the 
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other thresholds – but not the first – are designated as “other significant.”  In practice, the last 
three criteria are sufficiently inclusive to ensure that the White House can review any 
regulation that it wishes.   
   E.O. 12866 requires that the agencies send “other significant” and “economically 
significant” proposed regulations to the White House for review.  Only administration 
personnel are present during these reviews.  The design of these review periods specifically 
minimizes contact with parties outside the executive branch, including Congress and the 
public.  For example, no one, including the public and Congress, has the exact text under 
consideration at the OMB.  Given that these reviews constitute the final administration 
checks on the regulations prior to public unveiling, it is unsurprising that the White House 
wishes to retain the ability to alter them in an environment free from public scrutiny.   
The reviews take place in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  Substantial evidence exists indicating that 
the reviews further the President’s policy agenda.  When President Reagan issued Executive 
Order 12291 (the precursor to, and model for, E.O. 12866), he intended it as a method of 
expanding presidential power over the bureaucracy: “In essence, OMB review 
institutionalizes the primacy of politics” (Cooper and West 1988).  Similarly, congressional 
investigations found that the review process substantially increased administration control 
over regulatory outcomes: 
While the informal, often secretive nature of the review process has made it 
impossible to measure the effects of E.O. 12291 with any high degree of precision, 
numerous documented cases of OMB influence in areas of public safety, health, and 
the environment strongly indicate that it has provided a very effective means of 
controlling policy in those instances where the administration has taken a strong 
interest (Energy Subcommittee Report, 1985). 
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Given this, I assume that any changes that occur during the review process move the 
regulatory outcomes closer to the administration’s preferred policy.  The White House has 
three options during review.  First, it can approve the text of the regulation without change.  
Second, it can allow the proposed regulation to move forward, but with changes.   Third, the 
White House can reject the rule (or force the agency to withdraw it from review). 
Predictably, the White House is reluctant to publicly embarrass an agency in this fashion, and 
the authority to reject is used sparingly. 
 If the proposed regulation survives White House review and the agency wishes to 
move forward, then it publishes the agreed-upon text in the Federal Register for public 
comment.  The agency then drafts the final regulation, taking public comments into account.  
The final rule is returned for a second round of White House review.  Again, the President 
can reject the rulemaking by returning it to the agency or forcing the agency to withdraw it.  
In addition, the White House can change the language here, but with one important caveat.  
The Administrative Procedures Act requires that the final rule remain substantively similar to 
the proposed rule.  This makes sense from a good governance standpoint.  The regulatory 
process is designed to allow the public to engage meaningfully in the discussion.  If the 
requirements change dramatically between the proposed and final rule stages then the public 
does not have the ability to voice concerns before the agency has essentially closed debate on 
the subject.  Thus, any changes to rule between the proposed and final stages must either 
come directly from the public comments or be a reasonable extension of the original 
proposal.  If the regulation changes too dramatically then the agency must re-propose it – 
effectively starting the process again.  From the perspective of those interested in influencing 
regulations, then, much of the action occurs at the proposed rule stage.  If a principal or 
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interest group loses at the proposed rule stage the chance of succeeding at the final rule stage 
is slim.   
If the final rule language that emerges from the review process is acceptable then the 
agency publishes the final rule in the Federal Register.  The public once again has an 
opportunity to comment, although these comments are more for the formal record.  Once the 
final rule is published in the Federal Register it has the force of law.   
In this dissertation I am fundamentally concerned with important government 
actions – those regulations with sufficient impact on society to meet one or more of the 
thresholds of significance.  E.O. 12866’s ability to call in all the rules that meet the 
significance thresholds account for a majority of the impact of regulations on society.   
Unimportant regulations comprise more than 50 percent of federal regulatory activity, yet 
their cumulative impact on society is negligible. Tellingly, principals rarely, if ever, engage 
on “non-significant” regulations.  For this reason, I have chosen to focus the analyses on only 
those regulations that meet the significance thresholds and are reviewed by the White House.  
The question of how issue salience affects policy conflict is an interesting one, however, so I 
take care to examine it within the context of important regulations.  If different levels of 
regulatory importance may potentially affect my outcomes of interest I retain empirical 
leverage by contrasting “other significant” and “economically significant” regulations.      
 The White House review process is particularly suited to test the transaction cost 
theory because of its clean measures of principal influence and easily-identified stages across 
issue areas.  For example, on any given issue, Congress has delegated a certain amount of 
rulemaking discretion to the agency prior to White House review.  If the transaction cost 
approach is correct then presidential influence over the regulation should decrease as agency 
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discretion decreases.  Similarly, if the court has decreased agency discretion on a regulation 
then the President should have less opportunity to steer that regulation’s outcome.  Even 
better, the statutes and executive orders governing the regulatory process require the federal 
dockets to preserve remarkably precise measures of principal influence.   
 
Two Key Independent Variables – Statutory Deadlines and Judicial Deadlines 
The federal regulatory process provides multiple opportunities for principals to 
reduce agency discretion prior to White House review.  The transaction cost theory predicts 
that as these principals limit agency discretion the President will be less likely to influence 
policy.  Thus, testing the transaction cost model requires a consistent measure that identifies 
those regulatory actions where agency discretion was reduced by another principal prior to 
White House review.  The data provide two such measures – statutory deadlines and judicial 
deadlines. 
One of the unique properties of these variables is that they provide consistent 
indicators of congressional or judicial constraint on regulatory implementation across 
agencies, issue areas, and time.  Prior to this dataset, correctly assessing whether a statute or 
judicial decision achieved a meaningful level of control over agency behavior required an 
encyclopedic knowledge of the agency’s structure, in-depth substantive knowledge, and often 
a subjective judgment call.  Deadlines, however, do not require subjective evaluations to 
determine whether the expected costs to the President of policy influence have actually 
increased.  I explore the costs and benefits of deadlines and policy delay to each entity in this 
section.    
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The Benefits to Congress of Statutory Deadlines 
The presence of a statutory deadline means that Congress wrote a proscriptive statute 
constraining agency discretion.  A deadline mandates the date by which an agency must 
promulgate the implementing regulation(s).  This clearly reduces the amount of delegated 
discretion, thereby constraining the agency’s and/or the President’s ability to select the time 
frame for promulgation.  Statutory deadlines are certainly not perfect indicators of the degree 
to which Congress has limited the potential for drift.  They do, however, reliably indicate two 
things – congressional interest in the regulation (and the probable existence of additional 
statutory controls) and a meaningful reduction in agency discretion.   
Congress enjoys three potential benefits from mandating the implementation 
schedule.  First, by specifying the promulgation date Congress prevents either the agency or 
other principals from engaging in what Kerwin (2003) calls “tactical delays” of the 
regulation.  The passage of time plays a vital role in the design and implementation of policy.  
The importance of issues can wax and wane, the public’s opinion can change, or new data 
may alter the fundamental nature of the policy question.  Any of these time-dependent 
circumstances have the potential to make the original preferences of Congress more difficult 
to achieve if the agency is permitted to delay the promulgation of the implementing 
regulations.  Eliminating the possibility of delay reduces Congress’s uncertainty about what 
form the regulation will take, and precludes the possibility that the agency will delay 
promulgation of the policy indefinitely.   
Second, limiting the timeframe within which the agency must craft the regulation can 
give an advantage to one interest over another.  Bawn (1995) suggests that imposing 
statutory deadlines on agency rulemaking can have the effect of limiting the agency’s ability 
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to employ its full complement of resources, such as information gathered from external 
sources.  Knowing how a deadline will limit agency options allows Congress to predict 
which option the agency will select, thus allowing Congress to force policy that favors one 
constituency over another.  In Bawn’s example, shortening deadlines renders the agency less 
able to question the entrenched group’s information, thereby giving the interests on the other 
side of the issue “less of an opportunity to respond” (Bawn 1995).  Thus, under certain 
circumstances, Congress can impose deadlines to strategically advantage a particular interest 
without having to explicitly favor that group.  Finally, Congress can reap credit-claiming 
rewards by imposing the deadline.  Kerwin and Furlong (1992) note that “Congress often 
enacts these deadlines to placate impatient and powerful interests.”   
The question, then, is does imposing a deadline result in meaningful reductions in 
agency discretion such that Congress obtains the benefits listed above?  The answer appears 
to be affirmative.  Whitford’s work on the effects of competing principals on bureaucratic 
policy finds that controlling the timing of policy outputs is a particularly effective method of 
limiting agency discretion:  “For agencies, this shifting of gears – accelerating or decelerating 
as political overseers demand – has substantial importance for administration” (Whitford 
2004).  Similarly, Bawn (1995) suggests that statutory deadlines have a force-multiplier 
effect on other requirements put into place by Congress – the imposition of a deadline makes 
other controls over the agency’s regulation more effective.  Finally, Moe (1990) lists 
deadlines as the formal requirement that "simultaneously protects against the problems of 
political uncertainty: by locking in controls ex ante, not only are bureaucrats highly 
constrained in how they can use their official positions but opposing groups are effectively 
shut out."  Thus, whichever entity controls the timing of the regulation gains a considerable 
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advantage in achieving its preferred policy outcomes.  By specifying a deadline Congress can 
limit the timing dimension of both agency-driven and principal-driven drift while still 
allowing the agency to make use of its expertise in the technical details of the policy area.   
Why then, are deadlines used so infrequently?  Despite their effectiveness, Congress 
imposed statutory deadlines on only 12.8 percent of all regulations that underwent White 
House review between 1994 and 2005.  This seems like a vanishingly small number for a 
constraint that yields such a wide range of benefits to Congress.  The answer, I believe, lies 
in the expense that Congress incurs each time it writes a deadline into a statute.   
 
The Costs of Deadlines to Congress and an Empirical Examination of their Use 
Perhaps the largest category of costs to Congress of imposing statutory deadlines is 
that many of the advantages that Congress receives by delegating authority to the agencies no 
longer apply.  These advantages of delegation (and the costs of not delegating) are discussed 
at length in Chapter I.  The costs directly associated with deadlines, however, bear further 
explanation.  First, one of the key reasons for Congress to delegate is to make use of agency 
expertise.  Complex issues have many moving parts, and understanding how all those parts 
fit together requires a considerable expenditure of time and resources.  Congress would 
generally like to set the broad policy objective and allow the agency to use its specialized 
expertise to bring that objective to fruition.  Removing agency discretion by writing 
proscriptive statutory requirements reduces a key agency resource – time – in such a way that 
the agency has fewer policy options available.  In order for the net benefit of such a move to 
be positive Congress must invest the time and resources necessary to understand the issue 
and set a deadline that allows the agency to achieve Congress’s preferred outcomes.  
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Congress, therefore, is now duplicating agency expertise and reducing the value of 
delegation.   
Second, imagine a circumstance where Congress imposes a deadline without 
conducting the due diligence necessary to select the deadline that will yield the appropriate 
policy.  The consequences of the wrong statutory deadline can be significant in terms of 
undesirable policy outcomes.  In the preceding section I discuss how the presence of a 
deadline can enfranchise specific interests or effectively determine the policy the agency 
must select.  If the deadline is not selected with care then Congress runs the risk of forcing 
the agency to generate a policy outcome that is inconsistent with congressional preferences.  
Thus, Congress faces one of two outcomes when imposing deadlines, both of which generate 
additional costs to Congress.  In the first, Congress expends the resources to become 
sufficiently expert in the issue area, and the policy outcomes are consistent with 
congressional preferences.  In the second, Congress avoids the cost of issue expertise, but the 
expected value of the policy decreases because the likelihood that the policy change will 
yield Congress’s preferred option is lower.  In either case, the decision to impose a deadline 
increases the costs (or decreases the benefits) of policy control to Congress.   
While Congress likely incurs substantial costs when imposing deadlines, it is worth 
considering a possible state of the world in which accurate, policy-influencing deadlines are 
cheap for Congress to impose.  Congress writes statutory deadlines into fewer than 13 
percent of regulations that make it to White House review – why employ so useful a tool so 
infrequently if the costs of doing so are low?  If low-cost deadlines are the norm but their use 
is so infrequent then something else is likely preventing Congress from employing them.  
This would suggest that I am missing a significant part of the story and, therefore, 
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misspecifying my model.  Thus, I need to examine whether the “cheap deadline” scenario is 
viable.   
Such a state of the world requires that Congress has an easy and consistent method – 
such as interest group input – to determine what deadline is appropriate for a given issue.  
This would allow Congress to inexpensively and accurately set the optimal deadline without 
incurring the resource costs of duplicating agency expertise.  Fortunately, the “low cost” 
theory and the “high cost” theory generate vastly different predictions that are testable using 
the regulatory database.  If deadlines are cheap then Congress should impose deadlines 
whenever doing so would increase the likelihood of policy control.  Conversely, if deadlines 
are expensive to craft, then the decision calculus is not simply one of whether a statutory 
deadline will successfully steer policy outcomes.  It becomes a cost-benefit calculation where 
the expected benefit of controlling the policy is balanced against the costs of imposing the 
deadline.  In this case, Congress’s willingness to shoulder those costs will rise as the 
expected benefit of policy control increases.   
In order to test which case best fits the data I examine whether Congress is more 
likely to impose deadlines on “economically significant” rules rather than “other significant” 
regulations.  As mentioned previously, “economically significant” regulatory actions have 
greater impacts on society than do “other significant” regulatory actions.  If Congress is 
equally likely to impose deadlines on regulations meeting both thresholds of significance 
then the costs of deadlines are likely low since Congress is willing to impose deadlines 
regardless of the expected benefit.  In contrast, if Congress is disproportionately likely to 
impose deadlines on “economically significant” regulations, this suggests that the costs 
associated with deadlines are substantial enough to matter.   
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To evaluate whether the probability that Congress imposes a statutory deadline varies 
by the economic significance of a regulation, I estimate an unconditional agency fixed effects 
model with standard errors clustered by agency.  This model estimates the probability of a 
statutory deadline as a function of the economic significance of the regulations and agency 
dummy variables.2  The inclusion of the agency dummies controls for any unobserved time 
invariant agency characteristics that influence the probability that a statutory deadline is 
imposed.  The excluded agency is the Department of Agriculture.  As seen in Table 2.1, 
policies that are deemed “economically significant” are 9.6 percentage points more likely to 
have a statutory deadline relative to “other significant” regulations.  Given that 10.5 percent 
of “other significant” regulations have statutory deadlines, this represents a 91.4% increase in 
the probability that Congress imposes a statutory deadline.   Thus, as the probable benefits of 
policy control increase so too does Congress’s willingness to write statutory deadlines.  This 
provides considerable support for idea that deadlines are costly to Congress.  The coefficients 
on the other agency dummy variables indicate how the average probability that a regulation 
in that agency has a statutory deadline differs from that of agriculture rules.  The variation 
among the agencies demonstrated no discernable pattern. 
 This analysis does have an important caveat.  I do not include any additional 
information about the political environment at the time that the statute was passed – my 
current data does not allow that level of specificity by statute.  This may result in an 
underspecified model if, for example, a political variable such as divided government 
influences both the likelihood that a given statue has a deadline and the likelihood that the 
statute addresses a policy capable of producing “economically significant” regulations.  In 
                                                 
2While my original dataset includes 6,202 regulations, this analysis only includes 6,061 regulations because 6 
agencies did not have any regulations with statutory deadlines. 
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the future I will collect data on the authorizing statutes for a random stratified sample of my 
regulations to allow the inclusion of additional control variables.  Despite this limitation, 
however, I feel that the logic of the delegation literature and this rudimentary empirical test 
provide confidence that deadlines impose costs on Congress.   
 
Statutory Deadlines and Presidential Control 
How do statutory deadlines affect the President’s willingness to influence policy?  
The transaction cost theory predicts that a meaningful constraint on presidential influence 
will result in fewer policy interventions by the President.  To test this assertion I need to 
determine a) what types of policy influence the President would exert in the absence of 
deadlines, and b) whether those options were curtailed by the presence of statutory deadlines.  
The second is an empirical question that I answer in Chapter III.  The first, however, I 
address here.  I first discuss the benefits of policy delay (the type of influence directly 
curtailed by statutory deadlines), and then discuss how those benefits are affected by the 
imposition of deadlines. 
The President can reap substantial rewards from Kerwin’s (2003) “tactical delay” of 
regulations.  A delay can generate three broad categories of benefits to the White House – 
policy benefits, constituent benefits, and political benefits.  First, the rule may look very 
different if the President can wait out the current policy environment.  Delaying the rule even 
a relatively short time can allow the issue to fade in importance, give interested groups time 
to generate new data that changes the nature of the policy question, or allow Congress (or a 
new Congress) to prioritize other issue areas.   Thus, delaying the rule potentially increases 
the President’s influence – or allows him to obtain a different outcome with the same amount 
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of influence – than would have occurred had he been forced to promulgate the rule a year 
earlier.  Second, delaying a regulation may provide immediate and direct benefits to a 
constituent group that yield political capital to the President.  For example, consider an 
industry facing new and more stringent regulations on a production process.  A delay in the 
codification of the rule gives the industry precious time to move assets out of the regulated 
area, create alternative streams of production, and delay expected penalties.  A delay in the 
imposition of stringent regulations can make a significant difference in the stock price on 
Wall Street.  Finally, a President may simply want to avoid promulgating a regulation at a 
politically sensitive time.  Delaying the policy until the next administration or waiting out an 
unfavorable period in public opinion can generate substantial political benefits.   
All of these benefits become more expensive to obtain if a statutory deadline 
determines the date at which a regulation must be codified into law.  In the presence of a 
deadline, the President must select one of two options if he is to successfully control policy.  
First, the President can negotiate with Congress to write a new law that eliminates the 
presence of a deadline.  The political costs of this are obvious.  Second, the President can 
simply force the agency to miss the deadline.  The transaction costs of this approach are high 
for several reasons.   First, missing a statutory deadline makes the Department Secretary or 
Agency Administrator a candidate for jail time.  While such a stint in the slammer is 
vanishingly unlikely, I certainly heard this complaint from agency staff during my time at 
OMB.  Putting a chief subordinate in this position certainly incurs political costs to the 
President.  Second, forcing the agency to miss the deadline leaves the President open to 
negative press charging that the President is openly thwarting the will of Congress.  Finally, 
Congress itself can impose political costs on the President in terms of reduced cooperation, 
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budgetary friction, etc.  Thus, statutory deadlines increase the transaction costs to the 
President of obtaining the benefits of controlling policy through regulatory delay.   
It is worth noting that a statutory deadline frequently indicates that the authorizing 
statute contains other discretion-reducing requirements.  For example, the Food Quality 
Protection Act of 1996 contained statutory deadlines, scheduling requirements of pesticide 
licensing, agency review requirements, public notice requirements, and a host of other 
reductions of agency discretion.  For the President to overturn these additional provisions 
would require absorbing even greater political transaction costs.  Thus, even though the 
deadline is a potent control mechanism in its own right, the other statutory provisions that 
likely accompany a deadline further reduce agency discretion and increase the costs of 
control to the President.3  
 
Why Measuring Congressional Influence is Insufficient  
Testing the transaction cost theory of inter-principal interaction requires evaluation 
beyond just Congress and the President as the principals of interest.  The constant interaction 
between the two institutions creates an intricate web of interdependency and political back-
and-forth.  This makes it exceedingly difficult to claim that a single factor – like a statutory 
deadline – is the sole catalyst for presidential action.  It is equally plausible that one of the 
multitude of informal political structures between the two institutions (e.g., logrolling) is 
systematically guiding the results.  Further, the analysis is limited to the most important 
subset of regulations, thereby increasing the likelihood that Congress and the White House 
have informal (or unobservable) agreements influencing the President’s actions.  In other 
                                                 
3I will formally test this assertion using the statute data I plan to collect for a stratified random sample of the 
regulations – discussed earlier.  Specifically, I will examine the correlation between the presence of a statutory 
deadline and the statute length under the hypothesis that more proscriptive statutes are longer.   
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words, unobservable political influences might create non-random patterns within the data 
leading to a spurious result.  This would run counter to my experience – I never observed a 
systematic channel of influence that this analysis ignores – but I cannot rule out the 
possibility that one existed above my pay grade.  Thus, I test the transaction cost model 
between two institutions that rarely engage in political logrolling – the President and the 
courts.   
 
Court Control – Judicial Deadlines 
The dataset also allows me to examine how judicially-imposed restrictions on the 
regulatory process affect the President’s control over regulatory policy.  Similar to statutory 
deadlines, a judicial deadline reduces agency discretion when promulgating the regulation.  
Moe (1989) finds that judicially-imposed deadlines are a particularly effective method of 
constraining EPA’s regulatory efforts.  In addition, it constitutes an unambiguous constraint 
on an agency’s policymaking authority prior to White House review.  OMB records all 
instances of regulations with judicial deadlines that underwent review and the actions taken 
during review.  The reasons to expect that judicial control over the timing of policy restricts 
presidential authority are the same as those discussed above in the statutory deadline section.   
Despite their similarities in effect, however, it is important to deal with one obvious 
difference between the two types of deadlines.  Whereas we might reasonably expect 
Congress to craft proscriptive statutes to deliberately restrict principal-driven drift by the 
President, we do not view court action through the same lens.  The courts must wait for an 
entity with standing to bring suit, and even then a court deadline may result from the 
preferences of the litigants rather than the courts.  Thus, we should not assume that the 
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application of judicial deadlines occurred because the courts wished to reduce principal-
driven drift during the regulatory process.  This difference is one of the primary benefits to 
testing the transaction cost theory using judicial deadlines.  It removes a great deal of the 
assumed intent behind proscriptive statutes and allows me to focus solely on the effect of any 
limitation on agency discretion.  It is not necessary for the theory that the courts intentionally 
restrain principal-driven drift from the White House.  The fundamental question of this 
empirical test is to see whether the second principal is less willing to engage in the costs of 
policy control when another principal previously constrained the agency.   
 
Transaction Costs and Gridlock 
The final empirical chapter assesses the potential effects of divided government on 
regulatory gridlock.  The independent variables of interest capture two types of divided 
government and the dependent variable measures the volume of regulation completed.  I 
discuss each variable in greater detail in the empirical chapters.  The next section provides an 
overview of the dataset, the coding rules, and descriptive statistics for the regulations across 
agency, year, and category of regulation.
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CHAPTER III 
THE DATA 
 
Data Source 
The data for this dissertation is a census of all regulatory actions reviewed by OMB 
from 1981 through 2005.  It was constructed from the XML files available at: 
(http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/XMLReportList).  This website is maintained by OMB 
and the General Services Administration.  The website provides a file for each calendar year 
from 1981 through the current calendar year.  Each file contains information (described in 
detail below) about all OMB actions related to regulation completed during that calendar 
year.  Each file from 1981 through 2005 was imported into Access then exported into SAS 
for cleaning.   
 
Data Cleaning 
The original dataset contains 37,619 actions completed by OMB; however, I delete 
the 898 actions outside the formal regulatory process.  Non-regulatory actions include: 
announcements, white papers, technical appendices, record management documents, notices, 
and pre-rules.  These are either administrative documents or agency updates that lack the 
force of law.  I delete 801 regulatory actions that lack information regarding the outcome of 
the review process.  241 of these were designated by OMB as “emergency cases,” with the 
remaining 560 titled “deadline cases.”   63 regulatory actions were deleted because a review 
was never completed.   Seven of these were deleted because the regulatory action was not 
submitted properly and therefore was returned to the agency and 56 were deemed to be 
exempt from the Executive Order after the agency submitted the paperwork.   Finally, a 
handful of regulatory actions (5) were deleted because integral information about the 
regulatory action was missing.  One regulation was missing the decision variable assessing 
whether the rule was approved without changes, approved with changes, rejected, or 
withdrawn.  Four regulatory actions were deleted because their agency code did not 
correspond to an agency name and the agency could not be determined based on a search of 
the on-line database.  These modifications leave 35,852 regulatory actions completed 
between 1981 and 2005. 
 
Data Description 
The data includes the following 9 variables, each described in detail below: 
• RIN 
• Title 
• Agency Code 
• Date Received 
• Date Completed 
• Legal Deadline 
• Stage 
• Economically Significant 
• Decision 
 
Identification and Date Variables 
The RIN is an identification number used by the federal government.  It is not, 
however, a unique identifier for an individual regulation.  A proposed and final regulation 
may have the same RIN number or they may not.  In addition, a controversial regulatory 
action may have undergone several proposed versions before reaching approval. All of the 
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versions may be under the same RIN or the RIN may have changed for each version.  
Consequently, proposed and final regulatory actions cannot be linked automatically.  This 
dissertation does not require linking proposed and final regulations in the analyses.  In the 
future, however, finding a way to link them would provide enormous possibilities when 
evaluating interest group strategies at different policy stages, how different Presidents 
interact with the bureaucracy, or the effects of different presidential appointees on the same 
issue area.   
The Title variable contains the agencies’ title for each submission.  186 regulatory 
actions are missing this variable, but these regulatory actions have all other information 
including agency code and RIN.  This information can be generated by using the searchable 
on-line database to look up each regulatory action by RIN, Date Received, and Date 
Completed.  I chose not to do so because the title is not necessary for the analyses in this 
dissertation.  In the future this variable may be instrumental in looking at subsets of 
regulation by issue area.  The current data format allows the database to be read into Access 
to facilitate searches.   
The Agency Code is a numeric code that corresponds to the agency or sub-agency 
submitting the regulatory actions.  A separate XML file contains the agency name and 
acronym.  These two variables were merged into the regulatory action dataset.  In addition, I 
created two new variables: main agency code and main agency name.  For regulatory actions 
originating in a sub-agency, these new variables were coded to reflect the larger agency in 
which the sub-agency is located.  For regulatory actions submitted from the main agency, 
these new variables match the original agency variables.  197 regulatory actions were 
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missing agency codes.  This information was found by using the searchable on-line database 
to look up each regulatory action by Title, Date Received, and Date Completed.   
 
Date Variables 
The Date Received provides the day, month, and year that a regulatory action was 
received by OMB, while the Date Completed provides the day, month, and year that a 
regulatory action was completed by OMB.  These variables could be used calculate how long 
the action was under review at OMB.  However, different administrations have chosen to 
selectively enforce the 90-day review time at different points in their term.  Thus, the 
measure would not be reliable across time.   
 
Volume of Regulatory Actions 
The 35,852 regulatory actions fall into 189 agency or sub-agencies which translates 
into 81 main agencies.  The table below lists the main agency names and the number of 
regulatory actions completed between 1981 and 2005.  As seen in the Table 3.1, 10 agencies 
account for approximately 79 percent of all regulatory actions completed between 1981 and 
2005 and 15 account for a full 90% of the actions.  Department of Agriculture completed the 
largest number of regulatory actions – 6,639 (19 percent) over this time period.  Department 
of Health and Human Services completed 12 percent (4,185) while the Environmental 
Protection Agency completed approximately 11 percent of the regulatory actions (3,895).  
Department of Transportation completed 10 percent of the regulatory actions (3,459).  
Combined these 4 agencies account for 50% of all regulatory activity completed between 
1981 and 2005. 
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A simple number or percentage by agency does not capture the substantial intra-
agency variation that occurs over time as the regulatory activity of a given agency waxes and 
wanes.  Note that not all agencies were active across the full time period.  In some cases, this 
simply indicates a lack of regulatory output.  In others, however, it may reflect the 
sometimes-transitory nature of agencies as they come into (and fade out of) existence.  Table 
3.2 provides the number of regulatory actions completed by each agency over time. 
 
Threshold of Significance 
As discussed in Chapter 2, E.O. 12866 sets guidelines for defining the significance of 
regulations.  OMB only reviews regulations meeting the “economically significant” and 
“other significant” status.  The Economically Significant variable captures whether the 
regulatory action was “economically significant”.  “Economically significant” regulatory 
actions are those with an annual effect of $100 million or more on the national economy 
(Executive Order 12291, 1981; Executive Order 12866, 1993).  Since 1981, all regulations 
meeting the $100 million threshold and having novel legal or policy implications have been 
required to undergo White House review.  These two criteria ensure that the rule has 
substantial quantifiable economic impacts and also engages an important segment of national 
policy.4  This designation allows for consistent tracking of the most important regulations in 
terms of economic effect and public salience.  In addition, Congress uses the same $100 
million threshold when it reviews regulations under the Congressional Review Act, thus 
ensuring that the executive and legislative branches are using similar measures of importance 
                                                 
4Rules that reach the $100 million threshold but are not reviewed by the White House include actions such as 
the re-licensing of a given chemical.  Such rules do not generally have novel legal or policy implications.  Note 
that the White House reserves the right to review any regulation should it surface as an issue requiring 
oversight. 
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for the purposes of this analysis.  Between 1981 and 2005, OMB reviewed 1,992 
“economically significant” regulatory actions from 31 agencies.  
Figure 3.1 describes the number of “other significant” and “economically significant” 
regulatory actions completed in each year.   The marked difference in the number of “other 
significant” regulatory actions completed before and after 1993 reflects the change in how 
E.O. 12291 and E.O. 12866 approached regulatory review.  At the beginning of regulatory 
review, no one was quite sure how it would work.  Reagan chose to err on the side of caution 
and kept the threshold for “other significant” regulatory actions very low.  This ensured that 
the White House saw virtually everything, but it also meant that OMB reviewed thousands of 
regulations per year.  Predictably, this caused substantial delays – OIRA has never had more 
than 50-60 analysts at any one time.  Clinton changed the review process by reducing the 
number of regulations termed “other significant” to diminish review times.  His Executive 
Order cleverly allowed the White House to call in every regulation that it wanted to review 
while still avoiding the procedural burden of reviewing unimportant regulations.  Note that 
the number of “economically significant” regulations called in for review did not diminish 
when the executive orders changed.  The $100 million threshold is used by both 
congressional and executive order review processes, and has remained unchanged since 
1981.  On average 77 “economically significant” regulatory actions are completed each year 
(SD=19).  The graph highlights the consistency of that number over time with the exception 
of 1991 through 1994 where the number was somewhat higher. 
Table 3.3 describes the number and percentage of “economically significant” 
regulatory actions over time.  The number ranges from 52 in 1981 to 126 in 1991.  Prior to 
the change in the Executive Order, approximately three percent of regulatory actions in the 
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average year were classified as “economically significant.”  After the change, approximately 
15 percent were considered “economically significant.”  This change is almost exclusively 
due to the reduction in “other significant” regulations undergoing review. 
 
Regulatory Stage 
 The Stage variable describes the type of OMB action evaluated.  As discussed earlier, 
given the topic of this dissertation, non-regulatory actions were deleted from the database.  
The remaining regulatory actions can be classified as proposed or final regulations.  Table 
3.4 and Figure 3.2 describe the number of proposed and final regulations completed over 
time.  The numbers of proposed and final regulatory actions follow the same pattern over 
time.  On average, 43 percent of completed regulatory actions in a given year are proposed 
rules. 
 
Legal Deadlines 
The Legal Deadline variable captures whether the regulatory action was subject to a 
statutory or judicial deadline.  This is the key independent variable for my first empirical 
chapter.  Figure 3.3 describes the proportion of regulatory actions with any deadline over 
time.  Prior to 1994 the proportion of regulations with a deadline varies dramatically over 
time (3% in 1981 to 50% in 1985).  This pattern calls into question the validity of this 
variable from 1981 - 1993.  In addition, prior to 1994, the database does not distinguish 
between judicial and statutory deadlines, making it virtually impossible to identify which 
type of deadline is causing the variation.  Consequently, none of the analyses examining the 
impact of deadlines use data prior to 1994.  Finally, the chapter evaluating the impact of 
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divided government on regulatory outcomes excludes regulations with deadlines to avoid 
confounding the results.  
Figure 3.4 describes the proportion of regulatory actions with each type of deadline 
from 1994 through 2005.  The proportions of regulatory actions with no deadlines, statutory 
deadlines, and judicial deadlines remain relatively constant between 1994 and 2005.  
 
White House Action 
The Decision variable describes the action taken by OMB.  These include: Approved 
Consistent with Changes, Approved Consistent without Changes, Returned to Agency, 
Withdrawn by Agency, and Suspended.  The outcomes for the 35,852 regulatory actions 
completed between 1981 and 2005 are described in Table 3.5.   The majority of regulatory 
actions are approved without change (69 percent).  Twenty-six percent are approved with 
changes.  Finally, OMB rejects 6 percent of regulations by returning them to the agency in 
one of three forms – returned, suspended, or withdrawn by agency.  While the dataset allows 
the distinction between changed and not changed, the extent of the changes made is unclear.  
I change in the placement of a comma could lead to a changed designation.  In addition, 
whatever changes occurred yielded a compromise that the President was willing to approve.  
Consequently, I only distinguish between regulations that were approved relative to those 
that were rejected in this dissertation. 
As seen in Figure 3.5, the percentage of regulatory actions rejected remained 
relatively constant over time with one exception -2001.  On average, 6 percent of regulations 
are rejected each year (SD=0.04) ranging from 3 to 8 percent each year (except in 2001).  In 
2001, 26 percent of regulatory actions were rejected and returned to the agencies.  President 
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George W. Bush actively pursued turning back those midnight regulations that Clinton did 
not quite finish before leaving office.  
The final section of this chapter examines the rejection rates among various types of 
regulatory actions over time.  Figure 3.6 compares rejection rates for proposed and final 
regulations.  The graphs reveal that the rejection rates for proposed and final regulatory 
actions follow the same pattern over time with the rejection rate for proposed regulations 
approximately 3 percentage points higher each year.  On average, 8 percent of proposed 
regulations are rejected in a year (SD=0.06), while only 5 percent of final regulations are 
rejected (SD=0.03).  The rejection rates are fairly constant over time for both types of 
regulations with the exception of 2001.  The proportion of proposed regulations rejected 
ranges from 4 to 11 percent while the proportion of final regulations rejected ranges from 2 
to 8 percent.  In 2001, 34 percent of proposed and 20 percent of final regulations were 
rejected by GW Bush.   
Figures 3.7 compares White House rejection rates for “economically significant” and 
“other significant” regulatory actions.  The rejection rates for “other significant” regulations 
is fairly consistent over time with the exception of the spike in 2001.  On average, 6 percent 
of “other significant” regulations are rejected each year (SD=0.04) ranging from 3 to 8 
percent (excluding 2001 in which 26 percent were rejected).  The rejection rates for 
“economically significant” rules is somewhat more erratic, however, the total number of such 
regulations is smaller – 1933 total (77 per year on average).  On average, 8 percent of 
“economically significant” regulations are rejected each year (SD=0.06).  The times series is 
marked by 2 peaks in the percentage of rejections: 1989-1990 during the middle of George 
Bush’s term and 2001-2002 at the beginning of GW Bush’s first term.   
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An Outline of the Empirical Tests 
 These data have numerous applications for evaluating bureaucratic systems.  In the 
next two chapters I use the data described here to evaluate two specific predictions of the 
transaction cost theory.  Chapter IV looks at how decreasing agency discretion affects the 
decision calculus of the President.  Chapter V takes the transaction cost theory to its logical 
conclusion and examines the potential effects of increasing principal cost on the likelihood 
that bureaucratic gridlock results.   
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CHAPTER IV 
TESTING THE THEORY: THE FEDERAL REGULATORY PROCESS 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter empirically tests the responsiveness of the President to two different 
types of reduction in agency discretion that increase the transaction costs of policy control – 
statutory and judicial deadlines.  The goal of these tests is to determine whether principals (in 
this case the President) are in fact less likely to influence policy as the transaction costs of 
doing so increase.  Extant research has never empirically established this link, and the 
absence of such support casts doubt upon the validity of applying the transaction cost theory 
to questions of principal-driven drift.  In essence, scholarship has assumed that Principal I 
uses reductions in agency discretion to control Principal II, but has not empirically tested 
whether or not Principal II responds as anticipated.  Given the myriad of other reasons that 
Principal I might reduce agency discretion (e.g., credit claiming or controlling agency-driven 
drift), claiming principal-driven drift as a motive requires validation.   
I have chosen to evaluate this link using the White House review of regulations as the 
target bureaucratic system.  This segment of the federal regulatory process offers an excellent 
venue within which to evaluate the transaction cost theory.  I begin with a look at the 
segment of the regulatory process under examination – White House review – and then turn 
to the dependent variable, independent variables, and statistical design.  The findings provide 
substantial support for the transaction cost theory.  They also indicate the presence of a 
surprising degree of pre-decisional court influence over the bureaucracy. 
 
Why White House Review? 
The White House review stage offers several advantages when evaluating the effects 
of changes in transaction costs on principal-driven drift.  One of the stage’s great virtues is 
its terminal position in the overall regulatory process.  Evaluating principal-driven drift 
requires identifying whether the principal in the second stage is reacting to previous 
reductions in agency discretion or is seeking to influence principals even later in the process.  
A principal’s decision at some middle stage could be a response to a previous principal’s 
action, an effort to reduce principal-driven drift by a future principal, or some combination of 
the two.  Reliably distinguishing between these two motives at a middle stage in the process 
is extraordinarily difficult.  I avoid this problem by evaluating a principal’s behavior at the 
final stage in the process when their actions could only be in response to, rather than in 
anticipation of, another principal’s actions.   
Scholars of the courts or Congress might argue that both entities have windows of 
regulatory influence that occur after White House review is complete.  Neither, however,  
affects the outcomes of presidential review.  Although legal challenge occurs after White 
House review, the courts are tasked with evaluating whether or not an agency’s regulation is 
consistent with its statutory mandate – not whether the agency adhered to presidential 
preferences.  Thus, White House review has no effect on either the likelihood that a court 
action will occur or on its eventual result.  Similarly, the White House does not factor in 
possible rejection by the Congressional Review Act (CRA) when making decisions.  In 
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theory the CRA provides Congress with a final check over certain classifications of 
regulations.  In its entire history, however, the CRA has only been employed once (the 
Ergonomics Rule) and it has functionally ceased to be relevant to White House decision 
making.  For these reasons, I can reasonably assert that White House decisions are not made 
in anticipation of future principal-driven drift. 
  The second advantage stems from the first – multiple principals have had the 
opportunity to influence the regulations at earlier stages.  Both Congress and the courts can – 
and frequently do – reduce agency discretion prior to White House review.  The third 
advantage is one of scope.  The White House reviews critical regulations from all but a 
handful of the regulatory agencies.  Thus, the evaluation of the transaction cost approach – a 
rather broad theoretical lens – includes an equally broad set of the federal policymaking 
activities.  This stands in marked contrast to more typical approaches to bureaucratic research 
that focus on a single policy area, or at best a handful of issues.   
Finally, as part of White House review, OMB keeps excellent records of all three 
principals’ influence over regulations.  The data provide consistent measures of key types of 
principal intervention across policy areas and across time.  Recalling Chapter II’s discussion 
of the regulatory process, Congress has a clear opportunity to reduce agency discretion 
through the use of proscriptive language in the authorizing statute.  One such proscriptive 
control – and the first independent variable of interest – occurs when Congress imposes a 
statutory deadline on agency rulemaking.  In other words, Congress dictates the date by 
which the agency must successfully promulgate the regulations implementing the policy 
intent of the statute.  The second independent variable, judicial deadlines, occurs when the 
courts impose a similar restriction on the agencies prior to White House review.  I explain 
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how the courts directly influence regulatory outcomes prior to the agency writing the 
regulation, in greater detail below.   
The final measure of principal activity captures whether the President is less willing 
to influence a regulation’s outcomes when either a statutory or judicial deadline increases the 
transaction costs of doing so.  The dependent variable – White House rejection of a 
regulation – provides a consistent measure of presidential influence over regulations.  The 
mechanisms of rejection are uncomplicated.  If the White House deems a regulatory action so 
unacceptable that it cannot be salvaged by policy compromise then it has two options – 
return the rule5 or force the agency to withdraw it. Either decision constitutes a rejection of 
the rule for the purposes of the analysis.  For example, OMB “suggested” that EPA withdraw 
its first regulatory proposal on Yucca Mountain because there was no way the White House 
was going to approve the text as submitted.   
Given these three measures of political influence, Figure 4.1 provides a view of the 
transaction cost theory’s predictions as they apply to White House review of regulations.  
Next I discuss in detail the three measures, beginning with the selection of rule rejection as 
the dependent variable.   
 
The Dependent Variable: Rule Rejection by the White House 
Evaluating the transaction cost theory within the context of White House regulatory 
review requires a dependent variable that provides a consistent measure of presidential 
influence on regulatory policymaking across agencies and over time.  Rule rejection meets 
                                                 
 
5Returning a rule requires that OMB craft a “return letter” that provides a detailed account of all that is wrong 
with the regulation.  If the agency ever decided to try again then it would have to respond to each point in the 
return letter.  These return letters are made available to the public. 
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this criterion. There is no more severe expression of presidential influence over regulatory 
policy than rejection (Kerwin 2003), and its effects are consistent across all agencies.  
Similarly, the process of rejection and its impact on regulations have remained constant over 
the entire time period.  Most importantly, rejection of the rule by the White House can only 
be construed as an attempt to control the policy outcome.  Every rule rejection carries 
substantial political costs to the President, embarrasses the agency, and generally airs 
executive branch dirty laundry to the public.  If something other than policy control is the 
goal of the White House, there are cheaper, more effective ways to achieve political ends.  
Rejection is the option of last resort, used only when every other method of policy 
compromise has failed.  Given this, the White House is understandably reluctant to use the 
authority – only 6 percent of the regulatory actions were rejected between 1994 and 2005. 
From the perspective of the theory, I expect a decrease in the likelihood that a rule is 
rejected when the agencies have less discretion over the rule’s policy outcomes.   As 
discussed in Chapter I, the cost to the President of controlling a policy increases when agency 
discretion has been previously reduced by another principal.  Rule rejection is the most 
expensive manifestation of White House regulatory oversight, and is therefore used only on 
those rules that are absolutely unacceptable.  The severity of rejection imposes costs on the 
President.  The political transaction costs to the White House have four primary components.  
First, as discussed in Chapter II, the White House designed the review process to remain 
opaque to entities outside the administrative branch.  No one – including Congress – has the 
text of the regulation under review.  This allows the White House to alter the regulation 
without having to publicly claim which revisions it demanded.  The political benefits of such 
deniability can be enormous, particularly when dealing with a controversial policy and active 
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constituent groups.  Rejecting the rule strips the White House of this option by making the 
rule, and the decision, public.  Second, rejecting a rule consumes considerable White House 
and agency resources that could be profitably spent elsewhere.  White House personnel will 
generally exhaust every option for compromise before choosing to reject a rule.  On average, 
rejected rules require that more White House staff get involved and commit greater political 
resources than do rules that undergo a successful review.  The agency faces a virtually 
identical situation.  Successful reviews are generally handled by agency program staff 
familiar with the issue area.  Conversely, I have never heard of a review ending in rejection 
that did not involve one or more of an agency’s political appointees.  Finally, public 
disagreement between an agency head and the White House on an important policy issue 
carries substantial image costs to the President.  When the President rejects the considered 
opinion of his “expert” in the issue area he virtually guarantees himself a certain amount of 
political fallout that he would prefer to avoid.  For all of these reasons, rule rejection 
constitutes the most severe measure of the presidential control over regulatory outcomes. 
Its effect is as impressive as it is expensive – rejecting the rule publicly forces the 
agency to accept the status quo.  Thus, rejection is at once the most expensive form of policy 
control and the most effective.  If constraining agency discretion successfully reduces the use 
of this tool then the practical effect is to protect a regulation opposed by the President in a 
process designed to prevent just such a regulatory proposal from becoming law.   Such a 
finding would provide considerable support for the transaction cost theory, but the analysis 
requires reliable measures of reductions in agency discretion imposed by other principals 
earlier in the process.  I now turn to a description of these key independent variables.   
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The Independent Variables of Interest: Statutory Deadlines and Court Deadlines 
 As described at length in Chapter II, statutory deadlines and judicial deadlines 
provide excellent measures of reductions in agency discretion.  The transaction cost theory 
predicts that as agency discretion goes down the President’s likelihood of policy intervention 
also decreases.   Thus, the transaction cost theory generates the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Regulations with statutory deadlines are less likely to be rejected 
during White House review than are regulations without deadlines. 
 
H2: Regulations with judicial deadlines are less likely to be rejected 
during White House review than are regulations without deadlines. 
 
A Second Implication of Pre-Decisional Court Control 
The presence of judicial deadlines provides an opportunity to test a secondary 
question that, while unrelated to the transaction cost theory, is of interest to scholars of the 
bureaucracy and the courts: “Do the courts have a formal, pre-decisional check on 
bureaucratic policy?”   In theory, the courts’ formal authority is limited to reviewing an 
agency’s interpretation of congressional intent.  This can only occur after the agency 
promulgates the rule and if an entity with standing brings suit.  The traditional view, 
therefore, of court/agency interaction contends that agencies are not forced to take court 
preferences into account when formulating policy because the courts lack formal pre-
decisional authority (Moe 1985; Baum 1976, 1981; Rosenberg 1991).  In theory, legal 
precedent supports this attitude.  The lower courts were removed from the business of 
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interfering in pre-decisional rulemaking by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. 
United States (1978).  Similarly, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council (1984) ruled 
that the courts must show deference to the agency’s interpretation of statutory intent.  These 
cases should prevent the courts from exercising formal pre-decisional control on regulations 
prior to White House review.  Since judicial deadlines constitute a formal check on agency 
action, any finding that deadlines have significant pre-decisional influence on policy would 
require a reevaluation of the current conceptualization of court influence. 
Such a finding would not, however, come as a complete surprise.  Recent work has 
demonstrated that the courts have significant informal pre-decisional influence over 
bureaucratic outputs.  Research studying the Corps of Engineers has found that agencies take 
the attitudes of the courts into account when generating decisions (Canes-Wrone 2003).  
Similarly, Howard and Nixon (2002) find that the IRS audit rates are responsive to the 
ideological composition of circuit courts, and Wood and Waterman (1993) demonstrate that 
EPA referrals are unusually sensitive to court decisions.  Again, however, these are examples 
of informal, and in some cases, indirect influence.  A finding of formal pre-decisional 
influence would add new information to the discussion of court authority over the 
bureaucracy.   
 
Data 
Beginning with the clean dataset described in Chapter I, I omit all regulations 
completed before 1994 because the data do not distinguish between statutory and judicial 
deadlines.  I delete six regulations completed in 1994 because the type of deadline was not 
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available.6  There were 6,329 regulations completed between 1994 and 2005 with sufficient 
deadline information from 54 agencies.  As described in detail below, these models are 
estimated within a fixed agency effects framework which results in the exclusion of agencies 
without a rejected regulation over the time period.  This exclusion omits 24 agencies but only 
127 regulations.  The analysis, therefore, examines 6,202 completed regulatory reviews from 
30 agencies. 
Thirteen percent of the regulations have statutory deadlines (796 regulations), while 5 
percent have judicial deadlines (294 regulations).   Table 4.1 provides agency-specific 
statutory deadline information.  Twenty-four of the 30 agencies in this analysis have one or 
more regulations with a statutory deadline.  The Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) has the most rules with statutory deadlines - 165 regulations accounting for 21 percent 
of all regulations with statutory deadlines.  EPA, the Department of Transportation (DOT), 
and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) each account for approximately 12 percent of all 
rules with statutory deadlines with 95, 94, and 88 rules with statutory deadlines, respectively. 
On average, 12 percent of an agency’s regulations were subject to statutory deadlines 
(SD=.11 with a range of 43% to 0%).  Department of Energy (DOE), FAR 
(DOD/GSA/NASA), and Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board 
(ATBCB) had the highest proportion of rules subject to statutory deadlines (43, 35, and 29 
percent, respectively).  HHS’s 165 rules with statutory deadlines accounts for 19 percent of 
their total rules completed.  Among the agencies with nearly 100 rules with statutory 
deadlines, 12 percent of EPA’s, 19 percent of DOT’s, and 15 percent of USDA’s rules had 
statutory deadlines. 
                                                 
6I omit the 14 regulations in the sample that have both a judicial and a statutory deadline because of the risk of 
spuriously assigning causality to one deadline over another. 
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Table 4.2 shows that only 12 of the 30 agencies have one or more regulations with a 
judicial deadline.  The EPA has the most rules with judicial deadlines – 169 regulations 
accounting for 57 percent of all regulations with judicial deadlines.  Department of Interior 
(DOI) completed 77 regulations with judicial deadlines accounting for 26 percent of all 
regulations with judicial deadlines.  Department of Commerce (DOC) completed 18 
regulations with judicial deadlines accounting for 6 percent of all regulations with judicial 
deadlines.  Together these three agencies account for 90 percent of all regulations with 
judicial deadlines.  On average, 2 percent of an agency’s regulations were subject to judicial 
deadlines (SD=.06 with a range of 28% to 0%).  EPA, DOI, and DOC had the highest 
proportion of rules subject to judicial deadlines (28, 22, and 7%, respectively).  
Figure 4.2 compares the proportion of regulations rejected for rules without 
deadlines, those with statutory deadlines, and those with judicial deadlines.  Among 
regulatory actions without deadlines, the proportion rejected averages 8 percent with the 
exception of 2001 when 29 percent were rejected (approximately a 350 percent increase).  
Among regulatory actions with statutory deadlines, on average, 4 percent of regulatory 
actions with statutory deadlines are rejected in a year.  The rate does increase to 11 percent in 
2001 (slightly less than a 250% increase).  The pattern for regulatory actions with judicial 
deadlines is much more erratic, however there are only 294 regulations with judicial 
deadlines over the 12 year period compared to 796 regulations with statutory deadlines. 
 
Methods 
To determine whether reduced agency discretion impacts the behavior of the 
President at a later stage in the process, I examine the relationship between the probability 
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that a regulation is rejected and the presence of a statutory or judicial deadline.  Given that 
agencies complete multiple regulations over the time period – on average an agency 
completes 17.2 regulations per year (SD=21.4, median=7) – I need to control for the agency-
specific impact on the probability that a regulation is rejected.  I can model this impact within 
a fixed effects model (estimating a different intercept for each agency) or a random effects 
(estimating the agency-specific intercept as part of the error term) model.  Table 4A.1 in the 
Appendix shows the results from both models.  The results are similar, but I perform a 
Hausman test to determine whether the differences in the results are statistically significant.  
I reject the null of no systematic differences in the coefficient estimates between the models 
(χ2 = 18.8, p-value = 0.03).  This result indicates that the assumption of the random effects 
model – that the agency-specific part of the error term is uncorrelated with the other 
covariates – is violated.  Consequently, this analysis employs a fixed effects model.     
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous I must also choose between the 
available binary choice outcome models: logit, probit, or gompit.7  In addition, a fixed effects 
model may be estimated by including dummy variables for agency in a standard binary 
choice model (an unconditional fixed effects model) or as a conditional fixed effects model 
in which the likelihood function is conditional on the number of regulations rejected in each 
agency.  The conditional and unconditional fixed effects logit models yield nearly identical 
results as seen in Table 4A.2 of the Appendix.  Conditional fixed effects probit and 
complementary log log are not possible to estimate because there are not sufficient statistics 
                                                 
7A gompit model estimated using a reverse coding of the outcome and a complementary log log model.  The 
gompit model is a reasonable alternative to the standard probit and logit models when the outcome variable 
includes a disproportionate number of zeros.  This situation violates the symmetrically distributed error term 
assumption of the probit and logit models.  When the mean of the dependent variable is low, in this case only 
8.3 percent of regulations are rejected, the gompit model is more appropriate.  The gompit model assumes that 
the error term is distributed with a Gompertz distribution.  The cumulative Gompertz distribution is described 
by the following equation:  G(z) = 1 – exp(-exp(z)).   
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available to remove the fixed effects from the likelihood function (StataCorp 2005).  In 
addition, the unconditional versions of these fixed effects models produce biased coefficient 
estimates (StataCorp 2005).  I have estimated the unconditional fixed effects probit and 
gompit (a complementary log log model with the outcome reverse coded) models as a 
robustness check.  While the magnitudes of the estimates vary from those of the logit model, 
Table 4A.2 of the appendix shows that the pattern of results and the significance levels are 
reasonably consistent.  To allow readers to compare the differences in rejection rates between 
agencies, I present on the results from the unconditional fixed effects logit model in this 
analysis.  
Equation 4.1 describes the model.  The covariates of interest are the indicators for 
statutory and judicial deadlines.  The model also includes a number of control variables.  
First, I include an indicator for whether the regulation is “economically significant” or “other 
significant.”  As discussed previously, economically significant regulations carry additional 
analytical procedural requirements that could independently alter the probability of rejection.  
Second, I control for the stage of the regulation.  Final regulations have a substantial “hold-
over” component from their proposed texts, making rejection less likely.  Third, I include an 
indicator for whether the President was Republican to account for partisan differences in how 
presidents use OMB review.  Fourth, I control for the different specifications of divided 
government: divided government in which the majority party of the two houses of Congress 
differ (Split Congress); and an indicator for divided government in which the majority party 
of Congress differs from the party of the President (United Congress).8   I also include two 
                                                 
8The transaction cost theory offers a weak expectation for a link between inter-branch partisan conflict and 
rejection rates.  Overturning a statutory requirement requires the passage of a different statute – an expensive 
proposition for the President under any circumstances, but particularly under divided government.  If costs are 
lower under unified government, then, the President’s willingness to reject a regulation and fight the existing 
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time variables: whether the rule was completed in the last 3 months of an administration; and 
an indicator for whether the rule was completed in the first 3 months of a new 
administration.9  The two administration variables exist because of Clinton’s famous 
“midnight regulations” and Bush’s response – a moratorium on regulations for the first few 
months of his term.   
Finally, the model controls for the agency that promulgated the rule using a series of 
dummy variables.  To account for the fact that regulations from the same agency may not be 
independent of each other, I cluster the standard errors by agency.  Given that the coefficients 
from nonlinear models are difficult to interpret, I also report the percentage point change in 
the predicted probability that a rule is rejected for each covariate, holding all other covariates 
at their mean value10 (Long and Freese, 2006). 
 
Equation 4.1: 
)ZδβG(X1)Pr(Y a
a
arara ∑+==  
where 
 Yra = 1 if the regulation was rejected 
 r  = index for regulation 
 a = index for agency 
 Xra = vector including:   Statutory Deadline, 
                                                                                                                                                       
statutory requirements may increase.  With only ten years of data, however, any observed patterns are suspect.  I 
return to the question of partisan conflict and regulation in Chapter V, which is devoted entirely to the effects of 
different specifications of divided government on regulatory systems. 
 
9I also estimate an alternative model in which I include year dummy variables rather than Split Congress, 
United Congress, Republican, Last 3 Months of Administration, and First 3 Month if a New Administration.  
The results are consistent. 
 
10This calculation is estimated using the prchange command from Stata’s Spost ado program. 
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Judicial Deadline, 
     Economically Significant,     
       Final Stage,  
     Republican President, 
     Split Congress, 
     United Congress, 
Last 3 Months of an Administration, and  
First 3 Months of New Administration. 
 Za = dummy variable for agency a 
 G(z)  = cumulative logistic distribution = exp(z)/[1+ exp(z)] 
 
Initial Findings 
 The initial analysis provides support for the expectations generated by the transaction 
cost theory.  The presence of either type of deadline results in a statistically significant 
reduction in the President’s willingness to reject the regulation.  Table 4.3 provides the 
results of the model, including the percentage-point change in the likelihood a rule is 
rejected.   
The findings of the initial model strongly support both hypotheses.  In the case of 
Hypothesis #1, the presence of a statutory deadline decreases the probability that a regulation 
is rejected by 3.2 percentage points, holding other covariates at their means.  Since on 
average 9.2 percent of rules without deadlines are rejected, this represent a 35 percent 
decrease in the probability of rejection.  Regarding Hypothesis #2, the presence of a judicial 
deadline decreases the probability that a regulation is rejected by 4.3 percentage points when 
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holding other covariates at their means.  This represents a 47 percent decrease in the 
probability that a regulation is rejected.    
  These main effects represent the average impact of each type of deadline across all 
regulations.  The effects are consistent with the idea that a reduction in agency discretion 
increases the political transaction costs of control to the President, thereby decreasing the 
likelihood that he engages in the policy process.  There is, however, another side to the 
equation when the President decides whether to reject a rule – the expected benefits of the 
policy intervention.  The basic calculus of the transaction cost theory suggests that the 
President will engage in policy control when the benefits of doing so exceed the costs.  Thus, 
the President should be more willing to absorb the increased cost of rejecting a rule with a 
deadline when the expected policy benefits are greater.  
Within the universe of regulations, those rules that comprise the “economically 
significant” group of regulations have the greatest impact on society when compared to 
“other significant” regulations.  They meet or exceed the $100 million requirement and trip 
at least one other threshold of significance.  They are unquestionably the most important 
regulations under review, and as such should generate the greatest benefits to the President 
should he influence their outcomes.  Thus, all other things being equal, the President should 
be more willing to reject “economically significant” regulations with deadlines than he is 
“other significant” regulations with deadlines.   
 
A Second Model 
To investigate whether the impact of reduced agency discretion is consistent for 
“other significant” and “economically significant” regulations, I estimate a second model that 
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includes two additional covariates:  the interaction between the indicators for statutory 
deadline and “economically significant” and the interaction between the indicators for 
judicial deadline and “economically significant.”  Table 4.4 provides the results for this 
model.  The interaction between the indicators for statutory deadline and “economically 
significant” is not statistically significantly different from zero, indicating that the impact of a 
statutory deadline does not vary by significance status.   
The interaction between the indicators for judicial deadline and “economically 
significant,” however, is statistically significantly different from zero.  This indicates that the 
impact of a judicial deadline does vary depending upon the significance of the regulation.  
The positive coefficient on the interaction suggests that the impact of a judicial deadline is 
dampened for “economically significant” regulations relative to “other significant” rules.  
Given the coding on the dummy variables, the indicator for judicial deadline provides the 
impact of a judicial deadline on “other significant” regulations.  The sum of the coefficients 
on judicial deadline and the interaction term provide the overall impact of a judicial deadline 
on “economically significant” regulations.  I use a Wald test to determine the statistical 
significance of this linear combination of coefficients.  Table 4.5 provides a summary of 
these results for both judicial and statutory deadlines across significance thresholds.   
As seen in Table 4.5, rules with statutory deadlines are 3.4 percentage points less 
likely to be rejected regardless of the significance status of the regulation.  This represents a 
37.6 percent decrease in the probability of rejection.  While the benefits associated with 
“economically significant” rules are higher than those of “other significant” rules, the results 
suggest that the increase in benefits are insufficient to overcome the additional costs imposed 
by a proscriptive statute.  Thus, the cost side of the transaction cost equation drives 
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presidential behavior.  The impact of judicial deadlines, however, varies considerably for 
regulations with different thresholds of significance.  Among “other significant” regulations, 
the presence of a judicial deadline decreases the probability that a regulation is rejected by 
5.3 percentage points.  This translates to a 58 percent decrease in the probability of rejection.  
In contrast, the presence of a judicial deadline decreases the probability that an 
“economically significant” rule is rejected by 0.2 percentage points – a result that is not 
statistically significantly different from zero.  The extremely low magnitude of the effect and 
the lack of statistical significance indicate that judicial deadlines do not affect the probability 
that a President rejects an “economically significant” regulation.  In the case of judicial 
deadlines, the benefits side of the equation appears to have greater relative weight – enough 
to tip the scales in favor of rejection.   
What accounts for the difference in effects of the two types of deadlines on 
“economically significant” regulations?   Most likely, we are seeing the breadth of 
Congress’s lawmaking authority.  As discussed earlier in Chapter II, Congress generally 
includes other statutory proscriptions along with statutory deadlines, the combination of 
which is the full amount of the reduction in agency discretion.  These proscriptions are often 
broad in scope, thus reducing the total amount of policy that the President can expect to 
influence.  Given this, the potential benefits to the President of policy control are reduced to 
the point where the costs of influence no longer justify the benefits.  In contrast, the judiciary 
does not have the same broad authority to generate new policy boundaries.  The proscriptions 
that accompany a judicial deadline are limited to interpretations of those congressional 
requirements that are under judicial consideration.  The extent of the restrictions that the 
courts can apply on regulations, therefore, is by definition narrower in scope. 
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 Other Variables of Interest 
As expected, the probability that a final regulation is rejected is 2.3 percentage points 
lower than that for a proposed regulation.  On average, 10 percent of proposed regulations 
are rejected, so this represents a 23 percent decrease in the probability of rejection.  This is 
consistent with the linked nature of proposed and final regulations.  If a President finds a rule 
acceptable at the proposed stage then the final rule generally receives the same treatment.  I 
was mildly surprised that the effect was not larger. 
Regarding the institution-specific covariates, the results indicate that divided 
government does alter the probability that the President rejects a regulation.  Relative to 
unified government, Split Congress increases the probability that a regulation is rejected by 
2.3 percentage points, holding other covariates at their means.  On average 11.2 percent of 
rules are rejected when the government is unified, thus this represents a 21 percent increase 
in the probability that a regulation is rejected.  On the other hand, United Congress decreases 
the probability that a regulation is rejected by 2.4 percentage points – a 21 percent decrease 
in the probability that a regulation is rejected.  I include controls for divided government 
because of the reasonable concern that partisan conflict is driving the analysis.  I do not, 
however, have great confidence that these results will prove robust if the time period of the 
analysis is increased.  From 1994 through 2005 there is only one period of United Congress 
(under Clinton) and one period of Split Congress (under Bush II).  Thus, only unified 
government has a significant presence in both administrations.  I examine the relationship 
between partisan conflict and the regulatory process with 25 years of data in the next chapter 
for a more robust look at the question and find little indication of partisan influence. 
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A regulation completed in the last three months of an administration is neither more 
nor less likely to be rejected controlling for the presence of deadlines.  This finding is 
surprising given the significant attention that Clinton’s final regulatory push received both 
inside and outside the White House.  I expected the rejection rate to decrease dramatically as 
Clinton worked overtime to push his agenda through.  Consistent with expectations, 
however, a rule completed in the first three months of a new administration is more likely to 
be rejected.  A regulation completed in the first 3 months of GW Bush’s administration is 52 
percentage points more likely to be rejected.  This undoubtedly results from the January 20, 
2001 memo in which President Bush halted all regulatory activity “unless and until a 
department or agency head appointed by the President after noon on January 20, 2001 
reviews and approves the regulatory action” (White House Memo, 2001).   
 
Alternative Specification #1: Rejection Rates as a Function of Resource Constraints 
 The initial analyses have treated the relationship between deadlines and rejection 
rates as a set of strategic decisions between two institutions.  An alternative view of the 
process, however, might regard policy implementation as a classic production function.  This 
perspective suggests a pair of alternative, resource-based explanations for the pattern of rule 
rejection observed in the preceding analysis.  Two types of resource constraints can 
potentially affect the analysis.  In the first, the agencies have greater resources with which to 
promulgate regulations capable of surviving White House review, thereby improving the 
quality of the regulations.  The White House has offered a number of rationales for its 
decisions to reject regulations since 1994, including incomplete technical analyses, 
insufficient stakeholder involvement, and confusing or contradictory regulatory 
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requirements.  This suggests that rejection may be the result of poorly constructed regulations 
rather than the presence of proscriptive statutory language such as deadlines.   
If this is the case then increasing agency resources should result in lower rejection 
rates as agencies generate better regulations through activities such as hiring additional 
personnel, purchasing capital equipment, and contracting out for necessary expertise.  This 
line of logic presents a potentially serious problem for my analysis.  If Congress cares 
enough about a particular policy initiative to increase the funding to the implementing 
agency then Congress is also likely to care enough to incur the costs required to write 
proscriptive statutes.  Thus, the number of agency regulations with statutory deadlines will 
increase at precisely the same time that agency funding increases.  If increased funding does 
result in better agency regulations – and a resulting decrease in the likelihood of rejection – 
then my initial findings may simply be the result of omitted variable bias.    
I measure the resources available to the agencies when formulating the regulation 
using lagged agency fiscal year budgetary outlays (Historical Tables – Budget of the United 
States Government Fiscal Year 2007) adjusted for inflation using the 2005 Consumer Price 
Index.  I use a one year lagged variable because any regulations under review in a given year 
were almost certainly in the final stages of production during the previous year.  The budget 
data are only available for the 23 largest agencies.  Consequently, 233 regulations are 
excluded from this supplementary analysis.     
The second potential resource constraint occurs within the White House itself.  As 
mentioned previously, rejection is an expensive and time-consuming process.  One could 
plausibly construct a scenario in which the probability of rejection decreases during periods 
when the review system is overburdened by a glut of regulatory activity.  As the number of 
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regulations increases the resources devoted to each rule review drops, and a large influx of 
regulations could force the resource allocation below the threshold necessary to reject the 
regulation.  The potential pathway for omitted variable bias is as follows.  Imagine that 
Congress is paying particular attention to a given policy area.  Under congressional scrutiny, 
the agencies feel pressure to generate more regulations within that policy domain.  This 
increase in the number of regulatory reviews overburdens the White House review process 
such that the probability of a rule receiving sufficient attention for a rejection to ensue is 
lower than normal.  At the same time, an attentive Congress is writing more proscriptive 
statutes with deadlines.  Thus, the presence of statutory deadlines may coincide with, but not 
result from, a reduction in rejection rates stemming from a significant up tick in the 
regulatory workload.   
Controlling for regulatory workload requires an absolute measure of regulations in a 
given subject area during a defined time period.  Common resource measures such as “full 
time equivalents” (FTEs), or budgetary outlays are inappropriate when dealing with the 
White House review system for two important reasons.  First, OIRA’s actual regulatory staff 
has not been reduced through cuts in FTE allocations during the time period under 
evaluation.  This does not mean, however, that the time spent on reviewing individual 
regulations is constant, but it does mean that the variation cannot be captured by tracking 
FTE allocations.  Second, reducing OIRA’s budget outside of FTEs is unlikely to have an 
appreciable affect on the amount of time spent on regulatory review, or even the quality of 
that review.  Regulatory review is a personnel-intensive, rather than a capital-intensive, 
activity.  Rule analysis simply does not require extraordinary expenditures on items such as 
computing power or extensive travel.  Instead, the regulatory workload story is one of 
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unexpected increases in the volume of regulations under review.  Thus, to estimate 
fluctuations in the workload confronting OMB during a particular regulation review, I 
constructed a variable that captures the number of regulations completed for the same agency 
in the 30 days prior and the 30 days after that particular regulation was completed.  By using 
the date in which the regulation was completed I am able to capture both realized and 
anticipated workload stress.  The construction of this workload variable is not possible for 
regulations completed in the first 30 days of 1994 and the last 30 days of 2005.  This results 
in the exclusion of 136 regulations from this supplementary analysis.  On average, an agency 
completed 7.86 additional regulations during the preceding and following 30 days of a 
regulation’s completion (SD = 5.99).  The agency workload ranges from 0 to 43 additional 
regulations. 
The results suggest that the earlier statutory and judicial deadline findings were not 
the result of omitted variable bias stemming from resource or workload constraints.  The 
effects of both types of deadlines remain significant and have similar or greater magnitudes 
when the workload and lagged agency budget variables are included as covariates in the 
models.  Table 4.6 shows that the magnitude of the impact of statutory deadlines does not 
change while the magnitude of the impact of judicial deadlines increases somewhat (-4.3 
percentage points to -6.0 percentage points).  Both coefficients are still significant at the 1 
percent level.   
Table 4.7 provides the results for the model that includes the interactions between the 
indicators for deadlines and economically significant.  Again, the overall pattern of results 
does not change.  The interaction of the indicators for statutory deadline and economically 
significant is still not statistically significant.  The interaction between judicial deadline and 
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“economically significant” remains statistically significant.  The magnitude of the impact of 
a judicial deadline on the probability that an “other significant” regulation is rejected 
increased from -5.3 percentage points to -8.8 percentage points.  A Wald test of the impact of 
a judicial deadline on the probability of rejection for “economically significant” reveals that 
the impact remains non-significant.  Consequently, the resource hypothesis is not confirmed, 
either in terms of agency resources or OIRA workload.   
Looking at the resource measures, two trends emerge.  First, both variables are 
statistically significant, but the magnitudes of the effects are low.  Second, and contrary to 
the expectations of the resource hypotheses, the probability that a rule is rejected actually 
increases when the agencies receive greater funding or when more rules are under review.  
An additional agency regulation under review increases the probability of rejection by 0.4 
percentage points.  Similarly, an additional million dollars in budgetary outlay for an agency 
during the year prior to the regulation’s review increases the probability of rejection by 0.03 
percentage points.  These results provide additional confidence that the resource/production 
theory is not driving the central results of the analysis.  In fact, the coefficients are signed 
positively, indicating that these measures of resource constraints have precisely the opposite 
effect than predicted by the resource/production hypothesis. 
Of these two variables, the workload measure presents the most promising avenue for 
future research.  The counterintuitive finding that increasing the regulatory flow through the 
White House results in higher rates of rejection offers interesting puzzles to both new 
institutionalists and scholars of public management.  For the former group, the findings raise 
questions about the design of the oversight process and the interactions between principal 
and agent.  For example, in what ways does White House review anticipate agency efforts to 
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overload the system, what are the agency incentives to promulgate or withhold regulations 
during high volume periods, and do patterns in regulatory volume follow shocks to the policy 
subsystems such as political appointments, election cycles, or changes in presidential 
preferences?  For management scholars, the structure of OIRA may provide clues as to how 
the office is able to flexibly adjust to changes in workload.  For example, OIRA keeps a pool 
of slack resources in the form of technical specialists (economists, legal analysts, and science 
advisors) in house to deal with sudden fluctuations in workload.  These analysts comprise 
anywhere from 15 to 25 percent of OIRA’s regulatory oversight staff and function as shock 
troops for the most important regulations.  Thus, an unexpected increase in regulatory 
workload within a policy area presents a less alarming picture than if OIRA did not possess a 
margin of safety within its FTE pool.  In addition, OIRA has a steady stream of specialists 
culled from the agencies and brought in on 6 month rotations.  For example, during one 
particularly short-staffed period five of the 28 regulatory analysts were temporarily 
“borrowed” from the agencies.  Finally, OIRA routinely rotates its regulatory personnel 
through accounts.  During the same 12 month period I reviewed education, transportation, 
energy, environment, and agricultural regulations.  Anecdotal conversations with members of 
other federal oversight bodies such as the Congressional Budget Office suggest that 
management within oversight groups view flexible workforces as an important aspect of 
handling exogenous shocks to their core missions.  It would be fascinating to know whether 
this pattern does indeed exist, and if that premium on flexibility gives way to an emphasis on 
specialization in programmatic offices.   
 
Alternative Specification #2: Grouping by Policy Area Rather Than by Agency 
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 The use of an agency fixed effects model has a number of merits given the transaction 
cost theory.  It does, however, assume that the unobserved time-invariant issue area 
characteristics that influence the probability that a regulation is rejected occur at the agency 
level.  For example, different agencies have markedly different internal regulatory design and 
review procedures, some of which mirror the goals of the White House and some of which 
do not.  It seems likely, therefore, that rules generated by different agencies will have 
different probabilities of survival once they reach the White House.  If, however, the issue 
area factors that influence rejection are instead specific to broader policy areas rather than 
agencies then the model may be misspecified.  There are reasons to believe that this might be 
the case.  For example, Jones, True, and Baumgartner (1997) point out that policy areas can 
migrate among oversight committees.  In addition, agencies are inconsistent in terms of the 
issues that they house.  For example, the Department of Defense generated the federal 
program on breast cancer research, and the Department of Energy housed the human genome 
project.  Finally, an agency does not necessarily control all federal policy on a given issue 
area.  For example, multiple agencies – not just EPA – have responsibilities for the 
generation and enforcement of environmental policy – much of the Endangered Species Act 
program resides within the Department of the Interior and the Department of Energy has an 
environment and health division. 
 Given these factors, using an agency fixed effects model may be inappropriate if the 
White House calculus on whether to reject a rule involves characteristics specific to the 
larger issue areas such as public perception of the issue (rather than the agency), the issue’s 
importance on the President’s agenda, or issue area conflict among the institutions.  In this 
case the better option would be to group the regulations by issue area and include fixed 
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effects for the issue categories.  Jones, True, and Baumgartner (1997) created a series of issue 
categories that allowed them to consistently track budget authority across time and agencies.  
I use a similar approach for grouping regulations by placing each regulatory action into one 
of the 19 major issue areas identified by Baumgartner and Jones in their Agendas Project.11  
To do so, I divided each of the agencies and sub-agencies in my data into policy areas.  
Appendix Table 4A.5 provides a list of the agencies and the sub-agencies and their 
corresponding policy areas.   
The primary results of the analysis do not change when the regulations are grouped 
by policy area.  When the policy area fixed effects rather than agency fixed effects are 
included in Model 1 the magnitude of the effects of deadlines increase as seen in Table 4.8.  
The presence of a statutory deadline is estimated to decrease the probability of rejection by 
4.1 percentage points as opposed to a 3.2 percent decrease in the original model.  Similarly, 
the presence of a judicial deadline is estimated to decrease the probability of rejection by 6.4 
percentage points as opposed to a 4.3 percent decrease in the original model.  This provides 
additional confidence in the robustness of the central findings.  In addition the results from 
Model 2 with the policy area fixed effects are consistent with the original model.   
As seen in Table 4.9, the interaction between the indicators for statutory deadline and 
economically significant is still not statistically significant.  The interaction between judicial 
deadline and economically significant is statistically significant, while the magnitude of the 
impact of a judicial deadline on the probability that an “other significant” regulation is 
rejected increased from -5.3 percentage points to -9.0 percentage points.  A Wald test of the 
impact of a judicial deadline on the probability of rejection for “economically significant” 
reveals that the impact remains non-significant.  While the alternative specification provides 
                                                 
11http://www.policyagendas.org/codebooks/topicindex.html (accessed on May 25th, 2008). 
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a different perspective on average rejection rates by policy area rather than agency, it 
explains less of the variance in the probability that a regulation is rejected.  The original 
pseudo R-square was 0.1384 and the alternative specification yields a pseudo R-square of 
0.1314.  The decrease is likely due to the fact that number of issue areas decreased from 30 to 
18.  These results suggest that the original specification remains the preferred option.   
Turning to the coefficients on the policy area dummies in Table 4.9, the excluded 
policy area is Agriculture which is consistent with the excluded agency from the original 
model – the Department of Agriculture.  The selection of this issue area creates a baseline 
that is a composite of the activities found throughout federal regulations.  Agriculture 
includes redistributive activities such as farm grants, and regulatory issues such as food 
production and storage.  The coefficients on the remaining policy area dummies demonstrate 
how the average rejection rates for regulations in each policy area differ from the average 
among agricultural regulations.  As seen in the table, the average rejection rates for the 
following policy areas are statistically significantly lower that the average rejection rate 
among agriculture rules: Energy; Public Lands and Water; Health; and Labor, Employment, 
and Immigration.  The rejection rates are statistically significantly higher for Education; 
Government Operations; Science and Technology; Law, Crime, and Family; 
Macroeconomics; International Affairs and Aid; Social Welfare; and Housing and 
Community Development.  One must be cautious when interpreting these results, however, 
in that this model only describes how the probability of rejection varies by policy area.  It 
does not evaluate how the impact of a deadline varies by policy area – the primary focus of 
this dissertation.  In order to evaluate how statutory and judicial deadlines influence rejection 
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rates across issue areas requires a multi-level model.  Such an analysis, which I intend to do 
at a later date, will be of particular interest to policy scholars. 
Table 4.10 provides the rejection rates by policy area to provide greater insight into 
how rejection rates vary by policy area.  These differences raise some interesting questions 
regarding the relative susceptibility to rejection among regulations in different policy areas.   
The categories with the highest rejection rates – Social Welfare (15.1 percent) and 
Housing and Community Development (14.5 percent) – generally produce agency actions 
that distribute public goods.  In contrast, the policy areas with the lowest rejection rates – 
Foreign Trade (0.0%), Energy (2.3 percent), and Public Lands and Water (4.2 percent) occur 
within agencies focused on regulatory activity that affects industry interests.  Taken together, 
this suggests that perhaps the President exerts a relatively large degree of control over 
redistributive activities – the kind that generate benefits to voting constituents.  The 
President, however, may be less inclined to become involved in regulations that punish 
constituent groups, thereby allowing the White House to a) blame Congress, or b) plead 
ignorance.   
 While this specification of the model generates interesting policy data for future 
research, it is worth reiterating two points.  First, the central findings important to the 
transaction cost theory remain unchanged.  Second, the results suggest that the original 
specification explains more of the variance.   
 
Alternative Specification #3: A Different Accounting of Time 
My original model controls for time through the use of dummy variables capturing 
periods of divided government (divided Congress and united Congress relative to Unified 
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government) and indicators for the first 3 months and the last 3 months of an administration.  
I chose these designations because I believe they capture the most meaningful aspects of time 
when evaluating the probability that a regulation is rejected.  A potential concern, however, 
is that there are other time-specific characteristics that might affect the analysis, such as 
attitudes of a given Congress, changing presidential preferences, etc.  To account for this 
possibility, I test an alternative specification that includes year dummies to distinguish 
varying rejection rates over time.  Since the variables for divided government, first 3 months 
and last 3 months of an administration are based solely on time, I cannot include these 
variables and the time dummies in the same model.   
Table 4.11 provides the results for Model 1 which captures time using year dummies 
instead of the original specification.  The results are consistent with my original 
specification, although the original model yields more conservative effect sizes.  As seen in 
the table, a statutory deadline decreases the probability of rejection by 4.1 percentage points 
(the original estimate was -3.2 percentage points).  Similarly, the presence of a judicial 
deadline decreases the probability of rejection by 6.3 percentage points (the original estimate 
was -4.3 percentages points). 
Table 4.12 provides the results for the model that includes the interactions between 
the indicators for deadlines and economically significant.  Again, the overall pattern of 
results does not change.  The interaction between the indicators for statutory deadline and 
economically significant is still not statistically significant.  The interaction between judicial 
deadline and economically significant is statistically significant.  The magnitude of the 
impact of a judicial deadline on the probability that an “other significant” regulation is 
rejected increased from -5.3 percentage points to -8.6 percentage points.  A Wald test of the 
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impact of a judicial deadline on the probability of rejection for “economically significant” 
revealed that the impact is remains non-significant. 
 Turning to the year dummies in Model 1 (Table 4.11), the excluded year is 1994. The 
coefficients on the year dummies indicate whether the average rejection rate in each year is 
statistically significantly different from the average rejection rate in 1994.  Only the 2000 and 
2001 year dummies have statistically significant coefficients.  The average rejection rate in 
2000 was lower than 1994 while the average rejection rate in 2001 was higher than 1994.  
The lower average rejections rate in 2000 is likely due to the fact that this was President 
Clinton’s last year in office and he was trying to push through as many regulations as 
possible to secure his legacy.  Regulations under consideration were more likely to have been 
generated by his people and in accordance with his preferences.  As such, rejection rates 
should go down.  The higher average rejection rate in 2001 probably corresponds to the fact 
that Bush put a moratorium on all regulatory activity upon taking office (White House 
memo, January 2001).   
 Overall I do not believe that this alternative specification contributes additional 
insight into my analysis of the probability of rejection.  My original specification included 
two variables to capture the year effects in 2000 and 2001 – an indicator for the last 3 months 
of an administration and an indicator for the first 3 months of a new administration.  The 
indicator for the last 3 months of an administration was not statistically significant in the first 
specification.  This may be because Clinton was serving his second term and therefore knew 
for sure that he was leaving office.  He may have started his exit strategy prior to his last 3 
months.  As expected the indicator for the first 3 months of an administration was statistically 
significant and negative.  My original specification also captures the impact of divided 
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government which is statistically significant.  Finally, my original specification explains a 
larger percent of the variation in the probability that a regulation is rejected.  The original 
pseudo R-squared was 0.1384 while the alternative specification only yields a pseudo R-
squared of 0.1026. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 The analysis above provides considerable support for the second link in the causal 
chain of the transaction cost theory.  Principals do in fact alter their behavior in response to 
reductions in agency discretion by other principals at earlier stages in the process.  The 
effects on regulatory outcomes are considerable.  Presidents are up to 58 percent less likely to 
reject regulations, depending upon the type of rule and the source of the reduction in 
discretion.  This level of responsiveness is notable both for its magnitude and the fact that it 
occurs during the stage in the process where the President has the greatest leverage on the 
regulatory process.  White House review was specifically designed to minimize the effects of 
Congress, the public, and interest groups (Cooper and West 1988).  Clearly, reductions in 
agency discretion constrain the range of the President’s options and the severity of his 
influence.   
 Further, this tool to constrain principal-driven drift is not limited to the give-and-take 
relationship between the executive and legislative branches.  If Congress was the only 
principal able to restrict presidential influence then we might reasonably be concerned that 
the findings were the result of some other aspect of political interdependency (e.g., inter-
branch logrolling).  To the contrary, however, the findings suggest that multiple types of 
principals can use reductions in agency discretion to control principal-driven drift.  This 
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generalizability enhances confidence in the findings, particularly given the breadth of policy 
areas in the analysis.   
 The results are extremely robust, with both statutory and judicial deadlines exhibiting 
the same or greater magnitude of impact across three alternative specifications of the model.  
The alternative specifications offered different methods of dealing with time, resource 
dependence, and policy groupings.  None of these analyses provided any concern that the 
President’s responsiveness to deadlines was the result of model misspecification.   
 Finally, I find that the courts, counter to most conceptions of court authority, have a 
strong formal pre-decision influence on bureaucratic lawmaking.  The impact of the courts is 
not limited to ex post interpretations of agency policy, but can influence regulations well 
prior to their implementation.  This finding is both intriguing and of concern for the inter-
institutional system of checks and balances.  A conflict in the system may exist if the courts 
get to take part in designing regulations and also have the authority to adjudicate the 
appropriateness of regulatory outcomes.  Further research is necessary to determine whether 
a court’s preferences predict its pre-decisional impacts of policy, particularly given the rise of 
specialty courts.  
 The next step for this analysis, and one that I plan on conducting in the future, would 
be to use a multi-level model (where the agency is the second level) to determine whether the 
effect of deadlines varies by agency.  An alternative specification would employ policy area 
as the second level, perhaps using the same definitions as found in the Agendas Project.  This 
would allow me to evaluate presidential behavior within the context of party platforms, 
budgetary categories, and a host of other considerations that play key roles in Washington 
politics. 
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 In the world of politics where even minor advantages are used, the effectiveness of 
reducing agency discretion as a tool to control principal-driven drift all but guarantees its 
use.  It works across agencies, issue areas, and time.  As a method of political control, 
principals could hardly ask for more.   
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CHAPTER V 
THE SECOND FACE OF POWER: PRINCIPAL PREFERENCES 
AND BUREAUCRATIC GRIDLOCK 
 
Introduction 
In this final analytical chapter I am interested in pursuing the predictions of the 
transaction cost theory to their logical conclusion – selective gridlock of bureaucratic policy.  
The first four chapters focus on the degree to which principals increase the probability that 
their policy preferences are implemented by altering the transaction costs of other principals.  
Of course, a principal will only expend the resources required to influence a policy when the 
net benefit of doing so is positive.  What happens, however, when the benefits do not justify 
the costs?  Until now, the analysis has only examined those policies that are already in the 
pipeline – regulations nearing codification into law.  This restricts the principals to a simple 
choice between attempting to influence the policy and letting it move forward unhindered.  
At earlier stages in many bureaucratic processes, however, principals have a viable third 
option – preventing the policy change altogether.   
There are a number of situations in which the transaction cost theory predicts that this 
option will be the best available.  Imagine a scenario in which Principal I wants an agency to 
institute a specific policy change to the status quo.  The principal looks forward in time, 
however, and sees that once the issue is placed on the agenda the agency and other principals 
with competing interests will exert influence over the policy outcomes.  Only by expending 
enormous resources on counteracting agency-driven and principal-driven drift will Principal 
I be able to move policy in its desired direction.  If those expenditures exceed the expected 
benefit of the policy then the net benefit to Principal I of the policy reaching the agenda is 
negative.  In this case, the principal would prefer that the issue never reach the agenda.  
Significantly, the net benefit does not even have to be negative for the principal to prefer to 
keep the issue off of the agenda.  In a world of finite political resources, an issue may have a 
positive net benefit and the principal may still keep it off of the agenda if other policy issues 
have greater net returns.   
Legislative scholarship has a convenient name for the systematic starving of the 
policy agenda – gridlock.  Seen as a form of incrementalism, the concern about policy 
gridlock is that it reduces the government’s ability to govern.  Federal systems will react 
more slowly to changing environments and outdated policies will stumble on long past the 
point of inefficiency.  Scholars as early as Wilson (1911) have examined the causes and 
probable effects of gridlock on the health of the nation.  Gridlock is frequently linked 
(although with mixed empirical support) to the presence of divided government.  The logic of 
divided government in American politics is familiar.  The design of the federal system 
requires inter-branch cooperation for the government to generate new law.  To the extent that 
the parties have competing policy priorities, however, the necessary cooperation is less likely 
when different parties control the policymaking institutions.  This heightened difficulty of 
brokering compromises can generate gridlock (Krehbiel 1998; Sundquist 1988; Wilson 
1911).   
The transaction cost theory’s predictions for divided government’s effect on 
bureaucratic policymaking look remarkably similar to the legislative version.  A principal’s 
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expected net benefit of policy control decreases as the probability of principal-driven drift 
increases with each additional competing principal.  Thus, divided government should 
increase the likelihood that the diminishing expected values of policy influence will keep 
more and more issues off of the agenda.   For this reason, divided government provides me 
with a useful theoretical lever with which to examine the limits of the transaction cost theory 
of bureaucratic control.  In the legislative literature, much of the divided government debate 
surrounds lawmaking, both for its considerable policy impact and the fact that the design of 
the federal system requires considerable inter-branch cooperation to generate new law.  This 
reasoning and the institutional structure of rulemaking suggest that the largest category of 
federal lawmaking – regulations – should be vulnerable to the effects of split-partisan 
control. 
Ironically, the bureaucratic oversight literature provides the most likely competing 
expectation for divided government’s effect on regulatory output.  Research on bureaucratic 
control suggests that divided government will have the opposite effect on regulatory output 
because policy disagreement among the principals reduces their ability to effectively control 
agencies’ policy decisions (Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Shipan 2004).  As the oversight 
capabilities of the principals decrease under divided government, then, the agencies should 
work to increase regulatory output.   
To test the competing expectations generated by the two lines of literature – divided 
government and bureaucratic oversight – I use a dataset of all “economically significant” 
regulatory actions reviewed by the White House since 1981.  I find that divided government 
substantially reduces the number of “economically significant” regulations promulgated 
across the bureaucracy, strongly supporting the notion that divided government causes large-
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scale lawmaking gridlock.  Adding an additional principal that has competing policy 
preferences dramatically reduces the volume of regulations.  The effect, however, is not 
uniform across types of divided government – the reduction occurs during periods of split-
party control of Congress but not during inter-branch conflict between Congress and the 
President.  Finally, the bulk of the gridlock effect occurs as the theory predicts – at the 
agenda-setting stage.     
 
Divided Government and the Regulatory Process 
While the reasoning behind divided government and gridlock makes intuitive sense, 
empirical examinations of patterns of legislative patterns have yielded mixed results.  
Mayhew (1991, 2005) and Fiorina (2003) find that split-party control of government has little 
discernable effect on legislative lawmaking.  Other scholarship, however, finds that partisan 
conflict does cause significant reductions in the number and/or type of legislation (Binder 
2003, 1999; Edwards, et al., 1997; Howell et al., 2000).  Despite the depth of extant research, 
the literature has focused almost entirely on the passage of legislation, leaving the 
implementation of these laws comparatively unexamined.   Statutes must be implemented by 
the bureaucracy through the issuance of regulations.  Agencies often have considerable 
discretion in when and how they interpret their statutory mandates.  For example, in Fiscal 
Year 2001 federal agencies promulgated 4,153 regulations (OMB 2003).  In the same stretch, 
Congress enacted only 136 public laws (CQ Press 2006).  To fully understand how 
partisanship affects lawmaking requires evaluating the regulations that comprise the vast 
majority of public laws.  These regulations impact almost every aspect of public life, from 
the setting of cancer risks from drinking water to the design of security requirements at 
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airports.  
Policy gridlock certainly occurs during the regulatory process.  For example, 
numerous rounds of legislation and congressional compromise finally succeeded in 
designating Yucca Mountain as the site for the nation’s high-level nuclear waste repository.  
This ended a 30-year debate among the House, the Senate, and the White House regarding 
the location of the repository.  It did not, however, curb the ferocious partisan and policy 
battles over site’s safety regulations that have been ongoing since the mid-1990s.  These 
implementing regulations have endured numerous rounds of congressional oversight, White 
House rejection, and legal intervention over more than a decade, and show no signs of 
reaching a useful conclusion.  Thus, even if an issue successfully navigates the legislative 
process, the policy change may still fail due to regulatory gridlock. 
The regulatory process provides ample opportunities for partisan conflict to cause 
gridlock.  Executive Order 12291 (the precursor to 12866) and E.O. 12866 have required 
White House review since 1981.  The executive orders were put into place specifically to 
increase congressional and presidential control over the regulatory process (Kerwin 2003; 
Cooper and West 1988).12  In addition, the House and Senate retain the authority to influence 
agency lawmaking by crafting statutes to further constrain the agencies (e.g., Shipan 2004; 
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987).  Due to these oversight options, lawmaking stalemate 
may result when the political principals disagree over regulatory goals.   
Successfully promulgating regulations clearly requires significant cooperation – or at 
least benign neglect – from the House, Senate, and President.  How does the regulatory 
process respond, then, when the preferred outcomes of the principals differ due to partisan 
                                                 
12The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) also provides two periods for public comment.  The President and 
Congress, benefit from the information provided by interested parties during these periods of forced 
transparency.   
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conflict?  In the following section I extend the logic of divided government to regulatory 
systems to show why and how gridlock may result from the two major specifications of split-
party control.  I then contrast these expectations of stalemate with the bureaucratic oversight 
literature that predicts the opposite – that conflict among the principals may actually increase 
an agency’s willingness and ability to promulgate regulations.   
 
Divided Government and Regulatory Gridlock 
Unified government occurs when the party of the President also controls both 
chambers of Congress.  Divided government is frequently treated as a dichotomous variable 
defined as periods where at least one chamber of Congress is of a different party than the 
President.  Recent scholarship convincingly demonstrates, however, that divided government 
has both an inter-branch and an intra-branch component that require independent evaluations 
for gridlock effects (Binder 1999, 2003).  Institutional frictions and agency incentives change 
dramatically depending upon which flavor of divided government is in place during 
policymaking.   
First consider the classic inter-branch arrangement where one party controls the 
Presidency and the other party controls both houses of Congress (“United Congress”).  The 
President and Congress have independent bureaucratic oversight mechanisms as well as the 
means to veto significant regulation.  This institutional structure means that agencies face 
three primary sources of gridlock under United Congress.  First, if the policy preferences of 
Congress and the President are sufficiently far apart, then one or the other branch may veto 
the rule no matter which policy option the agency selects.  Rules are expensive to research, 
design, write, shepherd through the process, and promulgate (Kerwin 2003).  The agency 
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may be less likely to go through the costly process of drafting a rule if a veto looks likely.  
Second, gridlock may occur when either principal slows agency policymaking using 
oversight authorities other than a veto.  Examples include the President’s appointment 
authority (Wood and Waterman 1991) and Congress’s control over statutory language 
(Shipan 2004) and hearings (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987).   Finally, either 
principal may issue a credible threat of future non-support.  This occurs when the principal 
opposes the policy but is unwilling to incur the public and procedural costs of a veto.  
Instead, the principal signals that it will withhold some or all of the resources necessary for 
the agency to meet its responsibilities under the new law.  Such threats increase the agency’s 
costs of drafting the rule as well as reduce the future resources available to the agency.  As 
one long-time regulatory analyst at OMB said, “We use the threat of future budgets to 
convince agencies to abandon bad ideas” (Phone Conversation, 2006). 
Regulatory gridlock may also result during periods of intra-branch divided 
government when one party controls the House and the other the Senate (“Split Congress”).  
Recent scholarship demonstrates that bicameral designs increase the likelihood of gridlock 
(Binder 1999, 2003; Brady and Volden 2006; Tsebelis and Money 1997).  In particular, 
Binder (1999, 2003) finds that bicameralism interacts strongly with partisan conflict to cause 
legislative gridlock:  
Parties do affect Congress’s capacity to legislate, but not strictly according to whether 
their control is unified or divided…  Bicameralism – rather than the separation of 
power between executive and legislative branches – seems most relevant in 
explaining stalemate in the postwar period (81). 
 
Binder’s research is compelling from a legislative standpoint, but it is unclear that 
bicameralism will induce regulatory gridlock.  Regulations may be more likely to survive 
under Split Congress since at least two of the major congressional veto tools used to control 
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agency regulations are more difficult to implement under split-party control.  To actually 
repeal a rule through legislation requires a joint decision to punish the agency by both houses 
of Congress and the President (Shipan 2004; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987).  
Similarly, Congress’s authority to chastise the agencies through budgetary means also 
requires a considerable measure of cooperation between the two chambers.      
Offsetting these procedural losses in control, however, is the powerful role that 
oversight committees play in bureaucratic oversight.  Committees hold a “privileged actor” 
position in the design and implementation of federal policy (MacDonald forthcoming; 
Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Moe 1985; Wilson 1989).  They (and their staffs) serve as the 
policy experts within the House and Senate, and they have a number of agency oversight and 
control mechanisms that allow them to intervene in the regulatory process.  These include 
budgetary sanctions (Wilson 1989), hostile hearings that damage the credibility of agencies 
and career staff (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Wood and Waterman 1993; 
McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), and burdensome administrative requirements (Balla and 
Wright 2001).  Not only do committees have considerable authority, they also pay closer 
attention to the agencies’ regulatory decisions than does the average floor member (Aberbach 
1990; Bawn 1997).  The information may come in the form of “fire alarms” sounded by 
interest groups (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) or institutionalized reporting requirements.  
Thus, committees have the information and the tools necessary to knowledgably enforce 
regulatory policy.  Unsurprisingly, agencies are responsive to the ideology of their oversight 
committees when crafting law (Shipan 2004; Weingast and Moran 1983).   
This responsiveness creates the opportunity for gridlock during periods of split-
Congress when partisan disagreements between the chambers results in policy disagreements 
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between the House and Senate committees.  Considerable research supports the idea that the 
committees reflect the preferences of the majority party (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Krehbeil 
1998; but see Weingast and Marshall 1988; and Hall and Groffman 1990) and that policy 
committees are used to advance the party’s policy goals (Rundquist and Carsey 2002; 
Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).  When the parties disagree over policy outcomes, then, the 
House and Senate committees responsible for agency oversight may also disagree over 
regulatory content.  In this situation the agencies face incentives that increase the likelihood 
of gridlock.   
Regulations can be very expensive undertakings for an agency in two ways.  First, the 
agencies burn considerable material resources during rule design, implementation, and 
enforcement (Kerwin 2003).  For example, EPA’s Yucca Mountain rule and many of the 
Department of Energy’s EnergyStar regulations tied up the bulk of the resources in their 
respective branches for years, and that was just during the initial rule design.  Second, 
promulgating a politically unfavorable rule can incur substantial costs to the agency if one or 
more of the principals elect to punish the agency.  For example, if one of the committees 
objects to the rule, then the costs of promulgation to the agency may include budget hassles, 
Hill testimony, and endless reporting requirements.  Imagine a scenario in which Committee 
I wants a new regulation controlling review times on prescription drugs, but Committee II 
strongly opposes a change to the status quo.  When the agency (probably the FDA in this 
fictional case) approaches the committees about the prospective policy change, Committee II 
“suggests” that this is not the right time for the agency to go forth with the rule.  Now the 
costs to the agency of promulgation the rule may include budget hassles, Hill testimony, and 
endless reporting requirements.  Even if the other committee is willing to punish the agency 
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to an equal degree for not promulgating the rule, the agency is still better off if it abandons 
the rule because it avoids the design and implementation costs of promulgation.  This 
simplified scenario ignores other costs and benefits surrounding the promulgation decision.  
For example, generating policy consistent with the agency’s mission comprises at least part 
of the agency’s incentive structure (Golden 2000).  In addition, presidential pressure can 
change the balance of costs and benefits as agencies decide whether to promulgate their 
rules.  The scenario does, however, demonstrate why, all else being equal, committee 
disagreement should increase the likelihood of gridlock. 
   
A Competing Expectation: Does Divided Government Increase Regulatory Output? 
In contrast to the theory that divided government causes policy stasis, the literature on 
the political oversight of the bureaucracy suggests that split-party control of government may 
encourage agencies to promulgate regulations.  As principals disagree, the agencies have 
more tools and/or discretion at their disposal with which to steer policy toward the agencies’ 
preferred outcomes.  To the extent that disagreement among the principals is more likely 
during divided government, agencies should find regulatory promulgation more attractive.  
This line of reasoning relies upon an important assumption – that the agencies and their 
principals have policy preferences that are at times in conflict.  Agencies have preferences 
shaped by the desire to defend their missions, expand their resources, and steer policy 
(Golden 2000; Wood 1988).  These preferences can differ from those of the principals, 
inspiring the agencies to craft policy that “drifts” from the away from the principals’ ideal 
points (Wood 1988; Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989; McCubbins, Noll, and 
Weingest 1987).   
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Agencies could find the climate under divided government favorable for rule 
generation for two reasons.  First, as partisan conflict pushes apart the policy positions of the 
House, Senate, and President, the structure of the bureaucratic oversight process creates 
policymaking opportunities for the agencies.  Formal models predict that under many 
circumstances the agencies enjoy increasing policy latitude as the policy positions of the 
principals diverge (Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Shipan 2004).  The models suggest that 
unpopular agency decisions are more difficult to overturn through the various veto 
mechanisms – both within Congress and between Congress and the President – as the policy 
preferences of the principals grow further apart.  When the principals cannot agree the 
agencies should have greater opportunities to pursue their own policy preferences.  This 
provides an incentive for agencies to promulgate regulations during periods of divided 
government.   
In addition to structural changes in the oversight systems, divided government also 
may allow agencies to strategically exploit policy disagreement among principals.  A 
strategic agency can side with the principal(s) whose policy preference is closest to the 
agency’s own (Wood 1988; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1993), or even play the principals 
against one another (Waterman, Rouse, and Wright 2004; Wilson 1999; Calvert, McCubbins 
and Weingast 1989; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingest 1987).  Predictably, this strategy does 
not afford the agencies additional leeway when the principals agree about the policy (Wood 
1998).  During divided government, however, partisan disagreement may create the policy 
space necessary for agencies to influence outcomes.  The sequential nature of the regulatory 
process provides an additional tool should agencies choose to act strategically.  Research has 
shown that in sequential policy processes the reactions of principals in later rounds can be 
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dependent on the agency’s responses to principals earlier in the process (Whitford 2005).  
This reactionary effect enables the agencies to strategically structure their responses to 
influence the next principal’s decision, thereby exerting indirect influence over policy.  
Again, however, principals who are in agreement over the policy outcome do not leave the 
agencies nearly as much leeway to affect the process.  Assuming that policy disagreement is 
more likely during split-party control, then, agencies may find regulatory promulgation more 
attractive during divided government when they have more tools to affect policy.   
Taken together, the increase in policy latitude and the expansion of strategic options 
under divided government provide incentives for agencies to promulgate as many regulations 
as possible in order to codify their preferred policies.  In the following section I will 
empirically examine whether these incentives are sufficient to counteract the institutional 
friction working toward gridlock. 
 
Defining Divided Government and Gridlock 
In this analysis I specify three categories of partisan control:  Unified Government in 
which all three principals share the same party, Split Congress in which the majority party in 
the House and Senate differ, and United Congress in which the party of the President differs 
from that of both houses of Congress.   Between 1981 and 2005 there are two periods of 
united Congress and three periods each of unified government and split Congress.  Table 5.1 
describes how government has changed among the three states of partisan control over the 
time period of the analysis.   
Regulatory lawmaking occurs in two stages – proposed rules and final rules.  
Proposed rules are essentially statements of a future policy direction intended by the agency.  
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It is at this point that the agency identifies the need for the regulation, collects the first round 
of data, involves the stakeholders, and issues an initial draft of the regulatory language (and 
the justification for it) in the Federal Register.  The sum of all proposed rules during a given 
time period can be thought of as the regulatory agenda for the next round of policymaking.  
Once the proposed rule has been out for public comment, the agency then reworks the 
regulation to reflect any new information.  At this point the regulation enters the “final rule” 
stage.  There is no time limit between the proposed and final rule stages,13 which means that 
a final rule passed in 1998 may well have been proposed in 1994.  If the agency, the 
President, and Congress all agree on the text of the rule language then the agency publishes it 
as law in the Federal Register.  Note that final rules are limited in one important way – they 
cannot contain provisions that do not appear in either the proposed rule or in the public 
comments received at the proposed rule stage.  This adds imprecision to the policy baseline, 
but it also provides an opportunity to evaluate initiatives that were previously agreed upon 
but not yet codified into law.   
Regulatory gridlock, then, can have two components.  The first is composed of new 
policy initiatives that the government wants to move forward (proposed rules).  This is an 
unambiguous measure of the policy preferences of the institutions at the time.  Gridlock here 
would mean that the government is unwilling or unable to initiate new policy initiatives.  The 
second component of gridlock is composed of those regulatory policies that already have a 
substantial amount invested in them, but are not yet codified (final rules).  Gridlock here 
would mean that the current institutional mix is unwilling to codify previous policy 
agreements.  The promulgation of a final rule indicates the willingness of the political actors 
                                                 
13There is a practical 3-month minimum in most cases due to the public comment period required by the 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
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to implement the decisions made at some previous time.  It is important to note that final 
rules are difficult to kill outright.  The nature of regulations means that there are winners and 
losers on virtually every significant regulation.  Interests that stood to benefit at the proposed 
rule stage generally object to an agency’s decision not to move forward with the final rule.  A 
proposed rule shifts, in some respects, the understood policy baseline on an issue.  Those 
who approve of the new baseline are likely to apply considerable pressure on recalcitrant 
officials refusing to finalize the rule.  This makes politicians and agency personnel alike less 
willing to permanently obstruct final regulations.  As one OMB analyst said, “Nobody wants 
the press to start shouting that EPA or the White House is trying to kill the regulation they 
promised – it becomes a public fiasco” (Conversation with OMB staff, August 2005). 
 
Data and Methods 
To quantitatively test the effects of partisan divisions on regulations I return to the 
dataset containing all regulatory actions that underwent White House review from 1981-
2005.  These data cover an expanded time period relative to the previous chapter, and I 
exclude actions those with legal deadlines.14  In addition, the divided government literature 
presents a complication I did not face earlier with regards to the thresholds of significance.  
Much of the disagreement over the legislative examinations of divided government stem 
from differing definitions of “landmark” laws (see Howell et al 2000; also Kelly 1993).  
Also, Howell et al (2000) find that during divided government passage of trivial legislation 
rises at the same time that the promulgation of landmark legislation decreases.  Thus, I 
restrict the analysis to the “economically significant” rules.  The definition of “economically 
                                                 
14They reflect court interventions into the process or contain statutory restrictions from an unknown period in 
time.  The passage of these regulatory actions does not reflect the effects of divided or unified government at 
the time the rule was reviewed. 
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significant” regulations has remained unchanged since 1981, whereas the interpretation of 
“other significant” category has undergone multiple across time.  In addition, Congress uses 
the same $100 million threshold when it reviews regulations under the Congressional Review 
Act, thus ensuring that the executive and legislative branches are using similar measures of 
importance for the purposes of this analysis.  Between 1981 and 2005, OMB reviewed 1,322 
“economically significant” regulatory actions from 31 agencies.15   
From the regulation-level dataset, I aggregate the number of regulations completed by 
agency and month.  By breaking the time periods down into months it is possible to correctly 
identify every period of divided government, including Januarys after presidential elections 
and the partisan reversal brought by Senator Jefford’s 2001 defection from the Republican 
Party.  I create two outcome variables for each agency and month:  total number of proposed 
actions completed (Mean= 0.07, SD= 0.38) and total number of final actions completed 
(Mean= 0.08, SD= 0.36).16  The agency-level dataset includes 299 observations for each 
agency – one for each month between February 1981 and December 2005. 
Given the cross-sectional time series nature of the data and the fact that the outcome 
variables can only take on non-negative integer values, I estimate the impact of divided 
government using a conditional agency fixed effects negative binomial model.   For both 
outcome measures, I discarded the fixed effects Poisson model based on a likelihood ratio 
test for overdispersion – in each case I rejected the null of no overdispersion.17  Given the 
                                                 
15OMB does not review regulations from independent agencies and commissions such as the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.   
 
16To cleanly measure the impact of divided government on the production of regulation, I limit the sample to 
those regulatory actions where the review was submitted and completed within the same period of divided or 
unified government.  This reduces the sample by 60 actions and does not substantively affect the results. 
17For proposed regulatory actions χ2 = 82.7 (p-value < 0.01) and for final regulatory actions χ2 = 25.5 (p-value < 
0.01). 
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time series nature of the data, I also examined the autocorrelation coefficients within each 
agency to assess whether autocorrelation exists.  I find no evidence of autocorrelation in 
either outcome measure.18 
In addition to the indicators describing divided government, I include dummy 
variables capturing whether the President is Republican, the first three months of a new 
President, and the last three months of an outgoing President.   The first 3 months fits 
reasonably well with the 100-day honeymoon period for a new President and the last 3 
months covers the time between when the outcome of the election is known and the new 
President takes office.  These presidential measures capture Clinton’s famous “midnight” 
regulations and President G.W. Bush’s initial freeze on all regulatory activity (Loring and 
Roth 2005).  Equation 5.1 describes the conditional fixed effects negative binomial model. 
 
Equation 5.1:  
 
FtLtRtStUtat βFirstβLastβRβSplitβnitedU)E(Y ++++=  
where: 
E(Yat)  = expected number of regulations completed by agency a in month t 
Unitedt           = 1 if the party of President differs from that of a united Congress  
Splitt  = 1 if the majority party of House differs from that of the Senate  
Rt   = 1 if President is Republican  
Lastt     = 1 if one of the last 3 months of a President’s term 
Firstt     = 1 if one of first 3 months of a new President’s term 
                                                 
18As a robustness check, I also estimate a GEE population-averaged negative binomial model correcting for 1st-
order autocorrelation.   The results are consistent with those from the conditional fixed effects negative 
binomial model. 
 109
I address one additional concern.  Does President Reagan’s famously anti-regulatory 
position drive the analysis?  The results strongly refute this consideration, and bolster the 
gridlock patterns shown below.19  These findings are consistent with Mayhew’s (2005) 
conclusion that Reagan’s tenure provides no cause for concern when evaluating the effects of 
gridlock on lawmaking. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The empirical results demonstrate that divided government has a profoundly negative 
effect on the bureaucracy’s ability to promulgate meaningful law, but only under conditions 
of Split Congress.  In addition, only new additions to the regulatory policy agenda – 
proposed regulatory actions – experience gridlock.  Under Split Congress relative to unified 
government, the expected number of proposed “economically significant” regulatory actions 
generated decreases by 33 percent.  Conversely, agencies promulgate just as many 
“economically significant” final rules under Split Congress as they do under unified 
government.  These findings indicate that the political compromises between the House and 
Senate necessary to place important policy initiatives onto the regulatory agenda are much 
more difficult to arrange when inter-chamber partisan discord exists.  The 33 percent 
reduction means that average number of “economically significant” proposed regulatory 
actions completed annually drops from 26 under Unified Government to 17.5 under Split 
Congress.  This is an enormous reduction considering that these are the most important 
regulatory issues on the agenda, such as clean air regulations, food safety laws, and nuclear 
                                                 
19I investigate this alternative hypothesis by dividing the Split Congress indicator into 3 dummy variables – split 
Congress under Reagan, split Congress under Clinton, and split Congress under Bush.  While all the Split 
Congress dummies are not always statistically significant, the overall pattern provides evidence that split 
Congress decreases the number of regulations completed regardless of the President in power. 
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waste disposal.  Table 5.2 provides the complete set of results.   
The bicameral focus of the results support Binder’s finding that partisan conflict is 
most detrimental to the production of law when the full potential for bicameral disagreement 
is realized.  The findings are also consistent with the expectations of the transaction cost 
theory. Committees should be less willing to allow new regulations to be added to the agenda 
as the costs of regulatory control increase.  When the chambers are divided the costs to a 
committee of controlling agency outputs goes up for two reasons.  First, the other chamber’s 
committee(s) constitutes a competing principal, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
principal-driven drift.  Second, two of the key congressional powers used to punish wayward 
agencies and reduce agency-driven drift – legislation and budgetary control – become more 
difficult to employ when the chambers are split along partisan lines.     
Perhaps the more interesting finding is that the United Congress form of divided 
government does not increase gridlock relative to unified government.  This suggests that the 
President has very little agenda-setting authority.  If the President were in control of the 
regulatory agenda then there should be no difference in the output of proposed regulations 
among the three specifications of partisan control.  The analysis, however, indicates a 
systematic difference, indicating that the President cannot simply dictate which of the 
authorized regulations move forward.  The easy answer is that this pattern is consistent with 
the classic conception of “Congress directs and the President implements.”  In this model of 
branch responsibility Congress controls which regulations reach the agenda and then stands 
back and lets the President implement them.  The insensitivity of final regulations to partisan 
conflict offers some support for that interpretation.  This analysis, however, falls short of 
convincingly supporting this claim because the data do not allow me to determine whether 
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the same types of rules are surviving under the different specifications of partisan control.  If, 
for example, Split Congress yielded more discretionary regulations (those where the 
authorizing statute does not require the regulation) then I may be capturing an effect where 
the President may refuse to allow the agencies to promulgate these types of rules.  This is an 
important next step in determining with confidence the relationship between the President 
and Congress over regulatory outcomes. 
Two other results stand out.  First, outgoing Presidents make a concerted push to 
finalize their policy agendas through the passage of regulation.  The number of final actions 
increases by 74 percent in the last three months of an outgoing President’s term.  This result 
leads to a number of interesting questions, such as what types of regulations are left to the 
end of an administration and why?  Second, and somewhat surprisingly, Republican 
President has a positive and sizeable effect on the output of final actions.  This runs contrary 
to the common wisdom that Democrats are more likely to expand government influence 
through regulation than are Republicans.   
While this may in part be a statistical artifact of the fact that only one Democrat held 
the office during that time period, it does suggests that the Republican Party is not as anti-
regulatory as is generally assumed.  Why might this be the case?  The most likely reason is 
that codifying policy into law makes its long-term survival considerably more likely.  
Making federal policy becomes considerably more difficult when it requires existing 
administrative law.  The presence of existing law tends to generate entrenched interests, legal 
precedents, and existing bureaucratic systems – all of which increase inertia toward the status 
quo.  For these reasons, it is generally in the best interests of whomever is in power to codify 
its preferences into law through regulations.   
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Consider a hypothetical case where government is unified under Republican control.  
The policy question on the docket is how best to handle an industry that emits considerable 
amounts of toxic gases into the air sinks around major population centers.  Assume that the 
stereotypical Republican preferences are in play – the government is anti-market interference 
and does not generally prioritize environmental concerns.  Despite these preferences, the 
coalition should still regulate the industry, and the industry may even ask the coalition to do 
so.  The reasons are straightforward.  By writing the least coercive standards that current law 
allows the Republican government makes it that much more difficult for future pro-
environment groups to institute more stringent standards.  There are a number of incentives 
against new policymaking in the future.  First, the industry will have invested in the control 
technologies necessary to meet the standard, thereby making any new rule correspondingly 
more expensive.  Second, those technologies will also have reduced the overall level of 
emissions, thus making the marginal benefit of the second rulemaking lower than it would 
have been in the absence of the initial pro-industry regulation.  Third, because the marginal 
benefit is lower and the marginal costs are higher, the agency will almost certainly have 
lower-hanging fruit to pursue.  While this is an obviously stylized example, it is not too far a 
field of an actual regulation I worked on where the industry wanted to be preemptively 
regulated under a favorable political climate.  
From the perspective of the bureaucratic oversight literature, why do the agencies fail 
to take greater advantage of Congress’s relative inability to constrain the bureaucracy during 
Split Congress?  As previously discussed, one possibility is that congressional influence 
stems from the structural controls built into the committee system.  Shipan (2004) formally 
demonstrates the importance of committees to regulatory design.  An agency must take the 
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preferences of the committees – and the committee chairs – into account when crafting 
regulations to ensure support for the proposed policy changes.  Assuming that policy 
disagreement between the House and Senate committees is more likely when the chambers 
are controlled by different parties,20 the agency will have a more difficult time generating 
new policy.  As one lobbyist with 30 years of experience said, “We [lobbyists] make a lot of 
money on agency regulations when the Houses are split.  We always have friends on a 
committee or subcommittee to kill an unfavorable rule” (Conversation with lobbyist, 
September 2006). 
Another possibility is that the observed bureaucratic responsiveness stems from 
effective institutional controls employed by Congress.  These include the design of 
administrative procedures (see McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Bawn 1995) and the 
design of agency structures and processes (Wood and Bohte 1994; Bawn 1997; McCubbins, 
Noll, and Weingast 1989).  The dataset does not allow for a direct test of these institutional 
constraints, but future agency-level research may shed light on the relative effectiveness of 
different control suites under multiple political climates.     
 
Conclusion 
The above analyses provide considerable support for the expectations of the divided 
government literature – the size of the regulatory agenda is remarkably sensitive to partisan 
conflict.  Consistent with Binder’s findings, gridlock results from intra-branch partisan 
conflict rather than the classic vision of inter-branch partisan friction.  When the two houses 
of Congress disagree, the regulatory agencies reduce their output dramatically relative to 
unified government.  In addition, partisan friction does not affect existing policy initiatives.  
                                                 
20See Binder 2003 for a discussion about the increasing party polarization in Congress. 
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Taken together, these results indicate that Congress retains a significant measure of control 
over the agencies precisely when such control should be the most difficult to exercise – i.e., 
when lawmaking and budgetary constraints are less likely.  In contrast, the expectation that 
agencies may seek to increase regulatory output during divided government to take 
advantage of increased agency discretion received no support.  None of the specifications of 
partisan control yielded an increase in regulatory output.   
The expectations of the transaction cost theory are largely supported by the analysis.  
The size of the regulatory agenda for the most important regulations decreases as competition 
among committees reduces the expected net benefits of allowing regulatory activity on the 
agenda.  Additions to the regulatory agenda, then, are least likely when their outcomes are 
rendered more uncertain – and the corresponding costs of control increase – due to inter-
committee conflict and a reduction in the ability to minimize agency-driven drift.    
The findings presented here raise questions that deserve attention in future research.  
While this analysis finds strong support for the concern that party dissensus creates policy 
gridlock, it does not tell us what categories of regulations – e.g., deregulatory actions or 
partisan priorities – are least likely to reach the agenda.  Perhaps more importantly, we do not 
know how those regulations that survived a divided Congress were changed as the result of 
bi-partisan disagreement.  Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) persuasively argued that 
knowledge about the content of the policies that survive (or disappear) is vital to 
understanding the full effects of partisan conflict.  In addition, the role of committees in the 
dissuasion of policy generation is not well understood.  A formal examination of agency 
incentives under split-party control of Congress would add considerably to an analysis of 
how policy dies at the implementation stage.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
When evaluating a piece of scholarship read only the theory, the equations, and the 
tables.  The introduction and the conclusion are pure fiction (Lecture to a graduate 
seminar by a member of this dissertation committee, 2004). 
 
 
  One of the basic questions of representative government is how effectively federal 
institutions translate constituent preferences into public policy.  Bureaucratic systems are the 
fields upon which much of the political, scientific, and legal battles occur as policy directives 
are translated into concrete outcomes.  One of the fundamental questions asked by scholars 
and practitioners alike is “how do political institutions (and the agencies themselves) 
manipulate bureaucratic processes to secure policy outcomes?”  Part of the answer must 
come from the fundamental truth that bureaucrats, politicians, and institutions subscribe to 
the theory that the benefits of controlling a policy must justify the political costs of doing so.  
Finite political resources force difficult decisions across the policy spectrum as institutions 
seek to maximize the net benefits of their policy portfolios.  This decision calculus has 
frequently confounded scholarship that tends to focus only on whether a principal can 
control an outcome.  Such analyses lead inexorably to the conclusion that sophisticated 
political thinkers shackle themselves with the worst kind of pyrrhic victories.  The better 
question is whether the net benefits of controlling the policy are sufficient to overcome the 
opportunity costs of doing so.   
Recent work within the bureaucratic control literature has turned to the transaction 
cost theory to address this question.  The transaction cost approach has the advantage of 
combining a credible micro theory of behavior that is consistent across institutions and policy 
systems with testable predictions.  One of the most interesting of these predictions is that 
principals expend the resources necessary to restrict agency discretion to reduce principal-
driven drift as well as agency-driven drift.  In short, Principal I uses a bureaucratic process to 
constrain Principal II’s control over policy outcomes.  Though this makes intuitive sense, 
until now research had not yet established that Principal II’s actions changed in response to 
changes in agency discretion.  This dissertation provides support for that causal link, thereby 
increasing confidence in the validity of the transaction cost theory.   
Further, the transaction cost theory predicts that as the net benefits of controlling a 
policy change decrease the principal is increasingly likely to prefer the status quo.  This 
suggests that under certain circumstances gridlock in bureaucratic policymaking will result.  
The second major contribution of this dissertation is the empirical examination of this 
question and the finding that regulatory gridlock occurs in response to partisan conflict 
within Congress.  This finding expands the line of research evaluating the impacts of divided 
government to include bureaucratic outputs.  It also sheds light on a previously-ignored 
arrow in Congress’s bureaucratic oversight quiver – controlling the policy agenda by 
subtraction rather than addition.  Of all of the findings from the dissertation, this substantial 
gridlock effect presents the largest potential problem for representation.  The results suggest 
that during periods of partisan dissensus stopping an issue from reaching the regulatory 
agenda is significantly less costly than controlling it once it gets there.  Thus policy 
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initiatives with significant net social benefit may not survive simply because it takes so little 
effort to stop most initiatives.   
 
Extensions of the Research 
These findings generate as many questions as they answer.  Three of these involve 
extensions of the dissertation’s empirical analyses.  First, which policy areas are most 
responsive to the imposition of transaction costs?  This will require a multi-level model and 
the logical collapsing of agencies and sub-agencies into cleanly-defined policy categories.  
My initial suspicion is that issues pitting business against public interest groups will be the 
most responsive to changes in principal transaction costs relative to redistributive policies.  
Policy changes that regulate businesses generally require a strong advocate willing to impose 
substantial transaction costs on the other players.  Second, how deliberately do the courts 
exert pre-decisional influence over regulatory outcomes?  As the reach of specialty courts 
and the influence of agency general counsels increase, the role of judicial review will take on 
even greater importance.  Third, how effectively does the transaction cost theory predict the 
use of informal methods of control?  The executive branch has increasingly turned to 
guidance documents and executive orders to impose short-term changes on agency behavior.  
It would be fascinating to see how these informal reductions in agency discretion translate 
into changes in the behavior of Congress and the courts.   
 
Implications of the Research for Key Questions of Bureaucratic Control 
This dissertation took the necessary first steps toward addressing the most hotly 
debated questions in the bureaucratic oversight literature: just how much influence do the 
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agencies exert over policy outcomes, and how do they do it?  Of all the checks and balances 
inherent in the structure of federal government, unelected agency officials are not endowed 
with a single formal mechanism of control over the powers of elected or appointed 
representatives.21  The reverse, of course, is not true.  The President, Congress, and the courts 
have tremendous institutionalized authority over the bureaucracy.  How, then, can the 
bureaucracy succeed in shifting policy away from the preferences of any of the big three 
institutions?  The finding that a pre-existing contract with one principal reduces the 
likelihood that another principal will exert influence later in the process offers tantalizing 
glimpses of an answer. 
The separation of powers system guarantees that Congress, the President, and the 
courts will all have an opportunity to engage in a given policy debate.  These inputs occur in 
a sequential fashion, where first one principal and then another has the opportunity to 
contract with the agency for policy outputs.  Whitford (2005) shows that principals anticipate 
the future actions of other principals when deciding how to influence policy.  I demonstrate 
that principals in later stages are responsive to the decisions of principals in previous stages.  
Taken together, these two findings point toward a significant opportunity for the bureaucracy 
to exert policy control.  When the preferences of two principals conflict, the agency can use 
prior agreements with one principal to raise the transaction costs to another at a later stage in 
the process.  It is far more expensive for one principal (e.g., the President) to push a 
particular policy outcome if it has to override an existing contract between another principal 
and the agency (e.g., a statutory deadline).  Recognizing this, an agency will pursue early 
contracts with the principal(s) whose preferences most closely align with its own.  A contract 
                                                 
21One could argue that the basic tenure generally enjoyed by bureaucrats constitutes an institutionalized check 
against political pressure, albeit an indirect one.  I do not include tenure in the checks and balances category 
because tenure does not allow bureaucrats to force a policy change by the other actors. 
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of this nature strategically reduces agency discretion to “force” the agency toward policy 
outcomes consistent with its own preferences.  By raising the transaction costs to later 
principals those proscriptions increase the likelihood that the agency’s preferred outcomes 
survive the process.      
Within the regulatory sphere, the agencies have found proactive ways to obtain these 
voluntary checks on their discretion.  First, consider one method of procuring proscriptive 
statutory language.  Drafting a proscriptive, detailed statute incurs substantial costs, 
particularly on technically complex issues (Moe 1990; Bawn 1995, 1997; Huber, Shipan, 
Pfahler 2001).  Due to these costs, Congress cannot afford to craft proscriptive statutes on 
every issue.  This opens the door for the agency to use its technical expertise as a bargaining 
chip.  The agencies can compose “Technical Support Documents” (TSDs) for Congress.  In 
many cases, these are thinly-veiled drafts of statutory language.  Unlike hearing testimony by 
the agencies, TSDs do not undergo White House review – in fact, there is no formal 
administration process through which these documents must pass (and therefore no formal 
record).  TSDs are, however, extremely useful to both Congress and the agencies.  Congress 
gets to reduce the transaction cost of writing a more detailed statute by leveraging agency 
expertise.  The agency gets to draft language that will be closer to its policy preference than 
had it not participated.  In one movement the agency can decrease the transaction costs to the 
principal that supports its policy position and increase the transaction costs to the negatively-
inclined principal that it must face at the next stage.   
Do strategic TSDs actually occur?  Conversations with agency political appointees 
indicated that this type of transaction happens with some frequency. As one high-level 
agency official put it: 
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We definitely provide technical assistance to Congress to help draft legislation 
favorable to our point of view.  Not just hearing testimony, but actually drafts of the 
bill.  It’s useful to have input at that stage, particularly where statutory requirements 
are concerned.  It is tough to trace, though, because these ‘technical support 
documents’ don’t have a paper history to point to and say, ‘here is where we changed 
the statute in our favor.’ (Conversation with agency official on September 10th, 2004) 
 
 On the judicial front, court-ordered settlement agreements (COSAs) allow the agency 
almost as much flexibility as Technical Support Documents do in the statutory setting.  
COSAs occur when an entity with legal standing (individuals and interest groups are the 
most common parties) sues the agency, but neither party wants the case to go to trial.  
Instead, they agree to a settlement that is enforced by a court order.   This legally-binding 
agreement is often drafted jointly by the agency and the plaintiff.  There are anecdotal cases 
of agencies acting in league with interest groups to arrange mutually beneficial lawsuits.  
This creates the opportunity to raise the transaction costs of control to the President and 
Congress by crafting judicially-imposed reductions in agency discretion.     
COSAs, like Technical Support Documents, are not something that the agencies 
advertise.  What is clear is that the agencies have in the past found ways to enter into 
voluntary contracts with principals that decrease the agencies’ discretion.  A finding that 
these or other mechanisms allow the agencies to strategically control policy outcomes would 
force a re-evaluation of the current conception of bureaucratic authority.  In particular, it 
would cast a very different light on the debate pitting the value of neutral competency against 
the concern that unelected bureaucrats are making policy despite the preferences of elected 
officials.   
 
The Future of the Transaction Cost Approach 
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 In closing I would like to briefly offer what I believe to be the next frontier for the 
theory writ large – the calculation of discount rates for political costs and benefits.  The 
transaction cost approach is uniquely suited to generate predictions of principal actions and 
general movements within policy areas due to its ability to handle multiple streams of costs 
and benefits across different policy options.  In other words, the framework should allow 
scholars to examine several different policy options, calculate the relative value of each to a 
principal, and predict the principal’s actions.  To do this, however, we must first generate 
reasonable discount rates with which to move political costs and benefits through time and 
account for risk.  Without these rates, scholars of bureaucratic systems will remain largely 
limited to less-than-inspiring evaluations of the relative value of policy options that occur 
within the same time period.  In reality, however, principals, bureaucrats, and interest groups 
are comparing the current policy options against present and future policy opportunities.   
Non-quantifiable costs and benefits can only take us so far if the goal is accurate 
prediction.  The reason is simple – bureaucratic structures hardly ever shrink in complexity.  
Policymaking systems originally designed to keep agencies in check tend to evolve over time 
as different principals apply additional layers of requirements.  The regulatory process is an 
excellent example.  Congress has, over the course of decades, attempted to structure and/or 
reform the regulatory process with the Administrative Procedures Act, the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, the Small Business Regulatory Fairness Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, 
the Data Quality Act, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, and the Congressional Review 
Act (among many others).  The courts have selectively ruled on the implementation of these 
statutes and the validity of large portions the regulatory process.  The President has 
implemented more than 30 Executive Orders specifically designed to affect rulemaking and 
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has instituted a regulatory review process that requires every significant regulation to 
undergo White House review prior to promulgation.  Examples include E.O. 12866 
“Regulatory Planning and Review,” E.O. 13045 “Protection of Children,” E.O. 13132 
“Federalism,” and E.O. 13211 “Energy.”  Each of these actions, including the court rulings, 
added procedural requirements to the federal rulemaking process.   
Increasing complexity means two things.  First, the time required to promulgate 
policy continues to increase.  Principals, therefore, find themselves comparing the net present 
value of a policy that will yield benefits in year two with one that will yield benefits 
immediately.  We cannot predict which one they will choose – and, just as importantly, 
which one they will not – without some way to compare streams of costs and benefits that 
occur at different times.  Second, risk becomes a larger factor in the equation.  As the number 
of requirements within a bureaucratic system changes the probability that an individual 
policy survives the process also changes.  Appropriate discount rates for risk, therefore, are 
essential when comparing the value of policy options coming out of different bureaucratic 
systems.  For the transaction cost approach to fulfill its promise as an analytical tool for 
retrospective explanation and prospective prediction we need to develop estimates that can 
handle the ever-increasing complexity of policy systems. 
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 Table 2.1.  Unconditional Agency Fixed Effects Logit Model Estimating the Probability that 
a Regulation has a Statutory Deadline (Clustered SEs) 
 
  Estimate Percent Change 
Economically Significant 0.948** 9.6% 
 (0.212)  
Agency (USDA omitted)   
  ATBCB 0.948** 9.6% 
  (0.033)  
  DHS 0.070** 0.7% 
  (0.013)  
  DOC -0.309** -3.1% 
  (0.027)  
  DOD 0.076** 0.8% 
  (0.028)  
  DOE 1.696** 17.2% 
  (0.009)  
  DOI -0.827** -8.4% 
  (0.020)  
  DOJ 0.338** 3.4% 
  (0.057)  
  DOL 0.108** 1.1% 
  (0.016)  
  DOT 0.572** 5.8% 
  (0.017)  
  ED 0.855** 8.7% 
  (0.064)  
  EPA 0.200** 2.0% 
  (0.007)  
  FAR 1.406** 14.3% 
  (0.020)  
  FEMA 0.590** 6.0% 
  (0.026)  
  GSA -0.273** -2.8% 
  (0.059)  
  HHS 0.500** 5.1% 
  (0.007)  
  HUD 0.124* 1.3% 
  (0.051)  
  NSF 0.466** 4.7% 
  (0.073)  
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  Estimate Percent Change 
  OFHEO 0.454** 4.6% 
  (0.038)  
  OPM -0.850** -8.6% 
  (0.072)  
  SBA -0.262** -2.7% 
  (0.027)  
  SSA -1.267** -12.8% 
  (0.006)  
  STATE -0.020 -0.2% 
  (0.060)  
  VA -0.473** -4.8% 
 (0.057)  
Constant -2.258**  
 (0.073)  
Observations 6061   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Table 3.1.  Number of Regulations Completed between 1981 and 2005 by Agency 
Agency Freq. Pct 
Cumm. 
Percent 
Department of Agriculture 6,639 18.5% 18.5% 
Department of Health and Human Services 4,185 11.7% 30.2% 
Environmental Protection Agency 3,895 10.9% 41.1% 
Department of Transportation 3,459 9.6% 50.7% 
Department of the Interior 2,242 6.3% 57.0% 
Department of Commerce 2,190 6.1% 63.1% 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 1,600 4.5% 67.5% 
Department of Education 1,513 4.2% 71.7% 
Department of Veterans Affairs 1,293 3.6% 75.4% 
Department of Justice 1,215 3.4% 78.7% 
Office of Personnel Management 1,208 3.4% 82.1% 
Department of Labor 911 2.5% 84.7% 
General Services Administration 805 2.2% 86.9% 
Social Security Administration 620 1.7% 88.6% 
Department of the Treasury 576 1.6% 90.2% 
Small Business Administration 488 1.4% 91.6% 
Department of Energy 399 1.1% 92.7% 
Department of Defense 293 0.8% 93.5% 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 292 0.8% 94.3% 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 219 0.6% 95.0% 
Department of State 203 0.6% 95.5% 
Civil Aeronautics Board 179 0.5% 96.0% 
Railroad Retirement Board 147 0.4% 96.4% 
National Archives and Records Administration 129 0.4% 96.8% 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 119 0.3% 97.1% 
DOD/GSA/NASA (FAR) 90 0.3% 97.4% 
Department of Homeland Security 82 0.2% 97.6% 
Agency for International Development 80 0.2% 97.8% 
United States Information Agency 72 0.2% 98.0% 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 63 0.2% 98.2% 
Office of Government Ethics 62 0.2% 98.4% 
National Science Foundation 56 0.2% 98.5% 
Panama Canal Commission 54 0.2% 98.7% 
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board 45 0.1% 98.8% 
Institute of Museum and Library Services 40 0.1% 98.9% 
ACTION 36 0.1% 99.0% 
Other Temporary Commissions 28 0.1% 99.1% 
Selective Service System 24 0.1% 99.2% 
Peace Corps 21 0.1% 99.2% 
National Endowment for the Humanities 20 0.1% 99.3% 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 19 0.1% 99.3% 
National Endowment for the Arts 18 0.1% 99.4% 
Other Independent Agencies 16 0.0% 99.4% 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 15 0.0% 99.5% 
Navajo Hopi Indian Relocation Commission 15 0.0% 99.5% 
Corporation for National and Community Service 14 0.0% 99.5% 
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Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the DC 14 0.0% 99.6% 
National Indian Gaming Commission 14 0.0% 99.6% 
Office of Management and Budget 12 0.0% 99.7% 
Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation 12 0.0% 99.7% 
Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped 11 0.0% 99.7% 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 9 0.0% 99.7% 
Office of the United States Trade Representative 9 0.0% 99.8% 
African Development Foundation 8 0.0% 99.8% 
Tennessee Valley Authority 8 0.0% 99.8% 
Commission on Civil Rights 6 0.0% 99.8% 
Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board 6 0.0% 99.8% 
Appraisal Subcommittee of the FFIEC 5 0.0% 99.9% 
Inter-American Foundation 4 0.0% 99.9% 
Office of Federal Inspector, Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System 4 0.0% 99.9% 
Office of Science and Technology Policy 4 0.0% 99.9% 
United States Metric Board 4 0.0% 99.9% 
Council on Environmental Quality 3 0.0% 99.9% 
Emergency Oil and Gas Guaranteed Loan Board 3 0.0% 99.9% 
Emergency Steel Guarantee Loan Board 3 0.0% 99.9% 
James Madison Memorial Fellowship Foundation 3 0.0% 99.9% 
National Capital Planning Commission 3 0.0% 99.9% 
Office of National Drug Control Policy 3 0.0% 100.0% 
Resolution Trust Corporation 3 0.0% 100.0% 
Export-Import Bank of the United States 2 0.0% 100.0% 
United States Postal Service 2 0.0% 100.0% 
Barry M. Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in Education 
Foundation 
1 
0.0% 100.0% 
Executive Office of the President 1 0.0% 100.0% 
Farm Credit System Assistance Board 1 0.0% 100.0% 
Federal Communications Commission 1 0.0% 100.0% 
Interstate Commerce Commission 1 0.0% 100.0% 
Merit Systems Protection Board 1 0.0% 100.0% 
Office of Special Counsel 1 0.0% 100.0% 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation 1 0.0% 100.0% 
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Table 3.2.  Number of Regulations Completed by Agency and Year 
 Agency ‘81 ‘82 ‘83 ‘84 ‘85 ‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 
ACTION 3 9 5 0 2 0 7 3 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ACHP 3 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ADF 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AID 6 3 2 1 5 3 4 9 4 12 7 3 4 2 5 2 3 0 0 0 
FFIEC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ATBCB 2 3 0 0 0 0 7 4 1 1 6 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 2 3 
BGSEEF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CAB 53 51 53 21 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CCR 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
CPBSH 1 0 2 0 1 4 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CNCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CEQ 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CSOSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USDA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 12 42 0 4 3 3 2 
DOC 645 681 547 478 406 385 410 435 403 327 398 376 354 105 82 80 63 52 79 63 
DOD 158 141 94 86 95 91 107 118 194 229 205 222 192 13 11 18 11 18 46 33 
ED 4 9 13 7 17 9 17 12 6 8 25 5 23 14 16 6 16 6 3 4 
DOE 76 50 50 106 108 99 174 123 82 66 124 144 102 57 32 16 9 5 24 25 
HHS 50 49 33 25 19 16 20 19 16 14 32 25 37 3 6 3 2 1 2 6 
DHS 86 225 249 156 171 235 278 294 264 310 353 365 329 61 37 45 68 87 91 81 
HUD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DOJ 74 129 111 108 90 67 60 99 77 63 124 71 104 57 45 35 29 22 39 28 
DOL 53 50 72 45 78 46 84 52 96 77 132 78 62 10 6 14 23 27 15 18 
STATE 60 49 49 34 38 56 62 76 59 55 43 50 16 9 13 17 16 14 17 29 
DOI 13 10 3 4 7 4 19 16 15 9 45 18 9 6 1 1 1 1 3 0 
TREAS 265 221 217 216 248 196 203 253 247 237 242 202 206 60 40 42 35 29 35 32 
DOT 68 65 68 69 65 62 67 82 95 87 71 91 76 26 18 19 26 12 18 13 
VA 146 245 239 132 158 143 183 152 97 101 113 81 103 31 34 26 19 21 24 52 
FAR 34 32 51 43 26 20 29 37 46 64 51 69 46 3 3 1 5 2 0 0 
EOGGLB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
ESGLB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
EPA 703 341 266 300 301 198 192 178 177 152 168 145 162 72 59 48 45 54 48 46 
EEOC 7 3 5 0 5 3 6 1 5 0 6 3 4 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 
EOP 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EXIMBANK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FCSAB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FCC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FEMA 16 6 29 16 26 24 26 30 29 25 19 13 10 3 1 0 1 0 1 6 
FMCS 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GSA 56 62 84 63 85 41 59 56 61 35 37 33 42 18 13 20 13 10 4 2 
IMLS 0 1 3 3 4 2 3 6 2 5 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
IAF 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ICC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
JMMFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MSPB 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NASA 10 11 13 11 25 15 15 17 15 9 15 8 22 7 7 5 0 0 3 3 
NARA 0 0 0 0 9 13 8 17 8 13 7 14 6 1 4 1 2 1 4 4 
NCPC 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NEA 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 4 1 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NEH 5 0 0 0 0 4 4 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NIGC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NSF 1 2 5 2 0 2 1 8 5 5 5 6 7 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 
NAVAJO 0 0 1 4 2 3 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
OFHEO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 1 0 
ANGTS 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OGE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 3 8 4 1 7 5 4 6 2 6 
OMB 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ONDCP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OPM 36 49 64 45 69 71 97 73 52 52 87 95 69 42 24 15 18 23 28 37 
OSTP 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OSC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TRADEREP 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 
OTHINDAG 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 1 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 
OTHTEMPC 0 0 0 0 0 6 12 6 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OPIC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PANAMA 4 3 8 3 9 6 4 0 7 3 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PEACE 0 0 2 4 0 1 5 1 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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PADC 0 2 2 1 2 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PBGC 21 12 9 10 19 6 4 3 1 2 7 9 4 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 
RRB 3 3 6 4 15 8 11 14 21 7 21 9 14 0 0 2 6 1 0 0 
RTC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SSS 3 6 2 1 4 0 4 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SBA 10 15 20 32 19 26 15 35 38 35 34 28 30 20 22 0 2 17 10 18 
SSA 27 43 44 42 41 45 37 25 18 41 42 35 39 7 5 7 6 5 4 8 
TVA 0 0 3 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USIA 1 4 2 0 5 6 8 7 6 8 6 5 4 4 2 1 1 0 2 0 
MB 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USPS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 Agency ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 
ACTION 0 0 0 0 0 
ACHP 0 0 0 0 0 
ADF 0 0 1 0 0 
AID 0 0 1 2 2 
FFIEC 0 0 0 0 0 
ATBCB 0 1 0 1 1 
BGSEEF 0 0 0 0 0 
CAB 0 0 0 0 0 
CCR 0 0 0 0 0 
CPBSH 0 0 0 0 0 
CNCS 0 2 2 4 1 
CEQ 0 0 0 0 0 
CSOSA 4 2 8 0 0 
USDA 11 1 3 2 3 
DOC 65 48 69 50 38 
DOD 24 18 11 26 29 
ED 8 19 16 13 17 
DOE 4 9 10 11 7 
HHS 7 2 5 5 2 
DHS 86 65 91 75 83 
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HUD 0 0 22 36 24 
DOJ 34 26 42 36 30 
DOL 47 49 32 26 23 
STATE 19 24 37 38 31 
DOI 0 2 6 3 7 
TREAS 57 49 56 47 24 
DOT 69 41 47 20 18 
VA 47 19 28 29 19 
FAR 0 0 11 3 0 
EOGGLB 1 0 0 0 0 
ESGLB 0 0 0 0 0 
EPA 69 37 29 39 66 
EEOC 0 2 2 1 1 
EOP 0 0 0 0 0 
EXIMBANK 0 0 1 0 0 
FCSAB 0 0 0 0 0 
FCC 0 0 0 0 0 
FEMA 6 4 1 0 0 
FMCS 0 1 2 0 0 
GSA 6 1 3 0 1 
IMLS 2 0 1 0 0 
IAF 0 0 0 0 0 
ICC 0 0 0 0 0 
JMMFF 0 0 0 0 0 
MSPB 0 0 0 0 0 
NASA 5 0 1 1 1 
NARA 2 7 3 2 3 
NCPC 0 0 0 0 0 
NEA 0 0 2 0 0 
NEH 0 0 1 0 0 
NIGC 0 0 0 0 0 
NSF 2 1 1 0 0 
NAVAJO 0 0 0 0 0 
OFHEO 2 2 3 1 4 
ANGTS 0 0 0 0 0 
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OGE 1 1 2 2 2 
OMB 1 0 0 0 0 
ONDCP 0 0 1 0 0 
OPM 28 25 30 36 43 
OSTP 0 0 0 0 0 
OSC 0 0 0 0 0 
TRADEREP 0 0 0 0 0 
OTHINDAG 0 0 1 0 0 
OTHTEMPC 0 0 0 0 0 
OPIC 0 0 0 0 0 
PANAMA 0 0 0 0 0 
PEACE 0 0 1 0 0 
PADC 0 0 0 0 0 
PBGC 0 1 1 2 5 
RRB 0 0 2 0 0 
RTC 0 0 0 0 0 
SSS 0 0 0 0 0 
SBA 11 18 16 6 11 
SSA 24 10 20 10 35 
TVA 0 0 0 0 0 
OB 0 0 0 0 0 
USIA 0 0 0 0 0 
MB 0 0 0 0 0 
USPS 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 3.3.  Number of Regulatory Actions by Significance Status 
 
 
Year “Other Significant” 
“Economically 
Significant” 
Percent 
“Economically 
Significant” 
1981 2,664 52 2% 
1982 2,514 76 3% 
1983 2,370 62 3% 
1984 2,020 56 3% 
1985 2,125 59 3% 
1986 1,860 65 3% 
1987 2,195 59 3% 
1988 2,210 69 3% 
1989 2,104 70 3% 
1990 2,012 70 3% 
1991 2,324 126 5% 
1992 2,127 117 5% 
1993 2,002 95 5% 
1994 548 110 17% 
1995 483 62 11% 
1996 374 64 15% 
1997 361 71 16% 
1998 360 68 16% 
1999 439 78 15% 
2000 434 88 17% 
2001 544 98 15% 
2002 407 80 16% 
2003 532 90 14% 
2004 453 74 14% 
2005 457 74 14% 
Total 33,919 1,933 5% 
 
Table 3.4.  Number of Proposed and Final Regulations by Year 
Year Proposed Final 
Percent 
Proposed 
1981 1,005 1,711 37% 
1982 1,037 1,553 40% 
1983 1,046 1,386 43% 
1984 972 1,104 47% 
1985 1,058 1,126 48% 
1986 785 1,140 41% 
1987 1,074 1,180 48% 
1988 992 1,287 44% 
1989 937 1,237 43% 
1990 849 1,233 41% 
1991 1,171 1,279 48% 
1992 949 1,295 42% 
1993 958 1,139 46% 
1994 304 354 46% 
1995 220 325 40% 
1996 155 283 35% 
1997 195 237 45% 
1998 190 238 44% 
1999 240 277 46% 
2000 208 314 40% 
2001 271 371 42% 
2002 204 283 42% 
2003 229 393 37% 
2004 228 299 43% 
2005 220 311 41% 
Total 15,497 20,355 43% 
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Table 3.5.  Decision for All Regulatory Actions between 1981 and 2005 
Decision Frequency Percent Cumm. 
      Percent 
Consistent without Change 24,579 68.6% 68.6% 
Consistent with Change 9,222 25.7% 94.3% 
Withdrawn by agency 1,290 3.6% 97.9% 
Returned (reconsider) 419 1.2% 99.0% 
Suspended 202 0.6% 99.6% 
Returned (improper) 140 0.4% 100.0% 
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Table 4.1.  Number of Rules with Statutory Deadlines – By Agency 
 
  
Total Number of 
Rules 
Total Number of 
Rules with 
Statutory 
Deadlines 
% of Agency's 
Rules with 
Statutory 
Deadline 
Agency's Share 
of All Rules with 
Statutory 
Deadlines 
HHS 870 165 19% 21% 
USDA 793 95 12% 12% 
DOT 505 94 19% 12% 
EPA 601 88 15% 11% 
HUD 423 48 11% 6% 
ED 207 42 20% 5% 
DOJ 290 39 13% 5% 
DOL 264 33 13% 4% 
FAR 86 30 35% 4% 
DOC 255 21 8% 3% 
VA 327 21 6% 3% 
DOE 44 19 43% 2% 
DOI 348 18 5% 2% 
DOD 137 16 12% 2% 
OPM 349 15 4% 2% 
SBA 151 13 9% 2% 
DHS 82 10 12% 1% 
GSA 91 7 8% 1% 
ATBCB 17 5 29% 1% 
FEMA 23 5 22% 1% 
SSA 141 5 4% 1% 
OFHEO 19 3 16% 0% 
STATE 31 3 10% 0% 
NSF 7 1 14% 0% 
AID 17 0 0% 0% 
IMLS 7 0 0% 0% 
NARA 34 0 0% 0% 
NASA 33 0 0% 0% 
OGE 39 0 0% 0% 
RRB 11 0 0% 0% 
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Table 4.2.  Number of Rules with Judicial Deadlines – By Agency 
 
  
Total Number of 
Rules 
Total Number of 
Rules with 
Judicial 
Deadlines 
% of Agency's 
Rules with 
Judicial 
Deadline 
Agency's Share 
of All Rules with 
Judicial 
Deadlines 
AID 17 0 0% 0% 
ATBCB 17 0 0% 0% 
DHS 82 0 0% 0% 
DOC 255 18 7% 6% 
DOD 137 0 0% 0% 
DOE 44 1 2% 0% 
DOI 348 77 22% 26% 
DOJ 290 2 1% 1% 
DOL 264 4 2% 1% 
DOT 505 6 1% 2% 
ED 207 0 0% 0% 
EPA 601 169 28% 57% 
FAR 86 1 1% 0% 
FEMA 23 0 0% 0% 
GSA 91 0 0% 0% 
HHS 870 5 1% 2% 
HUD 423 0 0% 0% 
IMLS 7 0 0% 0% 
NARA 34 0 0% 0% 
NASA 33 0 0% 0% 
NSF 7 0 0% 0% 
OFHEO 19 0 0% 0% 
OGE 39 0 0% 0% 
OPM 349 3 1% 1% 
RRB 11 0 0% 0% 
SBA 151 0 0% 0% 
SSA 141 0 0% 0% 
STATE 31 0 0% 0% 
USDA 793 5 1% 2% 
VA 327 3 1% 1% 
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Table 4.3.  Unconditional Fixed Effects Logit Model Estimating the Probability that a 
Regulation is Rejected (Clustered SEs)22 
 
  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
Statutory Deadline -0.668** -3.2% 
 (0.192)  
Judicial Deadline -1.099** -4.3% 
 (0.120)  
Final Stage -0.391** -2.4% 
 (0.082)  
Economically Significant 0.261 1.7% 
 (0.205)  
Republican President 0.048 0.3% 
 (0.207)  
Congress Split 0.350* 2.3% 
 (0.173)  
Congress United -0.411** -2.4% 
 (0.155)  
Last 3 Months of Administration 0.452 3.2% 
 (0.336)  
First 3 Months of New Administration 3.090** 51.7% 
 (0.279)  
Observations 6202   
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
 
 
 
                                                 
22The complete results including the coefficient estimates for the agency dummy variables can be found in the 
Appendix Table 4A.3. 
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Table 4.4: Unconditional Fixed Effects Logit Model Estimating the Probability that a 
Regulation is Rejected including Interactions between Indicators for Deadlines and 
Economically Significant (Clustered SEs)23 
 
  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
Statutory Deadline -0.728** -3.4% 
 (0.196)  
Judicial Deadline -1.585** -5.3% 
 (0.188)  
Final Stage -0.389** -2.3% 
 (0.083)  
Economically Significant 0.179 1.1% 
 (0.176)  
Republican President 0.047 0.3% 
 (0.210)  
Congress Split 0.354* 2.3% 
 (0.174)  
Congress United -0.412** -2.4% 
 (0.154)  
Last 3 Months of Administration 0.453 3.2% 
 (0.336)  
First 3 Months of New Administration 3.119** 52.3% 
 (0.288)  
Statutory*Economically Significant 0.225 1.2% 
 (0.553)  
Judicial*Economically Significant 1.546** 15.7% 
 (0.282)  
Observations 6202   
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
 
 
                                                 
23 The complete results including the coefficient estimates for the agency dummy variables can be found in the 
Appendix Table 4A.4. 
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Table 4.5.  Impact of Deadlines on Probability Rejected By Significance Status 
 
  
Percentage Point Change in 
Probability Rejected Percent Change 
Statutory Deadline -3.4% -37.6% 
 (0.00)  
   
Judicial Deadline   
   "Other Significant" -5.3% -58.1% 
 (0.00)  
   
   "Economically Significant" -0.2% -2.1% 
  (0.86)   
p-values in parentheses   
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Table 4.6.  Unconditional Fixed Effects Logit Model Estimating the Probability that a 
Regulation is Rejected Including OMB Workload and Lagged Agency Budgetary Outlays 
(Clustered SEs) 
 
  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
Statutory Deadline -0.577** -3.2% 
 (0.174)  
Judicial Deadline -1.066** -6.0% 
 (0.200)  
OMB Workload by Agency 0.066** 0.4% 
 (0.013)  
Lagged Agency Outlays (in 1,000,000s) 0.006* 0.03% 
 (0.003)  
Final Stage -0.395** -2.2% 
 (0.082)  
Economically Significant 0.218 1.2% 
 (0.212)  
Republican President 0.167 0.9% 
 (0.311)  
Congress Split 0.419* 2.3% 
 (0.182)  
Congress United -0.193 -1.1% 
 (0.156)  
Last 3 Months of Administration -0.136 -0.8% 
 (0.473)  
First 3 Months of New Administration 2.720** 15.2% 
 (0.400)  
Agency (USDA omitted)   
  DHS -0.137 -0.8% 
   (0.278)  
  DOC 1.089** 6.1% 
   (0.218)  
  DOD -0.538 -3.0% 
   (1.017)  
  DOE 0.240 1.3% 
   (0.197)  
  DOI 0.542** 3.0% 
   (0.204)  
  DOJ 1.159** 6.5% 
   (0.201)  
 141
  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
  DOL 0.509** 2.9% 
   (0.155)  
  DOT 0.620** 3.5% 
   (0.095)  
  ED 0.699** 3.9% 
   (0.132)  
  EPA 0.589** 3.3% 
   (0.200)  
  GSA 2.354** 13.2% 
   (0.210)  
  HHS -2.816* -15.8% 
   (1.134)  
  HUD 1.534** 8.6% 
   (0.148)  
  NASA 1.340** 7.5% 
   (0.209)  
  NSF 2.198** 12.3% 
   (0.246)  
  OPM 0.591** 3.3% 
   (0.135)  
  SBA 1.534** 8.6% 
   (0.230)  
  SSA -1.442 -8.1% 
   (1.321)  
  STATE 1.226** 6.9% 
   (0.267)  
  VA 0.267** 1.5% 
 (0.101)  
Constant -3.883**  
 (0.269)  
Observations 5833   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table 4.7.  Unconditional Fixed Effects Logit Model Estimating the Probability that a 
Regulation is Rejected Including Interactions between Indicators for Deadlines and 
Economically Significant and OMB Workload and Lagged Agency Budgetary Outlays 
(Clustered SEs) 
 
  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
Statutory Deadline -0.651** -3.6% 
 (0.178)  
Judicial Deadline -1.577** -8.8% 
 (0.129)  
OMB Workload by Agency 0.067** 0.4% 
 (0.013)  
Lagged Agency Outlays (in 1000,000s) 0.006 0.03% 
 (0.003)  
Final Stage -0.394** -2.2% 
 (0.082)  
Economically Significant 0.116 0.6% 
 (0.162)  
Republican President 0.166 0.9% 
 (0.313)  
Congress Split 0.425* 2.4% 
 (0.185)  
Congress United -0.194 -1.1% 
 (0.156)  
Last 3 Months of Administration -0.136 -0.8% 
 (0.474)  
First 3 Months of New Administration 2.752** 15.3% 
 (0.409)  
Statutory Deadline*Economically Significant 0.284 1.6% 
 (0.578)  
Judicial Deadline*Economically Significant 1.640** 9.1% 
 (0.239)  
Agency (USDA omitted)   
  DHS -0.133 -0.7% 
   (0.280)  
  DOC 1.077** 6.0% 
   (0.218)  
  DOD -0.548 -3.0% 
   (1.054)  
  DOE 0.228 1.3% 
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Percent 
Change   Estimate 
   (0.206)  
  DOI 0.625** 3.5% 
   (0.209)  
  DOJ 1.148** 6.4% 
   (0.196)  
  DOL 0.501** 2.8% 
   (0.154)  
  DOT 0.608** 3.4% 
   (0.091)  
  ED 0.695** 3.9% 
   (0.127)  
  EPA 0.560** 3.1% 
   (0.206)  
  GSA 2.346** 13.0% 
   (0.207)  
  HHS -2.833* -15.7% 
   (1.161)  
  HUD 1.525** 8.5% 
   (0.142)  
  NASA 1.323** 7.3% 
   (0.198)  
  NSF 2.187** 12.1% 
   (0.238)  
  OPM 0.575** 3.2% 
   (0.123)  
  SBA 1.532** 8.5% 
   (0.229)  
  SSA -1.455 -8.1% 
   (1.366)  
  STATE 1.220** 6.8% 
   (0.262)  
  VA 0.244** 1.4% 
 (0.089)  
Constant -3.869**  
 (0.261)  
Observations 5833   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table 4.8.  Unconditional Policy Area Fixed Effects Logit Model Estimating the Probability 
that a Regulation is Rejected (Clustered SEs) 
 
  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
Statutory Deadline -0.685** -4.1% 
 (0.187)  
Judicial Deadline -1.061** -6.4% 
 (0.139)  
Final Stage -0.368** -2.2% 
 (0.098)  
Economically Significant 0.258 1.6% 
 (0.184)  
Republican President -0.015 -0.1% 
 (0.197)  
Congress Split 0.380* 2.3% 
 (0.168)  
Congress United -0.387** -2.3% 
 (0.132)  
Last 3 Months of Administration 0.419 2.5% 
 (0.328)  
First 3 Months of New Administration 3.080** 18.6% 
 (0.249)  
Policy Area (Agriculture Excluded)   
   Macroeconomics 0.346** 2.1% 
    (0.036)  
   Civil Rights/Liberties 0.052 0.3% 
    (0.074)  
   Health -0.365** -2.2% 
    (0.020)  
   Labor, Employment, and Immigration -0.197** -1.2% 
    (0.063)  
   Education 0.119* 0.7% 
    (0.059)  
   Environment -0.019 -0.1% 
    (0.032)  
   Energy -0.998** -6.0% 
    (0.062)  
   Transportation 0.042 0.3% 
    (0.029)  
   Law, Crime, and Family 0.345** 2.1% 
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    (0.071)  
   Social Welfare 0.709** 4.3% 
    (0.073)  
   Housing and Community Development 0.790** 4.8% 
    (0.048)  
   Banking and Commerce -0.031 -0.2% 
    (0.034)  
   Defense 0.025 0.2% 
    (0.069)  
   Science and Technology 0.222** 1.3% 
    (0.059)  
   International Affairs and Aid 0.561** 3.4% 
    (0.088)  
   Government Operations 0.137** 0.8% 
    (0.044)  
   Public Lands and Water -0.577** -3.5% 
 (0.040)  
Constant -2.361**  
 (0.142)  
Observations 6200   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table 4.9.  Unconditional Policy Area Fixed Effects Logit Model Estimating the Probability 
that a Regulation is Rejected including Interactions between Indicators for Deadlines and 
Economically Significant (Clustered SEs) 
 
  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
Statutory Deadline -0.740** -4.4% 
 (0.190)  
Judicial Deadline -1.511** -9.0% 
 (0.296)  
Final Stage -0.366** -2.2% 
 (0.098)  
Economically Significant 0.183 1.1% 
 (0.169)  
Republican President -0.015 -0.1% 
 (0.199)  
Congress Split 0.382* 2.3% 
 (0.169)  
Congress United -0.389** -2.3% 
 (0.132)  
Last 3 Months of Administration 0.420 2.5% 
 (0.329)  
First 3 Months of New Administration 3.103** 18.6% 
 (0.257)  
Statutory*Economically Significant 0.208 1.3% 
 (0.568)  
Judicial*Economically Significant 1.402** 8.4% 
 (0.363)  
Policy Area (Agriculture Excluded)   
   Macroeconomics 0.343** 2.1% 
    (0.034)  
   Civil Rights/Liberties 0.039 0.2% 
    (0.065)  
   Health -0.370** -2.2% 
    (0.024)  
   Labor, Employment, and Immigration -0.203** -1.2% 
    (0.066)  
   Education 0.114* 0.7% 
    (0.056)  
   Environment -0.040 -0.2% 
    (0.039)  
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   Energy -1.009** -6.0% 
    (0.097)  
   Transportation 0.034 0.2% 
    (0.029)  
   Law, Crime, and Family 0.336** 2.0% 
    (0.067)  
   Social Welfare 0.704** 4.2% 
    (0.071)  
   Housing and Community Development 0.782** 4.7% 
    (0.044)  
   Banking and Commerce -0.038 -0.2% 
    (0.033)  
   Defense 0.014 0.1% 
    (0.067)  
   Science and Technology 0.208** 1.2% 
    (0.052)  
   International Affairs and Aid 0.552** 3.3% 
    (0.084)  
   Government Operations 0.128** 0.8% 
    (0.040)  
   Public Lands and Water -0.508** -3.0% 
 (0.057)  
Constant -2.348**  
 (0.140)  
Observations 6200   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table 4.10.  Regulation Rejection Rates by Policy Area 
 
Policy Area Percent Rejected 
Social Welfare 15.1% 
Housing and Community Development 14.5% 
Law, Crime, and Family 11.3% 
International Affairs and Aid 10.4% 
Defense 10.4% 
Macroeconomics 9.9% 
Transportation 8.8% 
Government Operations 8.2% 
Agriculture 8.1% 
Environment 7.6% 
Science and Technology 7.5% 
Banking and Commerce 7.0% 
Education 6.6% 
Civil Rights/Liberties 6.3% 
Labor, Employment, and Immigration 5.6% 
Health 5.5% 
Public Lands and Water 4.2% 
Energy 2.3% 
Foreign Trade 0.0% 
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Table 4.11.  Unconditional Fixed Effects Logit Model Estimating the Probability that a 
Regulation is Rejected – Including Year Dummies (Clustered SEs) 
 
  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
Statutory Deadline -0.686** -4.1% 
 (0.174)  
Judicial Deadline -1.050** -6.3% 
 (0.106)  
Final Stage -0.403** -2.4% 
 (0.072)  
Economically Significant 0.309 1.9% 
 (0.204)  
Republican President 0.611 3.7% 
 (0.469)  
Year (1994 Omitted)   
  1995 -0.052 -0.3% 
 (0.297)  
  1996 -0.198 -1.2% 
 (0.190)  
  1997 -0.257 -1.5% 
 (0.303)  
  1998 -0.571 -3.4% 
 (0.420)  
  1999 -0.372 -2.2% 
 (0.265)  
  2000 -0.482* -2.9% 
 (0.239)  
  2001 1.168** 7.0% 
 (0.440)  
  2002 -0.420 -2.5% 
 (0.480)  
  2003 -0.318 -1.9% 
 (0.512)  
  2004 -0.425 -2.5% 
 (0.543)  
  2005 -0.463 -2.8% 
 (0.517)  
Agency (USDA omitted)   
  AID 1.175** 7.0% 
   (0.099)  
  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
  ATBCB 0.083 0.5% 
   (0.084)  
  DHS -0.718** -4.3% 
   (0.122)  
  DOC -0.058 -0.4% 
   (0.044)  
  DOD 0.606** 3.6% 
   (0.045)  
  DOE -1.350** -8.1% 
   (0.067)  
  DOI -0.384** -2.3% 
   (0.025)  
  DOJ 0.253** 1.5% 
   (0.056)  
  DOL -0.407** -2.4% 
   (0.048)  
  DOT 0.035 0.2% 
   (0.024)  
  ED 0.031 0.2% 
   (0.070)  
  EPA -0.022 -0.1% 
   (0.024)  
  FAR -0.095 -0.6% 
   (0.083)  
  FEMA 0.585** 3.5% 
   (0.076)  
  GSA 0.971** 5.8% 
   (0.071)  
  HHS -0.439** -2.6% 
   (0.027)  
  HUD 0.743** 4.5% 
   (0.043)  
  IMLS 1.002** 6.0% 
   (0.079)  
  NARA -0.382** -2.3% 
   (0.064)  
  NASA -0.378** -2.3% 
   (0.072)  
  NSF 0.135 0.8% 
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  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
   (0.073)  
  OFHEO -0.581** -3.5% 
   (0.058)  
  OGE 0.295** 1.8% 
   (0.056)  
  OPM -0.125* -0.8% 
   (0.060)  
  RRB 2.257** 13.5% 
   (0.137)  
  SBA 0.301** 1.8% 
   (0.029)  
  SSA 0.166** 1.0% 
   (0.053)  
  STATE -0.069 -0.4% 
   (0.100)  
  VA -0.100 -0.6% 
 (0.062)  
Constant -2.429**  
 (0.167)  
Observations 6202   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table 4.12.  Unconditional Fixed Effects Logit Model Estimating the Probability that a 
Regulation is Rejected including Interactions between Indicators for Deadlines and 
Economically Significant – Including Year Dummies (Clustered SEs) 
 
  Estimate Percent Change 
Statutory Deadline -0.761** -4.5% 
 (0.192)  
Judicial Deadline -1.440** -8.6% 
 (0.205)  
Final Stage -0.403** -2.4% 
 (0.073)  
Economically Significant 0.232 1.4% 
 (0.166)  
Republican President 0.611 3.6% 
 (0.470)  
Statutory*Economically Significant 0.267 1.6% 
 (0.579)  
Judicial*Economically Significant 1.235** 7.3% 
 (0.309)  
Year (1994 Omitted)   
  1995 -0.056 -0.3% 
 (0.295)  
  1996 -0.198 -1.2% 
 (0.188)  
  1997 -0.261 -1.6% 
 (0.303)  
  1998 -0.569 -3.4% 
 (0.420)  
  1999 -0.366 -2.2% 
 (0.265)  
  2000 -0.479* -2.9% 
 (0.240)  
  2001 1.177** 7.0% 
 (0.440)  
  2002 -0.420 -2.5% 
 (0.481)  
  2003 -0.315 -1.9% 
 (0.510)  
  2004 -0.429 -2.6% 
 (0.543)  
  2005 -0.463 -2.8% 
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  Estimate Percent Change 
 (0.517)  
Agency (USDA omitted)   
  AID 1.163** 6.9% 
   (0.092)  
  ATBCB 0.083 0.5% 
   (0.089)  
  DHS -0.717** -4.3% 
   (0.123)  
  DOC -0.068 -0.4% 
   (0.041)  
  DOD 0.603** 3.6% 
   (0.045)  
  DOE -1.380** -8.2% 
   (0.123)  
  DOI -0.330** -2.0% 
   (0.043)  
  DOJ 0.244** 1.5% 
   (0.052)  
  DOL -0.416** -2.5% 
   (0.046)  
  DOT 0.025 0.2% 
   (0.024)  
  ED 0.026 0.2% 
   (0.068)  
  EPA -0.041 -0.2% 
   (0.028)  
  FAR -0.083 -0.5% 
   (0.077)  
  FEMA 0.597** 3.6% 
   (0.066)  
  GSA 0.963** 5.7% 
   (0.070)  
  HHS -0.447** -2.7% 
   (0.032)  
  HUD 0.735** 4.4% 
   (0.038)  
  IMLS 0.984** 5.9% 
   (0.078)  
  NARA -0.398** -2.4% 
   (0.050)  
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  Estimate Percent Change 
  NASA -0.396** -2.4% 
   (0.074)  
  NSF 0.118 0.7% 
   (0.071)  
  OFHEO -0.613** -3.6% 
   (0.066)  
  OGE 0.281** 1.7% 
   (0.047)  
  OPM -0.138** -0.8% 
   (0.049)  
  RRB 2.252** 13.4% 
   (0.134)  
  SBA 0.299** 1.8% 
   (0.030)  
  SSA 0.162** 1.0% 
   (0.051)  
  STATE -0.075 -0.5% 
   (0.096)  
  VA -0.114 -0.7% 
 (0.058)  
Constant -2.416**  
 (0.163)  
Observations 6202   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table 5.1.  Description of Divided Government over Time   
 
Time Period Divided Government Status 
Jan. 1981 - Dec. 1986 Split Congress 
Jan. 1987 - Jan. 1993 United Congress 
Feb. 1993 - Dec 1994 Unified Government 
Jan. 1995 - Dec. 2000 United Congress 
Jan. 2001 - Jan. 2001 Split Congress 
Feb. 2001 - May 2001 Unified Government 
Jun. 2001- Nov. 2002 Split Congress 
Dec. 2002 - Dec. 2005 Unified Government 
  
Months of Split Congress: 90 
Months of United Congress: 145 
Months of Unified Government: 64 
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Table 5.2.  Impact of Divided Government on Number of Regulatory Actions Completed - Conditional Fixed Effects Negative 
Binomial Results 
 
  Number of Proposed Number of Final 
 Regulatory Actions Completed Regulatory Actions Completed 
 Model Percent Model Percent 
  Estimates Change Estimates Change 
Split Congress -0.395** -33% -0.120 -11% 
 (0.135)  (0.120)  
United Congress 0.082 9% -0.010 -1% 
 (0.112)  (0.107)  
Republican President 0.087 9% 0.197* 22% 
 (0.101)  (0.097)  
Last 3 Months of President's Term -0.330 -28% 0.555** 74% 
 (0.282)  (0.194)  
First 3 Months of New President's Term -0.124 -12% -0.016 -2% 
 (0.262)  (0.240)  
Constant -0.088  0.540*  
 (0.204)  (0.275)  
     
Number of Agencies 27  28  
Number of Months per Agency 299   299   
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Figure 1.1.  Two-Principal, Two-Stage Transaction Cost Model 
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Figure 2.1.  The Regulatory Process 
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Figure 2.2.  The White House Regulatory Review Process 
OMB Reviews Final 
Rule
OMB Returns 
Proposed Rule or 
Agency Withdraws It
OMB Approves Rule 
with or without 
Changes
Agency Publishes the 
Rule in the Federal 
Register
OMB Approves Rule 
with or without 
Changes
Agency Publishes the 
Rule in the Federal 
Register for Public 
Comment
Agency Drafts Final 
Rule
OMB Returns 
Proposed Rule or 
Agency Withdraws It
Agency Drafts 
Proposed Rule
Significance of Rule 
Assigned
OMB Reviews 
"Significant" and 
"Economically 
Signficant" Proposed 
Rule
"Non-Significant" 
Rules Promulgated 
without White House 
Review
 
   160
Figure 3.1.  Number of Regulations over Time by Significance Status 
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Figure 3.2.  Number of Reviewed Regulations by Year and Stage 
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Figure 3.3.  Proportion of Regulations with Legal Deadlines by Year 
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Figure 3.4.  Number of Regulations by Deadline Status and Year 
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Figure 3.5.  Proportion of Regulations by OMB Decision over Time 
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Figure 3.6.  Percent of Proposed and Final Regulatory Actions Rejected over Time 
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Figure 3.7.  Percent of Regulations Rejected by Significance Status over Time 
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Figure 4.1.  Predicted Effect of a Legal Deadline 
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Figure 4.2.  Percent of Regulations Rejected by Deadline Type 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 4A.1.  Probability a Regulation is Rejected: Fixed and Random Effects 
 
  
Conditional Fixed 
Effects Logit 
Random Effects 
Logit 
  (Standard SEs) (Standard SEs) 
Statutory Deadline -0.664** -0.710** 
 (0.192) (0.191) 
Judicial Deadline -1.095** -1.211** 
 (0.379) (0.374) 
Final Stage -0.388** -0.371** 
 (0.101) (0.100) 
Economically Significant 0.259 0.220 
 (0.143) (0.141) 
Republican President 0.047 0.001 
 (0.174) (0.172) 
Congress Split 0.348* 0.369* 
 (0.148) (0.147) 
Congress United -0.409* -0.408* 
 (0.168) (0.167) 
Last 3 Months of Administration 0.448 0.387 
 (0.276) (0.275) 
First 3 Months of New Administration 3.065** 3.088** 
 (0.192) (0.190) 
Constant  -2.220** 
  (0.173) 
Observations 6202 6202 
Number of Agencies 30 30 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
 
 
 
 
   170
   
171
Table 4A.2.  Probability a Regulation is Rejected: Alternative Statistical Models 
 
  
Unconditional 
Fixed Effects Logit 
Conditional Fixed 
Effects Logit 
Unconditional 
Fixed Effects 
Probit 
Unconditional 
Fixed Effects 
Gompit 
  (Clustered SEs) (Clustered SEs) (Clustered SEs) (Clustered SEs) 
Statutory Deadline -0.668** -0.664** -0.317** 0.219** 
 (0.192) (0.191) (0.080) (0.051) 
Judicial Deadline -1.099** -1.095** -0.482** 0.300** 
 (0.120) (0.119) (0.040) (0.023) 
Final Stage -0.391** -0.388** -0.193** 0.138** 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.042) (0.031) 
Economically Significant 0.261 0.259 0.127 -0.091 
 (0.205) (0.203) (0.107) (0.083) 
Republican President 0.048 0.047 0.019 -0.012 
 (0.207) (0.206) (0.106) (0.080) 
Congress Split 0.350* 0.348* 0.168 -0.120 
 (0.173) (0.171) (0.089) (0.067) 
Congress United -0.411** -0.409** -0.215** 0.166** 
 (0.155) (0.154) (0.071) (0.049) 
Last 3 Months of Administration 0.452 0.448 0.209 -0.137 
 (0.336) (0.333) (0.169) (0.125) 
First 3 Months of New Administration 3.090** 3.065** 1.768** -1.678** 
 (0.279) (0.277) (0.160) (0.189) 
Agency (USDA omitted)     
  AID 1.316**  0.702** -0.561** 
   (0.071)  (0.027) (0.015) 
  ATBCB 0.073  -0.001 0.028* 
   (0.073)  (0.024) (0.014) 
  DHS -0.608**  -0.300** 0.224** 
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Unconditional 
Fixed Effects Logit 
Conditional Fixed 
Effects Logit 
Unconditional 
Fixed Effects 
Probit 
Unconditional 
Fixed Effects 
Gompit 
  (Clustered SEs) (Clustered SEs) (Clustered SEs) (Clustered SEs) 
   (0.142)  (0.069) (0.050) 
  DOC 0.022  0.011 -0.010 
   (0.037)  (0.016) (0.011) 
  DOD 0.679**  0.335** -0.239** 
   (0.052)  (0.024) (0.015) 
  DOE -1.004**  -0.522** 0.394** 
   (0.058)  (0.042) (0.040) 
  DOI -0.333**  -0.138** 0.076** 
   (0.025)  (0.016) (0.016) 
  DOJ 0.352**  0.161** -0.101** 
   (0.068)  (0.035) (0.026) 
  DOL -0.248**  -0.115** 0.081** 
   (0.062)  (0.028) (0.017) 
  DOT 0.051*  0.020 -0.009 
   (0.024)  (0.015) (0.014) 
  ED 0.078  0.034 -0.020 
   (0.065)  (0.030) (0.019) 
  EPA -0.069*  -0.050** 0.058** 
   (0.028)  (0.016) (0.016) 
  FAR -0.117  -0.040 0.009 
   (0.062)  (0.033) (0.028) 
  FEMA 0.621**  0.358** -0.374** 
   (0.057)  (0.035) (0.026) 
  GSA 1.128**  0.577** -0.437** 
   (0.059)  (0.026) (0.017) 
  HHS -0.356**  -0.185** 0.145** 
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Unconditional 
Fixed Effects Logit 
Conditional Fixed 
Effects Logit 
Unconditional 
Fixed Effects 
Probit 
Unconditional 
Fixed Effects 
Gompit 
  (Clustered SEs) (Clustered SEs) (Clustered SEs) (Clustered SEs) 
   (0.018)  (0.011) (0.010) 
  HUD 0.800**  0.408** -0.306** 
   (0.051)  (0.021) (0.012) 
  IMLS 1.140**  0.578** -0.402** 
   (0.061)  (0.027) (0.022) 
  NARA -0.174*  -0.057 0.024 
   (0.085)  (0.039) (0.025) 
  NASA 0.087  0.007 0.021 
   (0.069)  (0.035) (0.028) 
  NSF 0.731**  0.452** -0.405** 
   (0.089)  (0.034) (0.028) 
  OFHEO -0.238**  -0.141** 0.121** 
   (0.087)  (0.048) (0.038) 
  OGE 0.427**  0.220** -0.165** 
   (0.056)  (0.023) (0.013) 
  OPM -0.092  -0.053 0.049* 
   (0.069)  (0.033) (0.022) 
  RRB 2.368**  1.294** -1.098** 
   (0.046)  (0.018) (0.014) 
  SBA 0.366**  0.185** -0.140** 
   (0.040)  (0.018) (0.011) 
  SSA 0.507**  0.242** -0.167** 
   (0.077)  (0.037) (0.026) 
  STATE -0.021  -0.008 0.006 
   (0.100)  (0.047) (0.031) 
  VA -0.209**  -0.114** 0.095** 
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Unconditional 
Fixed Effects Logit 
Conditional Fixed 
Effects Logit 
Unconditional 
Fixed Effects 
Probit 
Unconditional 
Fixed Effects 
Gompit 
  (Clustered SEs) (Clustered SEs) (Clustered SEs) (Clustered SEs) 
 (0.070)  (0.033) (0.024) 
Constant -2.385**  -1.356** 0.878** 
 (0.159)  (0.074) (0.050) 
Observations 6202 6202 6202 6202 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
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Table 4A.3.  Unconditional Fixed Effects Logit Model Estimating the Probability that a 
Regulation in Rejected (Clustered SEs) 
 
  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
Statutory Deadline -0.668** -3.2% 
 (0.192)  
Judicial Deadline -1.099** -4.3% 
 (0.120)  
Final Stage -0.391** -2.4% 
 (0.082)  
Economically Significant 0.261 1.7% 
 (0.205)  
Republican President 0.048 0.3% 
 (0.207)  
Congress Split 0.350* 2.3% 
 (0.173)  
Congress United -0.411** -2.4% 
 (0.155)  
Last 3 Months of Administration 0.452 3.2% 
 (0.336)  
First 3 Months of New Administration 3.090** 51.7% 
 (0.279)  
Agency (USDA omitted)   
  AID 1.316** 13.7% 
   (0.071)  
  ATBCB 0.073 0.5% 
   (0.073)  
  DHS -0.608** -2.8% 
   (0.142)  
  DOC 0.022 0.1% 
   (0.037)  
  DOD 0.679** 5.3% 
   (0.052)  
  DOE -1.004** -3.9% 
   (0.058)  
  DOI -0.333** -1.7% 
   (0.025)  
  DOJ 0.352** 2.4% 
   (0.068)  
  DOL -0.248** -1.3% 
   (0.062)  
  DOT 0.051* 0.3% 
   (0.024)  
  ED 0.078 0.5% 
   (0.065)  
  EPA -0.069* -0.4% 
   (0.028)  
  FAR -0.117 -0.7% 
   (0.062)  
  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
  FEMA 0.621** 4.8% 
   (0.057)  
  GSA 1.128** 10.8% 
   (0.059)  
  HHS -0.356** -1.9% 
   (0.018)  
  HUD 0.800** 6.4% 
   (0.051)  
  IMLS 1.140** 11.1% 
   (0.061)  
  NARA -0.174* -1.0% 
   (0.085)  
  NASA 0.087 0.5% 
   (0.069)  
  NSF 0.731** 6.0% 
   (0.089)  
  OFHEO -0.238** -1.3% 
   (0.087)  
  OGE 0.427** 3.0% 
   (0.056)  
  OPM -0.092 -0.5% 
   (0.069)  
  RRB 2.368** 35.4% 
   (0.046)  
  SBA 0.366** 2.5% 
   (0.040)  
  SSA 0.507** 3.7% 
   (0.077)  
  STATE -0.021 -0.1% 
   (0.100)  
  VA -0.209** -1.1% 
 (0.070)  
Constant -2.385**  
   
Observations 6202   
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table 4A.4.  Unconditional Fixed Effects Logit Model Estimating the Probability that a 
Regulation in Rejected including Interaction between Deadlines and Economically 
Significant (Clustered SEs) 
 
  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
Statutory Deadline -0.728** -3.4% 
 (0.196)  
Judicial Deadline -1.585** -5.3% 
 (0.188)  
Final Stage -0.389** -2.3% 
 (0.083)  
Economically Significant 0.179 1.1% 
 (0.176)  
Republican President 0.047 0.3% 
 (0.210)  
Congress Split 0.354* 2.3% 
 (0.174)  
Congress United -0.412** -2.4% 
 (0.154)  
Last 3 Months of Administration 0.453 3.2% 
 (0.336)  
First 3 Months of New Administration 3.119** 52.3% 
 (0.288)  
Statutory*Economically Significant 0.225 1.2% 
 (0.553)  
Judicial*Economically Significant 1.546** 15.7% 
 (0.282)  
Agency (USDA omitted)   
  AID 1.302** 13.4% 
   (0.062)  
  ATBCB 0.076 0.5% 
   (0.085)  
  DHS -0.607** -2.8% 
   (0.143)  
  DOC 0.011 0.1% 
   (0.037)  
  DOD 0.676** 5.3% 
   (0.050)  
  DOE -1.017** -3.9% 
   (0.096)  
  DOI -0.265** -1.4% 
   (0.043)  
  DOJ 0.342** 2.3% 
   (0.063)  
  DOL -0.255** -1.3% 
   (0.063)  
  DOT 0.042 0.3% 
   (0.023)  
  ED 0.072 0.4% 
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  Estimate 
Percent 
Change 
   (0.062)  
  EPA -0.098** -0.5% 
   (0.026)  
  FAR -0.113 -0.6% 
   (0.058)  
  FEMA 0.627** 4.8% 
   (0.054)  
  GSA 1.119** 10.5% 
   (0.058)  
  HHS -0.362** -1.9% 
   (0.022)  
  HUD 0.791** 6.3% 
   (0.046)  
  IMLS 1.122** 10.7% 
   (0.053)  
  NARA -0.189* -1.0% 
   (0.074)  
  NASA 0.071 0.4% 
   (0.062)  
  NSF 0.719** 5.8% 
   (0.084)  
  OFHEO -0.258** -1.3% 
   (0.075)  
  OGE 0.413** 2.9% 
   (0.049)  
  OPM -0.107 -0.6% 
   (0.060)  
  RRB 2.362** 35.0% 
   (0.044)  
  SBA 0.363** 2.5% 
   (0.038)  
  SSA 0.504** 3.6% 
   (0.074)  
  STATE -0.028 -0.2% 
   (0.096)  
  VA -0.228** -1.2% 
 (0.065)  
Constant -2.371**  
 (0.158)  
Observations 6202   
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table 4A.5.  Division of Agencies and Main Agencies into Policy Areas 
 
Main Agency Sub-Agency Policy Area 
Small Business Administration No sub-agencies designated Macroeconomics 
Department of Education Office for Civil Rights Civil Rights/Liberties 
Department of Education Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services Civil Rights/Liberties 
Office of Government Ethics No sub-agencies designated Civil Rights/Liberties 
Department of Health and Human Services Includes all regulations without specific sub-agency designated Health 
Department of Health and Human Services Administration for Children and Families Health 
Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Health 
Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Health 
Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration Health 
Department of Health and Human Services Health Resources and Services Administration Health 
Department of Health and Human Services National Institutes of Health Health 
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Public Health and Science Health 
Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Secretary Health 
Department of Health and Human Services Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Health 
Department of Agriculture Includes all regulations without specific sub-agency designated Agriculture 
Department of Agriculture Agricultural Marketing Service Agriculture 
Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Agriculture 
Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency Agriculture 
Department of Agriculture Federal Crop Insurance Corporation Agriculture 
Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service Agriculture 
Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service Agriculture 
Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service Agriculture 
Department of Agriculture Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration Agriculture 
Department of Agriculture Office of General Counsel Agriculture 
Department of Agriculture Office of the Secretary Agriculture 
Department of Agriculture Rural Business-Cooperative Service Agriculture 
Department of Homeland Security Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Labor, Employment, and 
Immigration 
Department of Labor Includes all regulations without specific sub-agency designated 
Labor, Employment, and 
Immigration 
Department of Labor Employee Benefits Security Administration 
Labor, Employment, and 
Immigration 
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Main Agency Sub-Agency Policy Area 
Department of Labor Employment Standards Administration 
Labor, Employment, and 
Immigration 
Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration 
Labor, Employment, and 
Immigration 
Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration 
Labor, Employment, and 
Immigration 
Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
Labor, Employment, and 
Immigration 
Department of Labor 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and 
Management 
Labor, Employment, and 
Immigration 
Department of Labor 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Veterans' Employment 
and Training 
Labor, Employment, and 
Immigration 
Department of Labor Office of the Secretary 
Labor, Employment, and 
Immigration 
Department of Education Includes all regulations without specific sub-agency designated Education 
Department of Education Office of Elementary and Secondary Education Education 
Department of Education Office of Innovation and Improvement Education 
Department of Education Office of the Chief Financial Officer Education 
Department of Agriculture Natural Resources Conservation Service Environment 
Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Environment 
Department of the Interior United States Fish and Wildlife Service Environment 
Environmental Protection Agency Includes all regulations without specific sub-agency designated Environment 
Environmental Protection Agency Air and Radiation Environment 
Environmental Protection Agency Office of Environmental Information Environment 
Environmental Protection Agency Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances Environment 
Environmental Protection Agency Regional Office Seattle Environment 
Environmental Protection Agency Solid Waste and Emergency Response Environment 
Environmental Protection Agency Water Environment 
Department of Agriculture Rural Utilities Service Energy 
Department of Energy Includes all regulations without specific sub-agency designated Energy 
Department of Energy Departmental and Others Energy 
Department of Energy Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Energy 
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance 
Board No sub-agencies designated Transportation 
Department of Transportation Includes all regulations without specific sub-agency designated Transportation 
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Main Agency Sub-Agency Policy Area 
Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration Transportation 
Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration Transportation 
Department of Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Transportation 
Department of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration Transportation 
Department of Transportation Maritime Administration Transportation 
Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Transportation 
Department of Transportation Office of the Secretary Transportation 
Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration Transportation 
Department of Homeland Security Bureau of Customs and Border Protection Law, Crime, and Family 
Department of Homeland Security Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Law, Crime, and Family 
Department of Homeland Security 
Directorate of Border and Transportation Security 
(Undersecretary) Law, Crime, and Family 
Department of Justice Includes all regulations without specific sub-agency designated Law, Crime, and Family 
Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Law, Crime, and Family 
Department of Justice Bureau of Prisons Law, Crime, and Family 
Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration Law, Crime, and Family 
Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Law, Crime, and Family 
Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Law, Crime, and Family 
Department of Justice Legal Activities Law, Crime, and Family 
Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Law, Crime, and Family 
Institute of Museum and Library Services No sub-agencies designated Social Welfare 
Railroad Retirement Board No sub-agencies designated Social Welfare 
Social Security Administration No sub-agencies designated Social Welfare 
Department of Agriculture Rural Housing Service 
Housing and Community 
Development 
Department of Housing and Urban Development Includes all regulations without specific sub-agency designated 
Housing and Community 
Development 
Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Community Planning and Development 
Housing and Community 
Development 
Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity 
Housing and Community 
Development 
Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Housing 
Housing and Community 
Development 
Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Public and Indian Housing 
Housing and Community 
Development 
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Main Agency Sub-Agency Policy Area 
Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of the Secretary 
Housing and Community 
Development 
Department of Commerce Includes all regulations without specific sub-agency designated Banking and Commerce 
Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security Banking and Commerce 
Department of Commerce Economic Development Administration Banking and Commerce 
Department of Commerce International Trade Administration Foreign Trade 
Department of Commerce Patent and Trademark Office Banking and Commerce 
Department of Housing and Urban Development Government National Mortgage Association Banking and Commerce 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight No sub-agencies designated Banking and Commerce 
Department of Defense Includes all regulations without specific sub-agency designated Defense 
Department of Defense Defense Acquisition Regulations Council Defense 
Department of Defense Department of the Army Defense 
Department of Defense Office of Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs Defense 
Department of Defense Office of the Secretary Defense 
Department of Energy Defense and Security Affairs Defense 
Department of Homeland Security Includes all regulations without specific sub-agency designated Defense 
Department of Homeland Security 
Directorate for Emergency Preparedness and Response 
(Undersecretary) Defense 
Department of Homeland Security Office of the Secretary Defense 
Department of Homeland Security Transportation Security Administration Defense 
Department of Homeland Security U.S. Coast Guard Defense 
Department of Veterans Affairs No sub-agencies designated Defense 
Federal Emergency Management Agency No sub-agencies designated Defense 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration No sub-agencies designated Science and Technology 
National Science Foundation No sub-agencies designated Science and Technology 
Agency for International Development No sub-agencies designated International Affairs and Aid 
Department of State No sub-agencies designated International Affairs and Aid 
DOD/GSA/NASA (FAR) No sub-agencies designated Government Operations 
General Services Administration No sub-agencies designated Government Operations 
National Archives and Records Administration No sub-agencies designated Government Operations 
Office of Personnel Management No sub-agencies designated Government Operations 
Department of Agriculture Forest Service Public Lands and Water 
Department of the Interior Includes all regulations without specific sub-agency designated Public Lands and Water 
Department of the Interior Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget Public Lands and Water 
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Main Agency Sub-Agency Policy Area 
Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs Public Lands and Water 
Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management Public Lands and Water 
Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation Public Lands and Water 
Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service Public Lands and Water 
Department of the Interior National Park Service Public Lands and Water 
Department of the Interior Office of Hearings and Appeals Public Lands and Water 
Department of the Interior Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement Public Lands and Water 
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